Quotations as Pictures

Josef Stern

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Josef Stern

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לנטע, אריה, איה, רענן, עופרי, מעין, וגבריאל

For Neta, Aria, Aya, Ra'anan, Ofri, Ma'ayan, and Gavri'el

ואמר רבי אלעזר אמר רבי חנינא כל האומר דבר בשם אומרו מביא גאולה לעולם. שנאמר: ותאמר אסתר למלך בשם מרדכי. (מגילה טו. מ. אבות ו, ו)

And R. El'azar said: "R. Hanina' said: 'One who reports a statement in the name of the one who first said it brings redemption to the world; for it is said: "And Esther reported it to the King in Mordecai's name" (Esther 2, 22)'" (BT *Megillah* 15a; M. *Avot* 6)

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1

1 Great Moments in the History of the Inverted Commas I: Quoting 5
2 Great Moments in the History of the Inverted Commas II: Mentioning 21
3 Great Moments in the History of the Inverted Commas III: Mixed (or Subsentential) Quotation 39
4 Three Themes from Pictures 49
5 Quotations as Pictures I: Representational Content 63
6 Quotations as Pictures II: Exemplificational Content 77
7 Other Explananda for a Theory of Quotation 93
8 What Do the Inverted Commas Do? 109
9 Scare Quotes and the Nonliteral Use of the Inverted Commas 131
10 Quotations in Pictures 143

Notes 175
References 213
Index 227

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for permission to use his images. For valuable comments on chapter 10, I also want to thank Stephanie Brooks, a prominent conceptual artist and my collaborator on the artworks *Philosophy Specials* I, II, and III, now in the permanent collection of the Department of Philosophy at Chicago. I also want to express my gratitude to Anne Walters Robertson, Dean of the Division of Humanities at Chicago, for her encouragement and a subvention to cover costs of production. Finally, I want to thank Marc Lowenthal (for his generous patience waiting for me to let go); Philip Laughlin, the current editor for philosophy and linguistics at the MIT Press; Philip's assistant Alex Hoopes; and my copy editor Judy Feldmann for seeing the manuscript through publication.

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Aharon, Aharon Haviv, last and most precious, my greatest debt is to my partner in life, Cheryl Newman, who has put up with me for all these years, whose patience has never ceased (even while I keep saying: "One more

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minute"), and whose love I can't quote because it is more than I can put into words.

The last chapter was composed under the dark shadow of Covid-19, though, ironically, if not for the forced isolation of the pandemic, it may never have seen the light of day. As grandparents on whom Covid took its toll, Cheryl and I dedicate this book to our grandchildren. According to the rabbis (PT *Shabbat* 1.1, 3a), whoever hears their grandchildren quote a passage from the Torah should imagine themselves hearing it at Mount Sinai in the presence of its original speaker. According to that statement, quotation reenacts an utterance in the past. But in the words of the Talmud cited in the dedication, quotation looks forward: may it be a harbinger of hope and future redemption for the world.

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Introduction

Inverted commas, single or double, usually raised above the print line—commonly called 'quotation marks'—are currently used for two purposes.[1] Both mark the use of language to talk about language, but one is to quote someone's utterance or inscription, the other to mention words. A rough-and-ready way to distinguish the two uses might be as follows: *Quotation* (e.g., 'Aristotle said: "Plato was a great philosopher"') (i) involves a "reporting frame" consisting of a singular term for the subject and a verb of saying ('said' or thicker verbs, e.g., 'call,' scream,' 'ask,' 'warn,' 'promise,' 'threaten,' etc.) (ii) complemented by an independent complete sentence (iii) enclosed in inverted commas. *Mention* (e.g., "'Aristotle' has nine letters") (i) need involve no subject or verb of saying (ii) and can include individual words or phrases of any syntactic category (as well as a nonword strings of letters and nonconstituent phrases) (iii) enclosed in inverted commas (iv) in argument or referential position.[2] The two practices, quoting and mentioning, predate the invention of the marks. However, the fact that both current practices, in written language, employ the superficially identical marks has tended to efface the difference between them. Philosophers nowadays label the use of the inverted commas to *mention* words 'pure *quotation*,' which they oppose to '*direct* quotation'—the paradigm of the practice of quotation—which in turn is contrasted with *indirect* quotation that employs no inverted commas. More perniciously, most philosophical theories of "quotation" limit themselves to the analysis of mention, either because they assume that its best explanation will carry over to (direct) quotation or because they assimilate direct to pure quotation: the independent sentence enclosed in inverted commas is taken to be a referring term in an argument or object position that mentions the enclosed sentence.[3] Next, and not surprisingly

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given all the progress we have made over the last century in the theory of reference, mention in turn is analyzed on the model of either names, definite descriptions, or demonstratives. As a result, the complement declarative sentence (enclosed by the inverted commas) in quotation-sentences turns out to be one or another kind of singular term. This move is not entirely unjustified, and it would be wonderful to arrive at a "unified theory of quotation and mentioning" (cf. C&L 1997). However, the present state of theorizing has tended to distort the very phenomenon of quotation as distinct from mentioning.[4]

In this monograph, I will focus on quotation rather than mentioning. In order to establish that the two are in fact distinct, I begin with genealogies of the two practices and their respective uses of inverted commas. Philosophers of language generally, and correctly, eschew genetic *explanations*, but I review the history in order to enable us, not to explain, but (in Duhem's words) to "save" or demarcate the different phenomena to be explained and to identify their specific semantic problems.[5] After putting the practice of quotation into sharper focus, I will turn to what I propose is the key to its understanding: the idea that quotations are pictures or have a pictorial character.

W. V. O. Quine, to the best of my knowledge, was the first to mention a connection between quotations and pictures: "A quotation is . . . a hieroglyph; it designates its object . . . by picturing it" (Quine 1951, 26). His digression through hieroglyphs, however, is obscure—and, for Quine, surprising. Hieroglyphs employ images, but they do not pictorially represent the things of which they are hieroglyphs. They are minimal units (graphemes) in a specific kind of writing system that conventionally represent either words, letters, or (groups of) sounds that, in turn, refer to external objects. The hieroglyphs themselves do not refer to the objects by picturing them. Dropping the detour through hieroglyphs, we shall directly connect quotations and pictures. A second misleading feature of Quine's own statement is that he uses the term 'quotation' to mean mention rather than quotation proper, and we shall argue that mentioning need not involve picturing, unlike quotation.

Nonetheless, Quine's quotation-picture analogy has been very influential. After lying fallow for a number of years, it resurfaced in Donald Davidson's seminal 1979 paper "Quotation": "a quotation somehow pictures what it is about" (Davidson 1984b, 82). Since then it has become a common motif in the quotation/mentioning literature. Herman Cappelen

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and Ernie Lepore (henceforth C&L) 2007 contrast the "arbitrary" relation between other linguistic expressions and their values with the "intimate" relation—they call it "proximity"—between a quotation and its semantic value that is "immediately striking . . . [but] difficult to make precise and non-metaphorical."[6] Others see in pictures the distinctive power of quotation that enables us to "go from knowing the quotation of any expression to knowing the expression itself."[7] Francois Recanati makes the quotation–picture analogy central to his theory of open quotation but refrains from explaining it.[8] More than any other potential *explanans*, authors fall back on *resemblance* between the quoting expression (e.g., "*e*") and the quoted one (e.g., '*e*')—assuming, uncritically, that it is resemblance that explains pictorial representation or depiction.[9] However, as a quick look at the literature on pictures over the past seventy years reveals, resemblance theories of pictorial representation have taken more than their share of critical beating. In recent years, resemblance has made a comeback, but we now know that the notion cannot be taken at face value. And even if resemblance can be made to work for pictures, it is not obvious how to extend it to quotation.

A primary aim of this monograph is to explore the quotation–picture analogy, but I shall focus on three different pictorial characteristics—not resemblance—to flesh out the connection. Following Nelson Goodman and more recent work by John Kulvicki, I shall focus on features that characterize pictures as elements of symbol systems and on their systemic interrelations within such systems. Drawing on these features, we can explain the "dual-reference" of quotations, their "opacity," and their iterability, but I should add from the start that the quotation–picture analogy is not a panacea that explains all phenomena associated with the practice of quotation, especially those related to its compositional semantic structure. It is indeed this perplexing interaction between the semantics and the pictoriality of quotation that makes it an interesting phenomenon.

My turn to pictures also bears on another issue central to contemporary debates over the question of whether quotation is a semantic or pragmatic phenomenon: whether its inverted commas are truth-conditionally relevant or nothing more than a heuristic device, a signal of quotational use of language, or a trigger for presuppositions, conventional implications, or other not-truth-relevant conditions. In all of these cases, quotation is a broadly linguistic phenomenon, whether semantic or pragmatic. According to the story I shall tell, quotation is a phenomenon where language, or

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linguistic competence, meets a nonlinguistic symbolic or representational ability, the pictorial. Our understanding of a quotation is neither a product exclusively of our semantic competence or language faculty—even in a broad sense that would include linguistic pragmatics—nor is it solely a matter of nonlinguistic symbolic skills like the pictorial; instead, it is a combination of features drawn from these two different symbolic or representational systems that accounts for the exceptional, and apparently idiosyncratic, behavior of quotation.[10]

Chapters 1 and 2 lay out the prehistories of the inverted commas employed in quotation and mentioning in order to establish the independence of these practices. Once I have accomplished that, I put aside the question of how best to explain mentioning, although I will continue to raise it as a foil to quotation.[11] In chapter 3 I turn to the last moment in my history, which focuses on Donald Davidson's seminal paper "Quotation" (1984b) that introduced a body of hitherto unexamined data and, in turn, will enable us to articulate the semantic problem posed by quotation. Chapter 4 sketches three themes in the theory of pictures, which, in chapters 5–8, I apply to quotation. Although I argue that the inverted commas do no work in determining truth conditions, on my view (unlike that of use theories of quotation) they do more than simply heuristically signal *that* an expression is being used quotationally on an occasion. Chapter 9 argues that their literal use for the purpose of quotational attribution empowers us to use them in nonliteral or figurative ways, for example, to express irony and sarcasm, uses that are often bracketed in the literature as the peripheral phenomenon of scare quotation.[12] Finally, in the last chapter I turn to the possibility of quotation *in* pictures: can one picture quote (as opposed to mention) another? That question, as well as our earlier question concerning the interplay between the linguistic and pictorial in the interpretation of linguistic quotations, raises the question to what extent our diverse symbolic skills, linguistic and nonlinguistic, are independent of one another.

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1 Great Moments in the History of the Inverted Commas I: Quotation

Our present practice of quotation is the product of a number of historical trajectories.[1] As I indicated in the introduction, paradigm examples of quotation employ sentences of direct discourse, which is typically contrasted with indirect discourse. Syntactically, the main difference between them is that direct discourse contains an independent main clause, for example, a declarative sentence, which, in written language, is enclosed in inverted commas; while indirect discourse contains an embedded (tensed or infinitival) complement clause governed by the complementizer 'that' and no inverted commas. A second, semantic difference between them turns on the behavior of their tenses, pronouns, demonstratives, and indexicals. In informal terms, direct discourse sentences express their content using deictically sensitive terms from the perspective, or as if they were uttered in the context, of the subject of the sentence. Indirect discourse chooses its deictically sensitive terms from the perspective of the present speaker of the utterance.[2] Finally, one often hears that direct discourse is distinguished from indirect discourse by the prescription that the former requires that the words within the inverted commas be "the exact words of the person being quoted," while indirect discourse obeys no such "verbatim requirement" (VR) so long as the reported *content* is the same as the original.[3]

Anthropological linguists have gathered considerable evidence that the direct/indirect discourse distinction, characterized in these terms, is not an unequivocal linguistic marker of quotation proper, that is, the attribution of interpreted words (especially deictic terms) to a particular subject. Some non-Western languages do not draw the direct/indirect distinction and employ different "logophoric" strategies to represent the speech of others, many of them intermediate between direct and indirect discourse (e.g., where 'I' can be used to refer to either the actual or reported speaker).[4] As

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late as the eighteenth century, authors also sometimes used inverted commas to mark indirect as well as direct discourse, and the behavior of indexicals in direct and indirect discourse is also more complicated and varied than the simple picture we have sketched (as we will see below). Nonetheless, some philosophers persist in demarcating the specific practice of quotation (though usually not distinguished from mentioning) by the essential presence of the inverted commas (see C&L 2007, 13, 38–39). This raises the question: When and how did the inverted commas originate as part of the practice of quotation? Are they the same inverted commas we find in mentioning? And how did the practice of quotation—the exact attribution of particular interpreted words to a particular subject—come about? As we shall argue, these characteristics of quotation are historical developments that are primarily technological, legal, and literary in origin rather than linguistic or semantic. However, against their background, we can identify what is truly of semantic interest about quotation. In this chapter, I trace three related but different trajectories.

I. From the Margin into the Text

Manuscripts in antiquity and the Middle Ages were densely populated by *notae*, graphic signs, such as the asterisk, a dagger, the crux, the ivy leaf (*hedera*), dots, crosses, slashes, and swirls of all sizes and combinations.[5] These graphic signs served a variety of functions: to signal textual criticism, passages in need of emendation or correction, omissions or missing lines, the beginning and end of a passage, passages of interest to which the reader should pay attention, and the citation of passages from Scripture and other authoritative texts. In general, there was no unique dedicated sign for each role but a variety, depending on country, conventions, scribal or copying practices, and the culture of reading. And for the particular function of citation, formatting and other devices like a different size, style, italics, underlining, capital letters, or color of font (especially red ink, rubrication) were also used (in addition to verbal parentheticals such as "He spoke, saying" or "In the words of the prophet, saying").[6]

Among these methods for marking citation, the predominant way in the fourth and fifth centuries (and probably earlier, although we lack definite evidence) was indentation of the cited passage. Some of our earliest examples are New Testament passages that cite verses attributed to Old

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Testament prophets that are fulfilled by Christ. Consider, for example, Matthew 21: 4–5:

> [1]As they approached Jerusalem and came to Bethphage on the Mount of Olives, Jesus sent two disciples,
>
> [2]saying to them, Go to the village ahead of you, and at once you will find a donkey tied there, with her colt by her. Untie them and bring them to me.
>
> [3]If anyone says anything to you, tell him that the Lord needs them, and he will send them right away.
>
> [4]This took place to fulfill what was spoken through the prophet:
> [5]Say to the Daughter of Zion, See, your king comes to you, gentle and riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a donkey.

The example of a citation or, as we would say nowadays, quotation occurs in vv. 4–5. Other verses, such as vv. 2–3, contain direct discourse and, in v. 3, within the discourse clause an embedded indirect discourse sentence ('tell him that the Lord needs them and he will send them right away')—although in other translations we find direct discourse. In either case, the scribes or copyists recognized a clear difference between these other direct and indirect discourse statements and the citation in v. 5. In Greek manuscripts, such as the fifth-century Codex Bezae, v. 5 is centered or indented on the page to set it apart from the rest of the text and it is written in a different and larger font.[7] These devices direct the reader's attention to the verse. This is one sense in which the author can be said to be referring (via the layout) to the verse, although the notion of reference at work here is neither naming, describing, nor demonstrating. This is also not yet an example of quotation in our contemporary sense—which involves attribution to an individual subject—but it is the first step in the historical development that led to this outcome.

Originally, indentation served as the most widely used means to mark citations of verses from Scripture (Parkes 1993, 55; Steinova 2018, 136, 2019). However, by the sixth century, it was completely displaced by *notae* or annotational citation signs inserted in the margin, one of which is now considered the ancestor of our present-day inverted commas: the '*diple*' (literally: 'double'), which has the form of a single or double wedge, arrowhead, or the contemporary greater-than symbol (>, >>). The diple was employed in antiquity, especially in the Alexandrian tradition, as early as the second century. Placed in the outer (usually left-hand) margin, it first served as an attention sign: to

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draw readers' attention to any noteworthy item in the text, for example that an occurrence of 'Olympus' refers to Mount Olympus rather than the heavenly Olympus.[8] Likewise, in the third century, Diogenes Laertius writes that "the *diple* (>) calls attention to doctrines and opinions characteristic of Plato" (Diogenes and Hicks 1925, III 65–66, 334–335; cited in Steinova 2016, 319). However, beginning in the third century, in Christian contexts, the diple was adopted first to mark exclusively citations of Scripture, then over time passages from the Church fathers, and from at least the sixth century passages by pagan authors like Virgil and Cicero.

While the diple replaced indentation by the sixth century, by the beginning of the ninth century in the Latin West its calligraphic wedge-like graphic shape (which required two strokes of the pen of the copyist) was itself replaced by a single cursive stroke that resembles the letter 'S' (*S*, *SS*) or, even more simply, by the right-parenthesis sign ')' as the sign for citation.[9] During the sixth and seventh centuries, the use of this cursive "S-shaped flourish" was restricted to citations of Scripture. To cite one notable testimony, Isidore of Seville (seventh c.) singles it out as the primary device used by contemporary scribes "in the books of the churchmen to separate or to make clear the citations of Sacred Scriptures" (Isidore and Barney 2006, I.21.13, 51, cited in Steinova 2016, 200)[10] But by the ninth century its use had significantly expanded to include nonscriptural and non-Christian texts including *sententiae* (brief moral or wisdom statements, proverbs, maxims) and gnomic (wise but mysterious) utterances by pagan Classical authors.

It should be emphasized that neither the calligraphic *diple*, the greater-than sign, nor the cursive S-shaped flourish was ever the only *notae* used for marking quotation, even while each dominated the scene. As figure 1.1 shows, other citation- or quotation-signs included an obelus-shaped sign (e.g., the division-like sign ÷, or a horizontal line flanked by two vertical lines |—|, or >—<), or the insular diple (a dot followed by the greater-than sign) as well as a bidirectional arrowhead ; the lower case 'll'; single and double inverted commas and combinations of commas and periods; zigzag shapes; guillemets (angle quotes << . . . >>); the "gnomic" pointing finger; and asterisks. Which among these various graphic signs was used on a given occasion was typically decided by the scribe, copyist, reader, or (later) the printer, depending on the amount of labor and cost it entailed (see McGurk 1961; Mitchell 1983). From a functional point of view, there was never anything privileged about the calligraphic or cursive *diple*.

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

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

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

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

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

(e)

Figure 1.1

Major methods of quotation-marking: (a) Indentation (Paris, BnF. Lat. 8907, fol. 15v). (b) Diple (Paris, BnF, n.a.l 1592 fol.lv). (c) S-shaped cursive diple (Paris, BnF. Lat.11627, fol 34v). (d) Insular quotation-sign (Paris, BnF. Lat.12292, fol. Cr). (e) Obelus-shaped quotation-sign (Paris, BnF. Lat. 12124 (fol. 8v).

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Before turning to the next stage in this history—the impact of the printing press—I want to briefly explain (as best I can, given present knowledge) why in the sixth century the *notae* or graphic signs, like the diple and S-shaped flourish, replaced indentation as the primary way of marking quotation. The most plausible account is that this shift corresponds to changes that occurred in the site of manuscript or book production, in the identities of those who produced these marks of citation, and in their corresponding reading cultures.[11] One obvious but important difference between indentation and *notae* concerns the questions of who can enter them and when. Indentation, which is embedded in the manuscript layout, must be inserted by design with preplanning and could only be entered by the scribe or copyist. In contrast, marginal signs like the diple and S-shaped flourish could be entered, not only by the copyist in composing the book, but by readers in the course of their reading. This difference corresponds to a difference in the respective sites where manuscripts and books were produced in the third to fifth centuries and in the sixth and later centuries. Originally manuscripts were composed, commissioned by patrons, by professional copyists in commercial workshops for an educated pagan and then Christian elite (in many ways descendants of the intellectual elite of antiquity). These readers were especially interested in theological and polemical works. Thus citations, primarily of Scripture, were of interest to these readers, not only in order to furnish sources, but more important for their role as justification for doctrinal statements of Christianity and for their use in argumentation as well as polemic.

Beginning in the sixth century, however, the production of books moved from these commercial workshops to monasteries and other ecclesiastical institutions for readers who were no longer necessarily the intellectual elite but by and large monks who read Christian texts and Scripture as spiritual exercises and as part of meditation, *lectio divina*.[12] Although our knowledge of how this reading was performed is limited, there is evidence that it was reading not merely (or even at all) with one's eyes, by sight, but also by pronouncing the words with one's lips (even if only silently or *sotto voce* and to oneself). But in order to correctly recite texts, one would need to know when to pause and the appropriate intonation. For this purpose, readers (and sometimes copyists) would enter annotation signs, *notae*, of all sorts to guide themselves or others in their recitation: when to pause and other aspects of intonation to mark the beginnings and ends of sentences,

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to separate internal constituents, and to mark grammatical structure. The pauses were deliberate and coordinated, both to enable reciters to breathe without distorting the structure and meaning of recited texts and also to impose interpretations on those texts. In particular, citation or quotation marks were entered to mark the necessary pauses and differences of intonation that signal the difference between assertion and citation and thereby signal quotations of authoritative sentences.

In sum, the shift from formatting, like indentation, to *notae* or signs, like the diple, corresponded to differences in where, *by* whom, and *for* whom books and manuscripts were produced and used from the third to ninth centuries. Indentation worked well for a Christian intellectual elite interested in their own theological and religious edification (and for debate), where the citations served as evidence for doctrines; copyists who knew the Bible could provide the sources in a format that made their use as justification easily accessible.[13] However, when reading of Scripture and Christian texts became a religious experience in its own right, in the monasteries, it was readers who often supplied their own directions for reading in the course of their performances—hence, the need for signs like *notae* that could be entered into an already completed text. As we shall see, the quasi-oral character of this second kind of reading will be important as *notae* like the *diple* turn into punctuation marks in the next stage of our history.

Originally, the *diple* and most other *notae*, or graphic signs, were found in the outer (and where there was one column, left) margin outside the actual type or page measure. The first major changes in the location of the marks came with the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century. The earliest known printed book in which there appear signs that may properly be termed what we now call 'quotation marks'—two opening (left) commas in the left-hand margin outside the regular type measure at the beginning of each line in which a quoted passage appears—was Flavius Philostratus's *De Vitis Sophistarum*, printed by Mathias Schurer in 1516 in Strasbourg, Alsace.[14] By the end of the sixteenth century, we regularly find inverted, turned, or twisted comma-shaped quotation marks cut in metal type.[15] Like the earlier *diple* and S-shaped flourish, the inverted commas were used for a variety of purposes: to mark scriptural citations, to draw attention to the wisdom of *sententiae* and gnomic utterances, and sometimes simply to mark emphasis. At first these marks were evidently added after the page was set up because their alignment varies greatly. But because

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of the difficulties, labor, and cost involved in adding these kinds of marginal marks *after* the main print block was set, printers soon began to experiment with other ways to signal quotation, among them the indentation of the quotation with the comma-like mark *within* the print measure, as in:

xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
“ xxxxx
“ xxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx

Notice that the original practice was to mark each line of the quotation in the left-hand margin. This, however, was inadequate for two reasons. First, it could not indicate exactly where a quotation began or ended if it was in the middle of a line; that demanded an additional mark (a dot or dash) placed at the beginning and end of the actual quotation. Second, toward the end of the 1500s, the *diple* (both calligraphic and cursive) and inverted commas began to be used, though not consistently, to indicate all direct discourse, especially in works of fiction, a use that exploded later in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For both of these reasons, the next change in the practice of quotation came with the migration of the marks, now inverted commas, *into* the line of type at the exact beginning and end of the citation or quotation (sometimes using different signs for opening and closing the quotation). By the end of the eighteenth century the marginal marks disappeared, leaving only the opening and closing ones marking the beginning and end of the quotation. And once the quotation signs moved from the margin into the text, a distinctive sign—double commas—was no longer necessary, and one comma often sufficed (see Mitchell 1983, 367).[16] Only our indented block quotations minus the marks that once filled the now-empty left-hand indentation survive as witnesses to the earlier practice.[17]

I said earlier that the shift from indentation to signs such as the *diple* and S-shaped flourish also marked a shift in reading practices. The annotation-like *notae* served as guides to pauses of breath and intonation, cues or directions for oral recitation, akin to stage directions or instructions on musical scores. They indicated when and how to pause or to change one’s

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intonation and tone of voice. But with printing, when reading became by sight and silent, the marks moved from being performance-based cues for delivery to indicators of the grammatical and semantic structure of sentences that directly contributed to the reader's (silent) comprehension of the text, both to prevent ambiguous misreading and to enable the author to impose alternative interpretations.[18] That is, the original *notae* or graphic signs evolved into punctuation marks. Punctuation came to serve as a guide to correct reading just as the *notae* and graphic signs, corresponding to the places when one ought to pause, had previously guided

> the oral performance of the written record of the spoken word. . . . Just as pauses had indicated phrasing in oral delivery, which would bring out the meaning of a text, so in manuscripts from the end of the seventh century onwards punctuation came to be used as a signal to the eye of the silent reader, and thus to facilitate the communication of a text. (Parkes 1993, 69)

To conclude this first part of the story, *notae*—from the *diple* and S-shaped flourish to our present-day inverted commas—first served to signal the citation of Scripture and to draw attention to noteworthy truths but over time, like other punctuation marks, they came to function as graphic surrogates, or placeholders, for pauses and intonation in recitation of the text, without which it would be ambiguous and its meaning distorted. This is important to bear in mind precisely because a number of armchair philosophers have argued that the inverted commas are semantically unessential and eliminable, proof of which is their absence in oral speech (see, e.g., Recanati 2001, 2011; Reimer 1996, 2005; Saka 1998, 1999, 2005; Stanton 1999; Washington 1992). In fact, however, the opposite is the case. The reason there are no graphic marks in oral speech is precisely because it retains the actual pauses and intonational patterns specific to quotation. The graphic marks do the work in written speech that the pauses and intonation do in oral speech, without which there would be no recognizable practice of quotation. Hence, just as we cannot eliminate the pauses without losing quotation, we cannot eliminate the inverted commas or other graphic marks.

II. From Common to Private Property

The second trajectory in the history of quotation and the inverted commas *qua* quotation marks tracks their evolving function. The original function of the *diple* and S-shaped flourish was, as I have said, to draw readers'

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attention to especially noteworthy passages and, by the early Middle Ages, to signal the citation of scriptural verses and the words of other canonical Christian thinkers. However, by the mid-sixteenth century, the use by then mainly of inverted commas was extended to quotations of all kinds of authorities such as *sententiae* or wisdom statements, maxims, proverbs, and gnomic utterances, drawn from Homer, Plato, and other classical greats. Nonetheless, not just anything could qualify to be so marked: only words or statements of *authorities*, like God or Plato or Homer, or of an *authoritative* character, like *sententiae* or gnomic utterances. Originally, then, quotation had an elitist character, but one that was also closely connected to universal truths and wisdom, propositions everyone ought to know: theological, moral, or philosophical truths. As wisdom, these truths or wisdom-statements were taken to be "commonplaces," not in the sense of the worn and trite, but in the sense of communal or common knowledge, content that no individual possesses privately, wisdom that belongs to everyone (see De Grazia 1991a,b).[19] Unlike their current use, the marks did *not* originally mean that such and such words with their content were the utterances of one as opposed to another speaker or thinker. Just the opposite: the marks served to draw attention to public property—universal truths—that anyone could appropriate for their knowledge and speech (see De Grazia 1991a,b). These "commonplaces" in turn were often anthologized in "commonplace books," organized by topical classifications of general truths or traditional wisdom, to which speakers could turn for rhetorical and dialectical purposes and for premises in constructing arguments or speeches. The commonplace books also served a pedagogical function: to teach and develop rhetorical and argumentative skills. And, by the first half of the eighteenth century, the commonplace books also began to serve as resources to cultivate and refine critical and stylistic skills and to judge literary "Beauties and Defects," that is, to develop a sense of taste when evaluating authors and critics.

During the second half of the eighteenth century the function of quotation and of quotation marks radically changed—in parallel with a number of other concurrent changes. It is not entirely clear whether and how these multiple changes were causally interrelated, but it is clear that they signaled a new attitude—something in the air—toward authorship, property, and appropriation.

The first major change concerned philosophical conceptions of authors' rights, property, and copyright law. Locke's idea of private property as the

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product of an autonomous agent's mastery over his own self, his abilities, his actions, and his labor was extended from material goods, and in particular from land, to intellectual and literary products. Books and writings were now conceived as property produced by the author's rational powers and intellectual labor, hence, as products one thereby possesses as one's own private domain. In other words, a work now belonged to its author; the work was *their* property. This in turn raises the question: What is "the work"—the words (or word types), the material inscriptions on paper, their abstract content or meaning, or some combination of these? Where this question about the nature of an author's literary property makes a practical difference has to do with one's right to copy or reproduce it. The conception of copyright that derives from Locke's theory of property differs radically from earlier sixteenth-century procedures that governed the right to copy a work that were based on the idea of patents, licenses, or privileges bestowed on printers or publishers by a sovereign. Lockean copyrights, in contrast, belong primarily to the authors themselves who as their natural right have ownership of the property they originated. It follows that if authors legally own their literary compositions, like any other part of their estate, they can also consign their ownership—their copyright, or right to copy—to others, such as booksellers (on this fascinating history, see De Grazia 1991b, 179–194).

The second centered on Shakespeare, the most quoted author in English literature who himself used no quotes or quotation marks! Beginning in the eighteenth century, volumes collecting Shakespeare quotations began to proliferate. Unlike the commonplace books whose aims were to transmit common wisdom and general truths, to teach rhetorical skills, and to cultivate taste and a critical sensibility, these books of quotations reflected a new intention to tell readers what Shakespeare himself thought and felt about various topics, reflecting a more general desire to identify "exactly what was said and by whom" (De Grazia 1991a, 61). Ignoring the fact that what are called 'Shakespeare's' statements are often those of characters in the plays—whose attribution to their author is, to say the least, a problematic leap—these collections gave Shakespeare himself a position and opinion on all major topics of interest (De Grazia 1991a, 62–65). The titles of these works give the flavor of the books: *Beauties of Shakespear* (1784, rep. 1818), *Shakespeare's Genius* (1821), *The Mind of Shakespeare as Exhibited in His Works* (1876) (De Grazia 1991b, 195–202).[20]

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As a consequence of these first two developments, a new kind of anthology emerged that gave "Shakespeare ownership over his words" (De Grazia 1991b, 202). The aim of these collections of quotations was not only to present Shakespeare's opinions on various topics; it was also to create bodies of citations "belonging to" Shakespeare to give him not only a voice of his own but a voice that he owns. This focus on citation was accompanied by a growing concern with accuracy, and with how to determine Shakespeare's exact wording. In the second half of the eighteenth century, we find the publication of various *variorum* editions of Shakespeare: editions containing different versions of the text by various editors as well as notes and commentaries by multiple scholars or critics, showing who made which emendations and clarifications (De Grazia 1991b, 210–214). As correct attribution became increasingly important, so did accurate transcription. And as boundaries of "ownership" over words were demarcated by higher and more carefully constructed walls, their transgression—plagiarism—increasingly became a danger and threat. On the one hand, the Shakespeare anthologies inspired striving authors to imitate the Master; on the other, they could do so only while respecting the boundaries of Shakespeare's private property. One solution to this problem—negotiating imitation while avoiding theft—was the use of quotation marks (De Grazia 1991a, 65–66).[21] And although I cannot prove it, it would be reasonable to conjecture that the current requirement that quotations be verbatim replicas of what the quoted speaker said or wrote—the verbatim requirement (VR)—originated against this general background (cf. Clark and Gerrig 1990, 795). If authors or agents wanted to claim title to what lies between the inverted commas as their own private property, it must be exactly what they wrote or spoke.

Finally, during roughly the same period in which these critical editions of Shakespeare emerged, as people became interested in exactly who said exactly what, and as the changes in copyright law transpired, the function of the inverted commas also changed radically. Now, in the eighteenth century, "quotation marks start being used systematically to mark off the words belonging to another," rather than to draw attention or to refer to noteworthy statements because of their wise content that is the property of all. They become "small scale copyrights, labelling word combinations the property of their originators and protecting them by making acknowledgement the condition for their general use" (De Grazia 1991b, 214).[22] In other words, quotations begin to serve as attributions of words or sentences

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to particular authors and thinkers, attributions that confer ownership of their words on their author or speaker. At the same time, the meaning of the word 'quote' also changes. Originally the verb 'To quote' meant simply *to mark* but in two senses: to make a mark and to attend to it (as in "mark my words").[23] Now it began to mean to cite what someone has said or written. The quoted passages continue to be attention worthy, but what makes them so is not their self-evident wisdom or truth but the fact that they were produced by a particular speaker or writer such as Shakespeare—that these are *his* opinions. So, despite this shift from correct opinion to correct attribution, quotation still carried an elitist connotation: the quoted words were those of an authoritative or important figure, someone worthy of imitation. One did not yet quote the ordinary speech of mortals.

III. The Egalitarian Revolution of Quotation

I mentioned earlier that, already in the late 1500s, the *diple* and S-shaped flourish, along with italics and dashes, were appropriated to mark direct discourse in works of fiction, imitating an earlier use of some of these devices in dramas and plays. With the development of the realistic novel in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, authors turned to inverted commas, by then the canonical marks of quotation, to create the illusion of rapid spoken discourse and mimetic dialogue among the ordinary characters of their fiction. Instead of prefacing each speaker's statement with 'He/she said/replied' followed by a paraphrase of what was said, or long rhetorical speeches, authors began to depict direct, natural intercourse among ordinary speakers without prefaces. To do this, they needed a convention to distinguish new statements for different speakers. Early novels used dashes, alternating lines in plain font and italics, and new lines to differentiate statements of different speakers. But by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this role was standardly being played by inverted commas, that is, quotation marks.[24] And this new role for the inverted commas in turn had a significant backlash effect on the practice of quotation: instead of highlighting the words only of authorities, the quotation marks were now employed for the "speech of ordinary mortals" (Finnegan 2011, 98; see also Mylne 1979). Over time the inverted commas began to play the same role in 'real life,' in journalism as well as in fiction, further expanding the scope of quotables. We might call this the "egalitarian revolution" of quotation.[25]

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This last development did not, however, lead to any relaxation of the requirement that the use of someone else's words be marked by inverted commas or of the VR that what is quoted be an accurate transcription of the exact words of the original speaker or author. Both quotation and quotation marks continue to mark the author's private ownership over the words between the commas. Thus by the end of the eighteenth century grammars explicitly make quotation marks obligatory for direct discourse reports (Mitchell 1983, 377, n. 50). And after the eighteenth century, the omission of quotation marks comes to be an ethical offense as well as a grammatical solecism, violating the rights of another person as well as the rules of grammar. "To quote without acknowledgement, as to print without copyright, is a form of theft, an encroachment on private property" (De Grazia 1991b, 217).

IV. Some Morals of Our First Mini-history

First, from antiquity till today there have been multiple ways to distinguish the various practices that led up to what we nowadays call 'quotation'—from drawing attention to noteworthy words, passages, or wisdom statements, to the citation of Scripture, to the attribution of particular words or statements to individual authors or speakers. The various devices to mark these practices range from pauses and intonation in oral speech to formatting, different fonts and styles of characters, to the *diple*, S-shaped flourish, and our current inverted commas. Which sign was used on a given occasion was often up to the scribe, copyist, printer, or reader, and some signs correspond to national compositorial habits.[26] The present privileged status of the inverted commas above the line within the page measure, opening and closing the particular quoting phrase, was mainly determined by technology—the printing press—rather than by any linguistic, semantic, or speech performance fact. Hence, the inverted commas per se should never be taken to be strictly speaking *necessary* for or constitutive of quotation, and one who tries to demarcate the practice of quotation solely by the presence or absence of inverted commas, or any other single kind of sign, will fail to cut the explanandum at the right joints.[27]

Second, while the practice of quotation preceded the inverted commas and earlier practices involved oral recitation with no graphic marks, it is a philosopher's urban legend that no sign or mark is ever necessary for

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quotation.[28] As Potts (2004b) has shown, quotation in oral speech has a distinctive intonation contour (rise, fall, rise), which is not unrelated to Parkes's (1993) pauses. Both correspond to the graphic signs, for example, inverted commas, of written language, that we now consider to be punctuation. These, in turn, are supplemented by body language—air or finger quotes—and verbal cues such as 'quote-unquote.'[29] In short, no single mark in either writing or speech is per se necessary, but we can drop all marks of quotation only at the risk of losing the distinct phenomenon of quotation and, with it, the different truth-conditions of an utterance construed as an attribution to a subject and not as the speaker's own assertion.

I here introduce the phrase 'q-marks' as a term of art to refer to the full range of devices that are used to mark the practice of quotation, including pauses, intonation, gestures, italics, bold, indentation, rubrication, and a different font as well as the inverted commas—to which I will sometimes refer using their contemporary name, 'quotation marks.' And while we are at it, here is some more terminology: I will call the actual word token(s) within or enclosed by the q-marks: the "quot*ing* word-token" (and, analogously, type), and the source-token uttered by the subject of the quotation sentence: the quot*ed* word-token (and, likewise, its type). And, although this will turn out to be misleading, for now let's call the expression that consists of left q-mark concatenated with quoting word-token concatenated with right q-mark "the quotation expression" (token and type). The complete sentence 'X said: "S"' is the quotation-sentence.

Third, throughout our history, both the quot*ing* and quot*ed* word tokens (and their corresponding types) have meanings—either their ordinary one or the meaning they would have (relative to their respective contexts) without q-marks.[30] Indeed to attribute a quot*ed* statement to a subject by way of a quot*ing* token presupposes that they have either the same or a sufficiently similar meaning. There are special uses of inverted commas, almost always in the service of mentioning, in proof theory and phonetics, whose function is to abstract away from the meanings of the quoting words, in which case the quoting tokens are uninterpreted (see Burge 1978, 144–148). But that is the exception. Contrary to what some philosophers and logicians have said about the effect of enclosing word tokens within inverted commas (again, usually in the context of *mentioning*), the practice of quotation excludes the possibility that either the quot*ing* sentence (token) magically loses its meaning when it is enclosed in q-marks or the quot*ed* thing is just

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a shape or sound with no meaning. When we quote what someone said, we are interested both in the linguistic *form* of the quoted sentence and its *content*. The precise connection between the two is one of the semantic problems of quotation to which we will return.

In sum, we have seen how the current use of inverted commas as quotation marks and the present practice of quotation (including the verbatim requirement) as a mode of attribution of words to an author are the result of multiple developments in different spheres: technology (the printing press and publishing); the law (the notions of private property, reproduction, and copyright; cultures of reading); and literature (new techniques to represent natural dialogue). None of these developments is connected to linguistic knowledge or semantics per se. This history enables us to screen off what is nonlinguistic and nonsemantic while putting into focus those features that are linguistically and semantically significant.

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2 Great Moments in the History of the Inverted Commas II: Mentioning

I. From Mentioning to Mention-Expressions

The practice of *mentioning*, using language to talk about language—using a word to talk either about itself or about another word—is presumably as old as using language to talk about the world.[1] But where and when did the practice of enclosing an expression in inverted commas in order to refer to—let alone name, describe, or demonstrate—the *enclosed* expression originate?

It is in fact possible to say exactly where, who, and when (cf. Johnson 2018, n. 18).

In the introduction to the *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (1893), Gottlob Frege writes:

> The reader may be surprised at the frequent use made of quotation-marks; by their use I distinguish between the cases in which I am speaking of the sign itself, and those in which I am speaking of its denotation. Pedantic as this may appear, I nevertheless hold it to be necessary. It is remarkable how an inaccurate manner of speaking or writing . . . can end in a confusion of thought when once that consciousness has disappeared. But people have succeeded in mistaking numerals for numbers, the name for what is named, the mere auxiliary devices of arithmetic for its real subject matter. Such experiences teach us how necessary it is to place the highest demands on the accuracy of a manner of speaking and writing. And I have taken pains to do justice to these demands, at all events wherever it seemed to me to be of importance. (Frege 1893/1903/1967, 32)

Later, in a letter to Bertrand Russell dated June 29, 1902, Frege writes:

> We must distinguish sharply between a name or sign and its meaning [i.e., referent]. When I use a proper name in a proposition, I am not talking about this proper name but about the object it designates. But it can happen that I want to talk about the name itself; I then enclose it within quotation marks. (Frege 1980, 135)

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In both passages Frege distinguishes between using a sign to speak of its denotation, its ordinary referent, and using a sign to speak of the sign itself. The latter we call 'mention,' the former 'use.' All signs are in principle ambiguous: they can be used to talk either about the objects they designate or about themselves. Frege obviously did not invent the practicing of mentioning, and one can find earlier authors who ad hoc enclose words in inverted commas when they intend to refer to them as words,[2] but in these passages Frege does seem to be the first philosopher/logician to deliberately, systematically, and by design adopt inverted commas as a convention, or rule, to signal mentioning—and the issue here is exclusively mentioning, not quotation.[3] As he emphasizes, Frege introduces this use of the inverted commas to *disambiguate* mention-uses from use-uses of words to avoid the confusion wrought by use/mention ambiguity. The marks themselves do no work in determining a referent, be it object or word. If this story is right, using inverted commas to signal the mentioning function of language is a recent invention of logical engineering.

Discussions in the literature of Frege's view of quotation have, surprisingly, ignored these passages.[4] Instead they focus on Frege's later statements in "On Sense and Reference." Unfortunately, that later discussion lumps together mentioning and quoting, and Frege's main concern is to distinguish direct from indirect discourse:

> If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. One's own words then first designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the words are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary reference. (Frege 1892/1980, 58–59)

> In direct quotation, a sentence designates another sentence, and in indirect quotation a thought. (Frege 1892/1980, 65)

Frege distinguishes (1) "ordinary" uses of words to "speak of" their references (e.g., the city of Chicago in "Chicago has a female mayor"); (2) their use to talk "about" either (i) themselves as words (e.g. "'Chicago' has seven letters") or (ii) their senses, for example, (a) "The sense of 'Aristotle'" in "The sense of 'Aristotle' is the pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great" (Frege 1892/1980, n. B)[5] or (b) the thought (or sentential sense) expressed by the italicized complement sentence in "Frege believed *that Aristotle was a*

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Greek"; and (3) the use of words to quote the words of another in which case the words of the other speaker "have their usual reference. We then have signs of signs." Here what Frege means by "signs of signs" is that the words 'Russell is correct' in the utterance of 'Frege said: "Russell is correct"' designate Frege's (utterance of the) words 'Russell is correct,' which themselves, in Frege's mouth, say something about the person Russell. Words retain their status as signs when they are quoted but the quot*ing* sign acquires a different referent than that of the quot*ed* sign. It is also the same reference relation—something like the name-bearer relation—in all five cases listed under (1)–(3) with the added proviso that a referent can be a sign with a referent of its own.

As in Frege's earlier writings, what does the referring in "On Sense and Reference" is the word or phrase contained between the inverted commas; the marks only flag *that* the enclosed word or phrase is being used to mention another word without playing any role in determining how it does. It is also not clear how the mentioned word is determined in light of Frege's general account of sense and reference, according to which singular terms possess senses that are modes of presentation of their referents such that, for each such sense, there corresponds a unique referent. We can easily grasp what a mode of presentation might be that is associated with a term and determines its ordinary referent, an object, but what would be the mode of presentation associated with the word 'Chicago' (and, remember, what is doing the referring is simply the enclosed word and not the inverted commas) that determines itself (and not the city) as its referent? And how would that mode of presentation differ when it is Frege's word rather than mine that is mentioned? This last case raises an additional question. For indirect discourse (or the propositional attitudes), Frege's well-known view is that the referent (*Bedeutung*) of a word shifts from its ordinary referent (say, an object) to its ordinary sense, which will be the same for all speakers of an ideal language and will not vary with the subject of the sentence. Ignoring other problems with that account (including a potentially exploding hierarchy of senses in iterated reports), the situation is much worse when one quotes the words of another. My use of the (sentential) sign 'Names have sense and reference' will have different referents in utterances of (1) and (2):

(1) Frege said, "Names have sense and reference."

(2) Quine said, "Names have sense and reference."

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In (1), its referent is the quot*ed* token uttered by Frege, in (2) Quine's token. And since each quotation sentence with a different subject will refer to a different quot*ed* token (uttered by its respective subject), albeit of the same type, it follows that each quot*ing* word (type) will be multiply, indeed unboundedly, ambiguous.[6] It is ironic that an account that introduced inverted commas to avoid use/mention ambiguity should now engender unbounded mention/mention ambiguity.[7] However, what is most important for our purposes is that this passage begins the conflation of quotation with mention, both of which are taken to involve the same reference relation to words, no different from the reference relation by which words refer to objects.

Alonzo Church, Frege's greatest twentieth-century disciple, continued Frege's own approach. He calls the use of a word Ø—ordinarily a name that denotes Øs—to name, or denote, itself '*autonymous*,' thereby rendering every word equivocal—though he thinks the "equivocacy . . . is often both convenient and harmless." Like Frege, he adds that where the equivocation leads to "real doubt of the meaning, it may be removed" by prefacing 'word' to the autonymously used word, or by enclosing it in quotation marks, or by writing it in italics. As with Frege, autonymous self-reference is accomplishing entirely by the mentioning word, and the marks simply signal *that* the word is being used autonymously. However, Church then adds, confusingly, that in the latter case, it is not really one and the same word that is used, without marks, to denote its ordinary object referent and, with marks, autonymously. Rather, the marks make the term "a different word from that without the quotation marks—as if the quotation marks were two additional letters in the spelling of the word" (Church 1956, 61–62). Now, rather than each word having two kinds of meanings, ordinary and autonymous, each kind of meaning has its own respective word. But if this is the case, how can Church still maintain that the word refers *autonymously*? The marks, like the first and last letters in any name, are now part of the name itself that does the referring, but what the name refers to does not have marks and therefore is a different word; strictly speaking, this is not *self*-reference.[8]

II. The Proper Name Theory of Mentioning: Tarski versus Quine

Church adopted Frege's idea that what does the referring is the mentioning expression and that the inverted commas are a disambiguating device that signals *that* the word is mentioning rather than being used. But Frege's

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appropriation of inverted commas for mentioning was subsequently taken up by Alfred Tarski, W. V. O. Quine, Peter Geach, Donald Davidson, and various contemporary authors who developed the idea in directions he never envisioned. Indeed, it would be fair to say that, beginning with Tarski, the quotation-expression or, more precisely, the *mention-expression*—namely, a left-inverted comma concatenated with the mentioning expression concatenated with a right-inverted comma—took on a life of its own and, for the most part, only within the worlds of philosophers, logicians, and editors.[9] Outside these circles there is no general convention or rule that mentioning a word requires the use of inverted commas (in contrast to the legal and moral prescriptions governing quotations of others' words, mentioned in chapter 1). There are now at least four different theories (some with multiple contemporary variants) of mentioning or, as it is more popularly called (in my view, misleadingly) by philosophers, *pure quotation:* the proper name theory (associated primarily with Tarski and Quine), the description theory (proposed by Geach), the demonstrative theory (put forth by Davidson), and the disquotational theory (put forward by Richard 1986 and C&L 2007). I will not review and criticize these four theories (or their contemporary variants) in depth; my aim is rather to establish that quotation and mentioning are two disjoint practices and then to go on to analyze quotation independently of mentioning.[10] But I do want to explore two topics central to mentioning that will also be relevant to quotation.

The main difference between Frege's own account and the four post-Fregean theories of mention-expressions is that the later theories give the inverted commas a constitutive role in determining what is mentioned.[11] Tarski, for example, introduces "so-called quotation-mark names" (which we would call 'mention-mark or, for short, m-mark names') in the metalanguage to designate expressions in an object language in the course of constructing a language for his theory of truth. He describes his quotation-mark name as a

> name of a sentence (or of any other, even meaningless, expression) which consists of quotation marks, left- and right-hand, and the expression which lies between them, and which (expression) is the object denoted by the name in question. (Tarski 1933/1983, 156)

What Tarski means by 'expression' here is not the concrete token between the marks but "whole classes of such series which are of like shape with the series given," that is, a type individuated by shape, and he tells us that he calls these theoretical constructions 'names' in order to treat them

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> like single words of a language, and thus like syntactically simple expressions. The single constituents of these names—the quotation marks and the expressions standing between them—fulfill the same function as the letters and complexes of successive letters in single words. Hence, they can possess no independent meaning. Every quotation-mark name is then a constant individual name of a definite expression (the expression enclosed by the quotation marks) and in fact a name of the same nature as the proper name of a man. For example, the name "p" denotes one of the letters of the alphabet. (Tarski 1933/1983, 159–160)[12]

In other words, quotation-mark names (a.k.a. mention-expressions) are names insofar as they are "syntactically simple expressions." Within a grammar for a language, they would belong to the (finite) lexicon on the basis of which the rules of composition, or constructions (to anticipate Quine's term), produce all the syntactically composite or complex expressions of the language. Mirroring the syntax, the semantics directly, that is, stipulatively, assigns meanings (e.g., extensions or referents) to the lexical expressions—which may be what Tarski means by saying that a quotation-mark name is a "constant individual name . . . and . . . a name of the same nature as the proper name of a man"—and, corresponding to each syntactic rule of construction, it provides a semantic rule that assigns to each constructed or composite expression an interpretation (reference, extension) given the meanings of its simple lexical parts and their mode of composition or structure. So, mention-expressions are lexical items assigned interpretations (e.g., referents) directly, or stipulatively, by the language; they are not *syntactically* composite expressions whose meanings are computed as a function of the meanings of their parts and *syntactic* structure. Hence, the marks are not functor-expressions and the expressions are not arguments. However, this leaves it open whether at the *lexical* level the mention-expression might have internal structure and whether it is produced out of other lexical parts.[13] Even in the passage we have cited, Tarski himself is not unequivocal about this possibility: he says both that the marks and enclosed expression "possess no independent meaning" but also that the quotation-mark name names "a definite expression," suggesting that the enclosed word is a semantically autonomous constituent. In short, we might think of mention-expressions as the products of a productive lexical operation that, given a lexical expression 'ø,' produces a new lexical item "ø," which in turn is stipulated by the semantics to have the interpretation that it names 'ø.' Once assigned this interpretation, the mention-expression then functions as simple input to the syntax and semantics, including the

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principle of compositionality. In any composite expression in which it is a component, formed by a syntactic rule of composition, it will be possible to substitute for the mention-expression any co-referential name, hence, any other name of the same expression '*ø*.'

An excellent example of a lexically complex but syntactically and semantically simple Tarskian mention-expression is Mario Gomez-Torrente's (2013, 361–369) account that analyzes a mention-expression as a semantically unstructured name that refers to the type of its "interior" token (i.e., the token contained between the m-marks) according to a conventional presemantic lexical rule known by speakers.[14] This lexical rule is intended to be analogous to the lexical rules that assign (direct) referents to indexicals (e.g., the speaker/agent of the context to each utterance of 'I') and demonstratives (e.g., demonstrated things to 'That' completed by a demonstration or contextually described individuals to Kaplan's 'Dthat['the shortest spy in the universe']) but, unlike the latter two, the rule for mentioning is not context-dependent. Put slightly differently, the descriptive rule (or character) for a mention-expression, like the descriptive rule (or character) for fixing the content (direct referent) of an indexical, fixes its content by the rule that it directly refers to the expression type identical to that of its interior token. However, unlike indexicals, whose nonstable character determines different contents in different contexts of utterance, the character of a mention-expression does not vary in its content (or direct referent, the mentioned type) over contexts of *utterance*. Thus both indexicals and mention-expressions have a kind of lexical complexity that is not articulated in their simple syntactic and semantic structure. A great virtue of Gomez-Torrente's account, in my view, is that he locates "pure quotation names" among a broader but still special class of conventional rule-governed names—like numerical street names and Old Spanish names—that were designed with specific conditions in mind, underscoring their common artifactual and artificial character.[15]

Now, Tarski introduced his "quotation mark names" as part of his scientific-mathematical project to give a definition or analysis of the concept of truth (in which disquotation has a central role); he never claimed to explicate the colloquial practice of mentioning (see C&L 2007, 101; Gomez-Torrente 2013, 356, n. 4). However, Quine adopted Tarski's general idea and applied it to natural language, which is one among a number of important differences between their two views.

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Quine's interest in mention-expressions (or quotations, as he calls them) stems from his wish to prevent use/mention confusion (see, e.g., Quine 1951, 23–26) and, more importantly, from the challenge they pose to compositional semantic theories. According to the principle of compositionality, the meaning (in particular, extension—truth-value for sentences, referents for singular terms) of a complex linguistic expression depends (and only depends) on the meanings (referents, extensions) of its components and their mode of composition, that is, their logical syntax. Therefore, if two singular terms ϕ and μ co-refer, the principle of compositionality dictates that it should always be possible to substitute μ for ϕ in any complex expression ∂ in which ϕ occurs while preserving the extension of ∂. In these cases, Quine calls the position of ϕ *purely referential* and the construction or compositional process that produces the complex expression ∂ *transparent*; sometimes he also describes the linguistic context in which ϕ occurs as transparent. Where the substitution fails to preserve the extension of ∂, the position of ϕ, or its context, and the construction that produces ∂, are said to be *opaque* or, in Carnapian language, non-extensional. Quotation, Quine argues, is an opaque construction that generates opaque contexts, and terms within them do not occupy *purely* referential positions. Here I add emphasis on 'purely' because, strictly speaking, Quine's view of opacity allows for the possibility that terms in these positions or contexts may yet refer, or serve to "specify" an object, but *only* under a mode of presentation (i.e., according to the sense expressed by the term) or under a description.

Like Tarski, Quine says that "each whole quotation [i.e., left mark+word+right mark, i.e., a mention-expression] must be regarded as a single word or sign, whose parts count for no more than serifs or syllables" (Quine 1951, 26). But what he means is stronger than what Tarski means. Recall that for Tarski mention-expressions, or quotation-mark names, are part of the lexicon and, while the syntax treats them as simple expressions, they can still be lexically complex, the products of systematic rule-governed lexical operations that generate compound lexical items from simple lexical items. For Quine, transparency and opacity are a matter of syntax, or referential position within a context, so either an expression (or, more accurately, singular term) occurs in purely referential position or it does not occur at all except superficially or on the grammatical surface—or, as Quine puts it, *accidentally*, like the way that 'dent' and 'tally' occur in 'accidentally' or 'quota'

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and 'tat' in 'quotation.' Hence, the mention (or quotation)-expression lacks all internal semantic or referential structure. For Quine, the upshot of opacity is not only that the extension of the mention-expression is not a function only of the extension of its term-part but also that no semantically significant component exists between the marks; the filling is simply a phonetic or graphic form or shape, that is, an uninterpreted object. "Quotations are names merely of the *forms* therein exhibited, *regardless of what language they belong to*" (Quine 1960, 213).[16] As we said earlier, this *is* true for a special set of uninterpreted expressions in mathematics and logic, such as proof theory. But under the powerful influence of Quine, this special case of mentioning/pure quotation became the paradigm of opacity and, with its erasure of all internal semantic structure, it also became Quine's model for his preferred analysis of all opaque contexts—among which he includes modal contexts, tenses, the propositional attitudes ('belief' sentences), and indirect discourse. If by 'use' we mean the occurrence of an expression *with* a semantic interpretation (e.g., an extension), Quine now *opposes* mention to use—as if mentioning were not itself a use of language—and mention-expressions lack all internal semantic interpretation. There is no difference between the occurrence of 'nine' in ''Nine' has four letters,' and in 'Canines bark,' both of which differ in the same way from 'Nine is the number of planets.'[17]

Quine's austere conception of quotation leaves him vulnerable to a well-known objection raised by Davidson, which Tarski's conception of lexically complex but syntactically simple names avoids. On Quine's view that mention-expressions are completely unstructured, there is no principled, non-accidental relation between the mention-expression and what is mentioned. For every mention-expression, it must be individually stipulated—as for a simple proper name—what it mentions or names, contradicting the widespread intuition that there is a rule-governed relation between the two. Indeed, Quine cannot even explain his own idea that a quotation (i.e., a mention-expression) is a picture of what is mentioned, since there is no articulated enclosed word that does the picturing.[18] Nor can he account for the productivity of mention-expressions, the fact that speakers know a general rule or operation that enables them to construct a name of any expression ø by enclosing it in inverted commas. Any theory that misses this generalization has missed an essential feature of mentioning (or quotation). Unlike Quine, Tarski's theory does capture this competence, if not as a syntactic or semantic operation, then as a lexical one.

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Quine's version of the proper name theory of quotation a.k.a. mention dominated the philosophical climate in the 1970s, when Donald Davidson's seminal paper "Quotation," the proximate stimulus for current discussions, made its appearance. But before turning in chapter 3 to that last moment in our history, let me draw some morals from this second stage of our history.

III. Some Morals of Our Second Mini-History

First, if we are on the right track, the use of inverted commas for mentioning was invented by a philosopher-logician relatively recently for a particular purpose: to avoid use/mention ambiguities and to serve as a metalinguistic device to refer to expressions in the object language. Mention-expressions are both artifactual and artificial—although they quickly took on a life of their own, almost entirely, however, in the philosophical and logical world. Outside professional literature, there is no obligatory use of *any* device to disambiguate whether a term is being used or mentioned. The analysis and explanation of the inverted commas in mentioning is a professional philosopher's problem that raises intriguing formal and theoretical questions but nonetheless is a philosophical curiosity.

Second, even if one rejects Quine's own theory, he raises a serious challenge to explanations of both quotation and mentioning: What determines the semantic value of expressions enclosed in inverted commas (whether they are quoting or mentioning) in giving a compositional semantics? It is obvious (since Quine) that the values of neither quotation nor mention-expressions are a function of the ordinary value(s) of the expression(s) contained between the inverted commas. So what determines them? Are they indeed referential expressions? For future purposes, it is helpful to distinguish two notions that have been conflated under the term 'reference' (*Bedeutung*) since Frege. One is the name-bearer or description-denotation relation; the other is the idea of the semantic value of an expression, its contribution to the compositionally determined truth-conditions of the complex expressions in which it occurs. In many cases, these two notions coincide. However, in quotation, I shall argue, they come apart. Although quotation-expressions contribute a value to their respective quotation-sentences (whose own semantic value is compositionally determined by the values of its parts and their syntax), their own semantic values are neither things they name or denote nor something determined compositionally

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from the semantic values of *their* constituents. Rather their semantic value is fixed by what I shall describe, in chapter 5, as exemplification. And that part of the story is where the quotation–picture analogy does its work. Only if we step outside our standard semantic repertoire of referring relations (naming, denoting, demonstrating), I shall argue, can we identify the relevant semantic value for quotation.

Third, if these first two chapters of "Great Moments" are on the right track, the inverted commas employed in the practices of quotation and mentioning have disjoint origins and geneologies. Although Frege presumably adopted his use of the inverted commas for use/mention disambiguation from their prior use in quotation, his was a deliberate, novel convention that baptized an unprecedented use for the marks. The same is true of Tarski's "quotation-mark names." Later I shall argue that the 'logical form' or lexical structure of the inverted commas in the practices of quotation and mentioning also differ. But for now let me simply propose that the marks employed in quotation and in mentioning are homonyms, like 'bank' (of a river, derived from the Old German *bankiz*) and 'bank' (the establishment for the custody of money, derived from the French *banque* or Italian *banco*): the same spelling and sound but lexically unrelated meanings. As I already mentioned in passing, I will also use the term of art 'm-marks' for the marks used in mentioning (which, like q-marks, need not be our usual inverted commas; among other m-marks are bold font, capitals, italics, indentation, etc., but *not* the *diple*!). In short, the inverted commas "'" and "'" (and '"' and '"') are ambiguous: they could be either q-marks or m-marks.

To be sure, it does not follow from our genetic argument for the distinctness of the practices of mention and quotation and, as a corollary, for the homonymy of their respective uses of the inverted commas (and other marks), that *in their present use* the commas are homonyms. To conclude this chapter, I will therefore begin to establish that stronger claim by sketching a number of semantic differences between quotation and mentioning—although some I will only touch on for now and elaborate in later chapters.

IV. Semantic Differences between Quotation and Mention

(A) Mentioning is in the metalanguage, quotations are in the object language—even though the quot*ing* expression also makes reference via a shared feature to the quot*ed* token.[19]

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(B) Indexicals behave differently when mentioning/mentioned and quoting/quoted. When we ordinarily use an indexical, e.g., 'I,' its (direct) referent, and its (truth-conditional) content, is a parameter, e.g., its speaker (or agent), in its context of utterance. Indeed, according to our best theory on the market, from David Kaplan (1989), indexicals, when used, are *always* interpreted relative to their context of utterance and there exist no operators in natural languages (so-called 'monsters') that shift their reference from their actual context of utterance to other possible contexts (e.g., the context of the subject of the sentence). So, when I, JS, utter 'I,' the referent and content should always be me, JS. As we shall discuss at greater length in chapter 5, this principle conflicts with the behavior of indexicals when they occur between inverted commas in both mention and quotation. But for now, I want to point out they also behave differently in quotation and mention contexts. When we mention an indexical, as in

(3) 'I' is the first-person indexical,

the indexical does not have its ordinary indexical referent or content. Instead, it refers either to the token or expression-type (of the token) contained within the inverted commas or to the sign that articulates the expression (C&L 2007). In contrast, when I (JS) quote someone's statement that contains an indexical like 'I,' as in

(4) Obama said: "I have to intervene in the election,"

it has a referent (and content) but not its ordinary one, namely, its speaker, the individual (me) to whom the first person indexical would refer were I to assertively utter the quotation-sentence on its own. Instead the referent, and content, is the subject Obama. Thus indexicals behave differently in quotation- and mention-contexts.

(C) We can quote an utterance u_i by a speaker of one language L_i using an utterance u_j in a different language L_j but we cannot mention "u_i" in L_i with an expression 'u_j' in a different language L_j even where 'u_j' is a translation of 'u_i.' For example, there is no prima facie difficulty reporting Stern's utterance in Hebrew

(5) Stern: Ani gar be-Yerushalayim[20]

as

(6) Stern said: "I live in Jerusalem."

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But we cannot mention 'Jerusalem' by 'Yerushalayim':

(7) *"'Yerushalayim" mentions 'Jerusalem'

(which should not be confused with "'Yerushalayim' mentions Jerusalem").

(D) According to Quine, mention-expressions are opaque contexts that block substitution of co-referential or coextensive components (e.g., singular terms) that lie between the m-marks while preserving the reference or extension of the whole expression. Because he does not distinguish the two, Quine would presumably say the same about quotation-expressions. We have also seen that quotation is governed by the verbatim requirement (VR), thereby blocking substitution of any other—even a co-intensional or synonymous—expression for the quoting-expression. Given these two conditions, the obvious question is whether there is any relation between opacity and VR.

Emar Maier proposes that quotation is "opaque in the sense that changes to the original are not permitted"[21] (Maier 2014a, 2) and that "an immediate consequence of the verbatim requirement is opacity in the logician's sense of blocking substitution of coreferential terms" (6). Further evidence for Maier's claim is that, insofar as we cannot cancel the metalinguistic implication of a quotation:

(8) *Trump said: "Obama was a disaster" but he did not use those words,

one must quote verbatim, with the result that not only co-referential but also co-intensional substitutions are prohibited—nothing but the very same words in the very same word order suffices. This would seem to support a connection between VR and opacity.

On the other hand, there are differences, especially in practice, between VR and opacity. There are exact conditions for substitutivity that define opacity (and transparency) which do not vary across contexts of utterance. On the other hand, standards of verbatim-ness are, as Maier observes, highly context-dependent. For example, for everyday reports of others' speech, we often tolerate changes in individual words and word order so long as the differences do not matter in context. But in scholarly contexts and in courtrooms, we may require exact faithfulness not only in content and in words but also in spelling, punctuation, and even line and page breaks. At the other end of the spectrum, when evaluating purported cases of plagiarism, sometimes it is sufficient that merely a few crucial phrases or words be verbatim reproduced in the act of theft, and in yet other cases theft of content or ideas is enough.

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Just as important, our mini-histories have shown that VR and Opacity have entirely independent sources. VR originated as a result of changes in law and conceptions of private property that transformed the practice of quotation and the use of q-marks. But even VR is not applied verbatim, or to the letter. One still finds dicta that rule that "To put quotes around anything other than a word-for-word repetition is wrong" (Trask 1997, 96),[22] but this is practiced more for the quotation of written inscriptions than for spoken utterances, and it is notorious that written quotations "clean up" quoted utterances, omitting the 'uhs,' 'ya knows,' half- or incomplete sentences, and so on.

> "No conversation is reproduced as such. The journalist eliminates the debris of spoken language (and that's not only the 'um's and 'uh's), the repetitions, the endless (bouts) useless phrases. She corrects the grammatical errors, unless she wishes to convey a certain exoticism." (J. Ginzburg and R. Cooper, quoting R. Solé, *Le Monde*, July 3, 2003)

However, "cleaning up the debris" of spoken language is one thing; "standardizing" or correcting misuses of words or bad style is another, and generally is a violation of VR.[23]

Opacity also rules out specific "changes to the original," making it superficially like VR. But its roots lie elsewhere: in the principle of compositionality, which constrains the substitution of constituents of complex phrases according to their semantic values. As we have also seen, there are multiple diagnoses of what goes wrong when substitutivity fails and, as finer and finer conditions have been imposed (from co-intensionality to intensional isomorphism and more) and time after time met with counterexamples, philosophers have been led to the conclusion that only a criterion of substitutivity individuated by the very word to be substituted would suffice (see, e.g., Carnap 1947, 53; Goodman 1949; Mates 1950; Putnam 1954; Church 1954). From this perspective, Maier is right to describe opacity as a prohibition against making any "changes to the original" word. However, as Scheffler (1955) first observed, many opaque contexts are governed by verbs for "psychological abilities [that] are continuous and not likely to follow sharp semantical boundaries" (41); hence, there may be no discrete general conditions for substitutivity, period. And, as Maier himself (personal communication, and chapter 7, n. 7, below) has also observed, if we allow for *de re* (or relational or wide-scope) as well as *de dicto* (or notional or narrow-scope) readings, and if wh-movement and anaphoric co-reference are tests

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of opacity, then we can make substitutions in quotations, rendering them *relatively* transparent after all.

In sum, it would be convenient if we could identify quotation with VR and mention-expressions with opacity and leave it at that. However, quotation-expressions are also opaque, that is, non-extensional, contexts—not because they are to be analyzed as (containing) mention-expressions—but because they semantically entail indirect discourse statements that themselves are non-extensional.[24] At the end of our story it therefore turns out that, even apart from VR, quotations are opaque contexts and, contra Quine, the paradigm of opacity is indirect discourse (and the propositional attitudes).

(E) As Quine showed long ago, and C&L (2007) repeat, we cannot quantify into mention-expressions or contexts. From

(9) 'Nine' has four letters

we cannot infer

(10) (∃x) ('x' has four letters),

—the latter is just nonsense. On the other hand, it is possible to quantify into quotation-expressions or contexts:

(11) Every Trump follower about whom Hillary said "They are deplorables"/"He is deplorable" voted for a Republican.

(12) To everyone he meets, John says, "I love you."

(13) To everyone he meets, John says, "I love her."

In this respect, quotation pairs with indirect discourse reports:

(14) Every Trump follower about whom Hillary said that they are deplorables/that he is deplorable, voted for a Republican.

(15) To everyone he meets, John says that he loves her.

As Partee (1973, 415) already noted, however, there is a disanalogy between quotation and indirect discourse.

(16) John says that he loves everyone he meets

admits both *de dicto* (narrow scope) and *de re* (wide scope) readings, unlike the quotation

(17) John says: "I love everyone I meet,"

which has only the de dicto reading.[25]

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In chapter 3 I will give examples of anaphoric co-reference where the anaphor falls outside and its antecedent within a quotation-expression, which again distinguishes quotation from mentioning which does not admit anaphoric co-reference. And in chapter 7 I will take up the question whether wh-movement is blocked for quotations despite the fact that we can quantify-into quotations.[26]

(F) There has been considerable controversy in the literature over whether 'quotation' is context-sensitive, that is, whether "one and the same quotation can be used on different occasions to quote distinct objects" (C&L 2007, 67)—tokens, types, expressions or lexical items, semantical objects (meanings), phonological objects (pronunciations or intonation patterns), or signs (articulations in speech or writing of expressions).[27] I put 'quotation' in the previous sentence in inverted commas because, as you might have already inferred from the quotation from C&L and from the examples, the controversy has been over mention-expressions, not quotation-expressions. Because I am not discussing mentioning in this monograph, I will not take a position in that dispute. But if one shifts to quotation proper, there is sufficient evidence that it is context sensitive. Consider the following exchange (based on Potts 2004a; Maier 2014a):

(18) Ellen: *The Godfather II* is a total snooze.

> Frank: Well, Pauline Kael said that this "total snooze" is a defining moment in American cinema.

There is a default assumption that, absent other information, the quoted expression is that of the subject of the quotation-sentence since she is the most salient quotee in the context. However, as Potts (2004a) argues, a quot*ing* token requires a preceding quot*ed* token, and in (18) the most salient quot*ed* token of the same type as the quot*ing* token is that of Ellen, not Pauline Kael; hence, in the context of (18) Frank reports the content of what Pauline Kael said, but he expresses that content by quoting Ellen's (subsentential) utterance.[28]

A second example of the context-dependence of quotation-expressions is given by Mark Richard (2015, 224–225), who argues against the view that (20) validly follows from (19):

(19) Greenspan said that his agreement with Reich was "a surprise to both of us."

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(20) Greenspan said that his agreement with Reich was a surprise to both of them [i.e., Greenspan and Reich].

—as one would think, given that it *is* valid to infer (22) from (21):

(21) Ellen said: "*Godfather II* is a total snooze."

(22) Ellen said that *Godfather II* is a total snooze.[29]

The reason why (19) does not entail (20) is that in (19) the quoting indexical 'us' will be understood to refer to Greenspan and Reich so long, but only so long, as they are the most salient individuals in the context of utterance *c* of (19). But suppose the speaker in *c* is describing a context *c'* in which, he reports, Greenspan and his wife were surprised by the agreement, leading Greenspan to say "The agreement with Reich was a surprise to both of us." Given the salience of Greenspan's wife in the quoted context reported in *c*, (19) will be true in *c* just in case 'us' refers to Mr. and Mrs. Greenspan. However, 'them' in (20) must refer to its two antecedents Greenspan and Reich, and Reich may not have been surprised, rendering (20) false in *c*. Thus the interpretation of the (subsentential) quotation-expression in (19) depends on who was most salient as a referent of the quoted 'us' in *its* context of utterance.

In a third example, based on Geurts and Maier (2003, 120–121), we quote not only a speaker's words but also his pronunciation.[30] In

(23) JS: George said: 'I called the POlice.'

I (JS) quote not only George's word 'police' (and its content) but also his odd (mis)pronunciation with emphasis on the first syllable of the word.[31] Because George is the speaker of the quoting sentence, in the absence of any other information, I also attribute to him, as the quoted speaker, the pronunciation 'POlice' (together with the word). However, suppose that Tom witnessed a robbery before George uttered "I called the POlice" and said:

(24) Tom: "Somebody, call the POlice."

In that case, where Tom is salient in the context, and suppose I know that George was himself echoing Tom's pronunciation, I will be quoting Tom (or Tom and George) on the pronunciation 'POlice,' even while I am also quoting the words (only) of George's utterance

(25) George: 'I called the POlice.'

The point is that the identity of the quoted speaker is itself a function of the context.[32] In most cases, absent additional information, we take the explicit

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subject of the quotation-sentence to be the contextual parameter that fixes the quoted speaker. However, this is simply a default assumption that can be overridden by additional contextual information. Again, this kind of context-dependence is specific to quotation, and distinguishes it from mention.

To sum up, this preliminary data drawn from our present practices of quoting and mentioning supports the lesson of our historical surveys that quotation and mentioning are distinct, indeed disjoint, uses of language—although both employ language to talk about language. Hence, the inverted commas the two practices employ also ought to be treated independently. In future chapters, we will meet more evidence and clarify exactly how the inverted commas are indeed homonymous.

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3 Great Moments in the History of the Inverted Commas III: Mixed (or Subsentential) Quotation

I. Davidson's Data and Challenge

The last great moment in our history is Donald Davidson's (1984b) "Quotation," first pubished in 1979, which, it would be fair to say, was the trigger for the explosion of interest in the subject over the last forty years.[1] There are at least three reasons why this paper had such an impact. First, Davidson proposed a novel—and controversial—theory of the inverted commas as demonstratives (or disguised demonstrative descriptions). Although a number of philosophers still defend this theory, and although Davidson himself appears to have intended it to cover the full range of quotations, as the theory has evolved it is now almost exclusively focused on mentioning, or pure quotation.[2] Since that is not the topic of this monograph, I will not discuss it further.

Second, Davidson launched a vigorous critique of the prevailing proper name (PN) theory of quotation championed by Quine. Among various criticisms, he attacked it for not capturing the pictorial dimension of quotation, which is, of course, ironic because it was Quine who introduced that feature of quotation into the literature. In effect, Davidson turned Quine against Quine. The second of his objections to Quine proved more influential: the PN theory fails to take into account the structural features of quotation in virtue of which speakers seem to know a general rule for constructing quotation/mention-expressions that explains, Davidson argued, their learnability and productivity, the speaker's capacity to produce and comprehend a potentially infinite number of novel quotation/mention-expressions. Its systematic character sharply distinguishes our knowledge of quotation/mention from the stipulative case-by-case introduction of proper names through baptisms of individuals (Davidson 1984b, 83). It remains a

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desideratum for all theories of quotation that they capture knowledge of this general rule.

Third, and most important for our purposes, Davidson drew philosophers' attention to a hitherto ignored body of data—which he called "mixed" and "double-duty" quotation,"[3] for example:

(1) Trump said that Obama "could not care less about terrorism."

The words between the inverted commas are clearly meant to refer to the very words uttered by Trump.[4] Evidence is the impossibility of canceling the reference to the words, as in

(2) *Trump said that Obama "could not care less about terrorism," but he never uttered the words "could not care less about terrorism."[5]

On the other hand, the quoting words also seem to be used with the same meanings, referents, grammatical categories, and semantic values they ordinarily possess outside of quotation-contexts; indeed, they must be, for the sentence to be grammatical and meaningful. Davidson's own argument for this claim—and he was the first to point this out—was that if the quotation-expression were *only* mentioning the words between its inverted commas and, I would add, if the kind of reference involved in mentioning is a semantic relation like denotation or naming, then the mixed-quotation-expression would be a singular term or nounphrase, rendering the sentence ungrammatical—of the form "Trump said that Obama NP" (Davidson 1984b, 81). Therefore, Davidson concluded that the quotation-expression is also being used. He did not, however, explore the internal semantic structure of a quotation. If one does, it is clear that the quotation-expression syntactically and semantically interacts with its sentential matrix—manifest in the fact that in, say, (1) the quotation-expression acts like a verb phrase (VP), or complex predicate, with constituent structure. As we showed in chapter 2 (E), it is possible to quantify into quotation-expressions (in contrast to mention-expressions),[6] demonstrating that their constituent terms occupy referential positions. Additional evidence of quotation-internal syntactic and semantic structure is anaphoric co-reference from outside the quotation:

(2) Trump said that Obama "could not care less about terrorism" but I believe that he *did*. (VP anaphora)

(3) Bush said his administration would "achieve our objectives" in Iraq but *they* were not what the president really wanted. (pronomial anaphora)

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This constituent semantic structure and grammatical categorial structure within these mixed quotation is symptomatic of the fact that the words are being used.[7] In sum, as Davidson concluded, mixed quotations involve both use *and* mention (cf. Shan 2011, 418).

However, it is also arguable to the contrary that mixed quotations involve *neither* use *nor* mention in the strict senses of these terms. On the one hand, Davidson's argument that the quotation-expression cannot *only* be mentioning the words between its inverted commas is equally an argument that it cannot be mentioning them, period. On the other hand, the mixed quotation does not involve use in the full sense because of the behavior of indexicals within the inverted commas, as we saw in chapter 2 (B). Suppose I (JS) utter:

(4) Trump boasted that there is "no greater president than me."

If 'me' were *used* in the full sense, it ought to refer to me (JS), the speaker in the context; I would be saying, per impossibile, that Trump boasted that that there is no greater president than JS, not that there is no greater president than Donald Trump (cf. Richard 2015). Therefore, if my utterance of the first person indexical in the mixed quotation expression refers to Trump, the subject of the sentence, 'I' is not being *used*—at least not in the full sense as it would be used without inverted commas. Hence, mixed quotations involve *neither* use in the full sense nor mention as semantic notions. However, as the evidence we cited earlier shows, they nonetheless manifest many of the symptoms of use *and* they make some kind of metalinguistic reference to the words between the inverted commas. How to articulate these notions of use and metalinguistic reference for quotation is the challenge to which we will turn in chapters 5 and 6.

Davidson's introduction of the mixed quotation data was a turning point in the literature, but he did not go far enough. Oddly enough, he did not analyze direct (i.e., sentential) quotation in his paper, but the same observations about syntactic and semantic constituent structure hold for them. In addition to quantification into direct quotations (as we saw in chapter 2), the same kinds of anaphoric relations that hold for mixed (subsentential) quotations hold between antecedents in sentential-quotations and external anaphors:

(5) John said: "Obama will win the election," and he did. (pronomial anaphora)

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(6) John said: "Obama washed the dishes," and so did I. (VP anaphora)

(7) John said: "Harry may leave," and Bill, too. (Here 'may' can mean either permissible or possible but, whichever one it means, the anaphor must be given the same interpretation as the antecedent. (Benbaji 2003, 33; Cf. Stern 2000, 69).

(8) Jack said: "You are the winner." Harry replied: "I am?" (If we do not give these direct quotations use interpretations, we cannot explain the coherence of the dialogue, the fact that Harry's statement responds to Jack's, etc.) (Discourse anaphora)

(9) The sign says, "George Washington slept here," but I don't believe he really ever did. (Partee 1973) (pronomial and VP anaphora)

(10) Whenever Fred sighs, "Boy, do I need a drink," he expects you to fix him one. (Partee 1973) (pronomial anaphora, shift of pronouns)

(11) What he actually said was "It is clear that you have given this problem a great deal of thought," but he meant quite the opposite. (Partee 1973) (semantic anaphora)

(12) "I talk better English than the both of youse!" shouted Charles, thereby convincing me that he didn't. (Partee 1973) (ellipsis)

(13) If Obama said, "Iran will agree," then it will.

In (5)–(13) the quoting sentence syntactically and semantically interacts with its sentential matrix, implying that it has internal syntactic and semantic structure, the diagnostic signs of use.[8]

However, this is not the whole story. Quoting sentences are not only used, they also refer to the very words they use, proof of which is that we cannot cancel the metalinguistic reference to the sentence, just as we couldn't in (2).[9] In fact, the semantic value the quoting sentences contribute to the truth conditions of their respective quotation-sentences is not their truth-value, namely, the value of the compositional function that takes the ordinary extensional or intensional values of their parts as arguments. Rather, as I have been arguing, quotation is the attribution to a subject of *words* (albeit as they are used with their ordinary content).[10] Modulo adjustments to VR to accommodate context, the very words, or something individuated by them, are the semantic value of the quoting sentences. Even their word order (which affects voice) matters, proof of which is that neither (14) nor (15) entails the other.

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(14) Jack said: "A bachelor killed my father with a knife."

(15) Jack said: "My father was killed by a bachelor with a knife."

Further evidence is that quoting phrases generally (though not always) preserve the original indexicals as they occur in the quot*ed* utterance, and they are understood relative to their quot*ed* context, not relative to the speaker's (quoting) context of utterance.[11] How to reconcile this indexical behavior with the semantics of indexicals is a point to which we will return in chapter 6. But all these considerations show that we need to capture in the truth conditions for a quotation-sentence the very words of the quoting sentence as well as its content as it is used. Nonetheless, the words are not *mentioned*, let alone named, described, or demonstrated by the quoting sentence as if it were a singular term. Our challenge, then, to which we will return in later chapters, is how to capture the nature of this metalinguistic reference to "the very words."

In sum, sentential (so-called direct) quotation exhibits the very same double-faced referential behavior (however we describe it) as subsentential (so-called mixed) quotation. All that distinguishes them is that one is sentential, the other subsentential. Both show signs of use and hence of their ordinary content (apart from indexicals), and of metalinguistic reference to the words between their inverted commas or q-marks.[12] Davidson seems to have thought that because "mixed" quotation is subsentential in contrast to sentential direct quotation, ipso facto it must be a puzzling kind of mention—proof of the powerful influence of the picture conflating quotation and mentioning. Once one realizes that the double-meaning of "mixed" quotation is characteristic of sentential quotation as well, one realizes that the real distinction is not between "direct" and "mixed" quotation but between quotation and mention. That said, the real problem for quotation, both sentential and subsentential, now comes into focus. On the one hand, the quot*ing* phrase has the quot*ed* phrase as its semantic value, not its ordinary semantic value as compositionally determined by the values of its parts outside the context of inverted commas. On the other hand, to account for its syntactic and semantic interaction with its sentential matrix, it is necessary to give the quoting phrase and its constituents their ordinary meanings, the semantic structure and values they would have if they were not in a quotation-context. As long as we are dealing with only one kind of reference relation (words to objects, like naming and denoting), it is very

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difficult to describe, let alone explain, this twofold meaning. *Quotations are not ambiguous or polysemous in any standard sense*. Any theory of quotation must therefore show how a quotation can both refer to its quoted utterance, its very words, and yet behave as if it had its ordinary referents and meanings.[13] Davidson's "challenge" to a theory of quotation is to account for this two-faced behavior.

II. Two Responses to Davidson's Challenge

One response to this challenge is to say that quotation-sentences, with either sentential or subsentential quoting phrases, communicate two propositions. One expresses *what is said* by the sentence, which is what is represented by the complement clause in a (usually homophonic) indirect discourse report. The second proposition captures the metalinguistic reference to the words of the quoted subject. For example, (1) expresses both the indirect discourse proposition

(1a) Trump said that Obama could not care less about terrorism

and the "metalinguistic" proposition that

(1b) Trump used the words "could not care less about terrorism."

Similarly, a sentential quotation like

(16) Trump said: "Obama could not care less about terrorism"

would be analyzed as

(16a) Trump said that Obama could not care less about terrorism.

(16b) Trump used the words: "Obama could not care less about terrorism."[14]

Potts (2004a,b) explicitly gives such a "two-dimensional" analysis in the course of analyzing quotation-utterances that report both a pronounciation and content. Contrast

(17a) Whenever he is in Santa Cruz, Peter orders "[eɪ]pricots" at the local market.

(17b) Whenever he is in Amherst, Peter orders "[æ]pricots" at the local market.

The consequents of (17a, b) both express the same "use" content expressed by

(17c) Peter orders apricots at the local market.

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However, they express different metalinguistic propositions:

(17d) Whenever he is in Santa Cruz, Peter utters "[eɪ]pricots."

(17e) Whenever he is in Amherst, Peter utters "[æ]pricots."

These propositions refer not to words but to abstract linguistic objects—in this case, phonological representations. (In other cases, the linguistic objects might be syntactic or semantic representations.)[15] Some welcome this analysis, taking it as support for the hypothesis that some utterances express more than one proposition in a context.[16] However, one problem with this solution, which Maier forthcoming calls 'the binding problem,' is that it does not explain how the same words *both* mean, or refer to, what they do in the "use" proposition expressed by the indirect discourse sentence and are themselves (or their phonological representation) meant or referred to in the "metalinguistic" proposition. As Geurts and Maier (2007) and Maier (2020) object, the conjunction of (1a) and (1b) does not itself state that Trump used the very same words referred to in (1b) to say what he says in (1a) (for a similar objection to Davidson, see C&L 1997b, 436). Therefore they (Geurts and Maier 2007; Maier 2014, 2020) instead propose (1c) as a better analysis of (1):

(1c) Trump said that Obama has the property that he (Trump) would express by the words "could not care less about terrorism."

Although Geurts and Maier do not discuss sentential (direct) quotations, the same analysis would presumably hold, say, for (16)

(16c) Trump uttered a sentence expressing the proposition that he (Trump) would have expressed using the words "Obama could not care less about terrorism."

More generally, any mixed quotation-expression *W* whose subject is *S* will be understood as "whatever *S* referred to with the word(s) *W*."[17] Maier (2016, 2020) baptizes this view as "the free relative paraphrase" analysis; one might also call it a "deferential account' of quotation since it defers the content of the quoting phrase to the quoted subject (see also Benbaji 2004b).

However, this analysis is also not problem-free. As Maier (2020) makes explicit, on the free relative paraphrase, the analysis of a quoting phrase *P* is the definite description "The property (or proposition) *A* such that *S* uses *P* to refer to *A*," where *S* is the quoted subject who is generally supplied by the context, for example, the linguistic context of (16), namely, Trump.

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Note, too, that substituends for the variable *P* will be *mentioned* phrases or words, that is, words designated by singular terms or NP's in argument position. Hence, on this analysis, quotation presupposes or is built up from mentioning.

One problem with this deferred account is that the definite description simply *describes* the property or proposition that was said without *displaying* the particular property or proposition: it is the property or proposition, *whatever it is*, that *S* would have expressed using the words *W*. And without constraints on what Trump *could* express with the quoting phrase, we do not know what he said. But one of the distinguishing characteristics of quotation is its "pictoriality." One "sees" through the quoting expression to the quoted expression; the latter is "displayed" or "presented" by the former. One knows from the quoting expression exactly what is quoted. I will explain in chapters 5–6 exactly what that means, but the intuitive idea is that the relation between the quoting and quoted expressions is neither arbitrary (like proper names) nor a matter of satisfying descriptive conditions given by the speaker, what or whoever the satisfying object or individual turns out to be. Geurts and Maier lose the "intimate relation" (C&L 2007) between quoting and quoted phrases by analyzing the (mixed/subsentential or direct/sentential) quotation-expression '"*P*"' as the description "what *S* referred to with the phrase *P*."[18]

It should be said, however, that Geurts and Maier's and Maier's free relative paraphrase analysis works well for nonwords in quotations, such as:

(18) Nicola said that Alice is a "philtosopher" (C&L 1997)

(19) Palin tweeted that "peaceful Muslims" should "refudiate" the mosque being built at Ground Zero. (Maier 2014)

(20) Bush said that the enemy "misunderestimated me." (Maier 2020)

In these examples it is at least arguable that either the speaker does not understand the quoting phrase or he wishes not to commit himself to the appropriateness of the subject's word to express what he (the subject) intends.[19] Hence, the speaker defers the content of the attribution to the subject in order to avoid the responsibility that comes with expressing it himself. This fits Geurts and Maier's analysis well: the quoting phrase (e.g., "misunderestimated me" in (20)) is mentioned rather than used, and therefore does not have to be "semantically interpreted," which in turn explains its acceptability despite the fact that it is not English (Maier 2020).[20] However,

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while (18)–(20) are instances of mixed/subsentential quotation, they add an additional, complicating layer. For that reason, they should not be treated on a par with 'simple' or 'pure' cases of mixed quotation such as (1) that lack this added layer. In chapter 9 I shall argue that they are instances of scare quotation, but I postpone their analysis to that later discussion.

To sum up this third "great moment":

(1) Davidson's observation that mixed, or subsentential, quotation involves both a kind of use and metalinguistic reference is key to understanding quotation.

(2) However, because Davidson exclusively focused on the subsentential cases of mixed quotation, he failed to see that the same observation holds for sentential quotations, so-called direct quotation. The upshot is that *all* quotation shows the two-sided behavior of use and metalinguistic reference. And because he did not distinguish the two different uses of the inverted commas in the two distinct practices of mention and quotation, Davidson also failed to see that this two-sided behavior is what distinguishes quotation and mention.

(3) Most important, Davidson's challenge for any account of sentential and subsentential quotation (not mention) remains unsolved: how can we explain its two directions of reference or meaning, the fact that quot*ing* words both refer to the quot*ed* words and to their ordinary semantic referents? Neither of the two going explanations in the literature—the two-dimensional account of the Davidsonians and of Potts and the free relative/deference account of Geurts and Maier—solve the problem. Apart from their specific problems, I will argue, the more general difficulty is that their notion of reference is restricted to the semantic relation from words to objects, the traditional notion of reference or denotation that is part of our linguistic repertoire. What is necessary, I will argue, is to step outside of language proper to the realm of pictures in order to capture the semantic value of quotations.

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4 Three Themes from Pictures

We concluded chapter 3 with what I called 'Davidson's challenge': to explain how words in quotations, sentential (direct) or subsentential (mixed), (metalinguistically) refer both to the subject's quoted words *and* to their ordinary semantic referents as if they were being used. Quotations are not ambiguous or polysemous, and the two meanings do not conflict. We explored two explanations in the literature, neither of which is free of problems. In light of these results, I suggested that quotation's two directions of reference or meaning may be best explained by devices outside our standard linguistic or semantic toolbox, appealing instead to the idea, often mentioned but rarely used, that quotations are pictures.

I. Resemblance in Pictures and Quotation

As I said in the introduction, Quine was the first among contemporary thinkers to draw an analogy between quotations and pictures—although, as we saw in chapter 2, it does not sit well with his own "proper name" analysis of mention/quotation. After him, Davidson and then C&L and others have picked up on the idea. The philosopher who has probably done the most with the quotation/picture analogy is François Recanati (2001, 2011).[1] In the course of working out his account of open quotations (to which we will return in chapter 7), Recanati proposes that "the quoted material is *displayed* or *presented*," that the act of quotation "depicts all manner of speech characteristics" (2011, 222–223), that all of this is "picturing" the quoted utterance, and that the "meaning" of the quotaton/demonstration is what it "pictures" (232), "pictorial meaning" (232, 247) or pictorial "value" (247). However, having made the comparison, Recanati retreats when it comes to working it out:

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> What the communicator puts forward in the above example is something like a *picture*. Now pictures mean in a way quite different from the way in which utterances mean. Utterances say, pictures show. The difference between symbolic articulation and iconic display is notoriously hard to pin down, and I do not intend to contribute to that field of study here. (229)

And in fact Recanati's use of terms like 'picture,' 'illustrate,' 'display,' and 'depict' are confusing, not only because he makes no attempt to explain them, but also because the little he says leads to well-known difficulties in the literature on pictures and pictorial representation or depiction. For example, he writes that the "depiction is effected through properties shared by the displayed token and the target" (224). Although Recanati does not explicitly mention the words 'resemblance' or 'similarity,' I assume that he is saying that the depiction is achieved by resemblance (or similarity), which itself he takes to be a function of the properties shared jointly by the displayed token and target.[2] Of course, not just any shared property yields resemblance. Suppose that a large picture of a heavy child happens to have the same weight as a slight child. Surely the picture does not resemble, let alone represent, the child in virtue of sharing that same property, that is, weight. Furthermore, this conception of similarity as shared properties runs afoul of Watanabe's well-known Ugly Duckling theorem, which shows, in effect, that if the similarity between any two objects is measured simply by the number of features they have in common, and if all features are weighted equally, then any two objects are equally similar (and, by the same reasoning, equally dissimilar) (Watanabe 1969, 376–379).[3] So, if quotation is depiction, and what is quoted is any utterance that shares common properties with the quoting token, and any two things including utterances and tokens share innumerable properties with each other, then any utterance will be quoted as much as any other by any quoting token. Furthermore, if depiction is a function simply of shared properties, then if x depicts y, y will also depict x. But the portrait depicts Napoleon, Napoleon does not depict his portrait. And it is surely not the case that a quoted utterance, in turn, quotes its quoting utterance.

There are two responses to this objection. One is that we should take into account the degree of similarity between two objects as a weighted function of their common *and distinct* features.[4] One consequence of this alternative view is that, contrary to the first model, similarity judgments and statements are typically asymmetrical, blocking the last objection.

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Thus Tversky (1977) observed that the choice of subject (*x*) and referent or (as we'll say) predicate (*y*) in ordinary statements of the form '*x* is like *y*' or '*x* resembles *y*' is not in general arbitrary (and the similarity relation is not symmetrical). We say that the portrait resembles (is/looks like) a person, but not that the person resembles (is/looks like) the portrait; that a son resembles (is/looks like) his father but not that the father resembles (is/looks like) his son; that the ellipse is/looks like a circle but not that the circle is/looks like an ellipse. So, by implication, the quoting utterance will resemble—and therefore depict and quote—the quoted utterance, but the latter will not resemble, depict, or quote the former.

The second response to the Ugly Duckling objection is that not all properties are weighted equally and that the similarity of two things depends on the number of shared *important* or *salient* properties. Therefore, not any two objects will equally resemble each other. However, talk of 'importance,' 'relevance,' and 'salience' brings in its wake the first of Nelson Goodman's objections: similarity cannot be an empirical, or scientifically determinate, concept because it is hopelessly context-dependent, depending on who makes the judgment of importance, her interests, the range of the comparison class for salience, the purpose of the comparison, and so on. In response to Goodman's pessimism about making scientific sense of contextual factors of this sort, one might argue that it is not inevitable. To the contrary, as Tversky (1977) also argued, we can empirically identify two main factors in deciding on the *salience* (or importance) of properties for judgments of similarity: (i) the intensity of the property (the brightness of a light, loudness of a sound, saturation of a color) which is relatively stable across contexts, and (ii) its "diagnostic value," its utility for the classificatory distinctions one wishes to make. Admittedly, the usefulness of similarity judgments will itself still vary with context—with agents and their purposes—but we can tame the beast by identifying contextual parameters relative to which the variations systematically and regularly fall into patterns. In sum, it is possible to make some scientific sense of similarity judgments in general. Nonetheless, it is another matter to show how these criteria for salience, or importance, apply to similarity judgments for quotation in particular.

These problems should not lead us to deny similarity/resemblance some role in accounts of depiction or pictorial representation, even if it is neither (as Goodman argued) a necessary nor sufficient condition for depiction. Over the last twenty-plus years, in part as a reaction to Goodman's

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demolition job, resemblance and similarity have had something of a comeback in theories of pictorial representation or depiction. However, these accounts, most of which look to perception in order to explain depiction, do not take the resemblance or similarity judgments to hold in virtue of *shared properties* by the depiction and its subject. Instead, recognition theories hold that what distinguishes pictures, and pictorial representations or depictions, is that we recognize their contents, and thereby 'understand' them, in a way *similar* to the way in which we ordinarily perceive things in the world: the picture elicits or triggers perceptual abilities or capacities *similar* to those by which we visually recognize its subject (what it pictures or what is depicted; see, e.g., Lopes 1996; Schier 1986). Others build resemblance into accounts of depiction in terms of communicative intentions. So, a picture-maker intends to bring some object to mind in the viewer, and he intends for the viewer to recognize his intention, and for that purpose the maker employs sufficient resemblances to bring that object, and no other, to the viewer's mind.[5] Yet others restrict the similarities to specific properties, for example, occlusion or outline shape instantiated by the picture, and some of these theories focus, not on actual resemblances, but on *experienced* resemblances, say, between the experienced outline shape of the depiction and that of the depicted object.[6]

Yet even if these perceptual theories hold out the promise of a better future for resemblance and similarity in theories of pictorial representation or depiction, and if the quotation relation is a species of picturing or depicting, it is still not at all clear how to generalize and extend these theories to the relation between the quoting and quoted utterances. At the very least, it should be clear now that theorists who claim that quotations are pictures, and that the quoting relation is determined by resemblance or similarity between the quoting and quoted items, owe us a serious explanation. One cannot simply assume that these are innocent explanatory notions in need of no explanation themselves. Similarity must be handled with care when using it to explain any phenomenon, let alone the relation between the quoting and quoted items.[7]

I will not attempt to remedy this situation by explaining the role of resemblance or similarity in pictures and then, by extension, in quotation. Nor do I want to claim, like Quine, that quotations *are* pictures. Instead, I will draw on three themes or features taken from theories of pictures that can illuminate the behavior of quotations and in particular resolve our

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problem about their two directions of meaning or reference. Thus, at most, I claim that quotations have a pictorial character. The three themes are:

(i) The distinction between what a picture represents or depicts and what it exemplifies

(ii) The analog as opposed to digital character of pictures

(iii) The transparency of pictures

Although I will refer to specific accounts in introducing these themes, my aim here is not to defend their details (some of which I also find problematic). However, these accounts are the best way I know to convey the essential element in each theme that will illuminate quotation.

II. Representation, or Depiction, and Exemplification

Nelson Goodman was the first, to my knowledge, to distinguish two ways in which pictures refer, mean, or symbolize (using these terms in the most generic sense for relations between pictures and things they are "about"): representation and exemplification.[8] For Goodman, pictorial representation, or depiction, is a species of denotation, which is the relation between symbols (words, pictures) and objects in the world; roughly, this is the relation other philosophers call (semantic) 'reference.' As a nominalist, Goodman restricts what is denoted—hence, what is pictorially represented and depicted—to the object (denoted or represented/depicted). Apart from vague gestures at convention, practice, or habit, and his sharp critique of resemblance, he has nothing to say about how denotation functions or is fixed—and he refuses to traffic with meanings, senses, or intensions.[9] However, even for Goodman, the "representational" or "depictive" content of a picture is not exhausted by the object denoted. To capture what other philosophers include under the headings of "sense" or "meaning"—for example, Frege's 'mode of presentation' or necessary and sufficient descriptive conditions associated with an expression to be satisfied by its referent—Goodman appeals to internal relations among symbols in a system. Thus, while the picture represents only an object, it necessarily represents it in some way, *as* one thing rather than another, and those features by which it represents the object are the same features by which we might describe and thereby denote the picture or representation itself. Here is an example. Suppose a picture *represents*, that is, *denotes*, the planet Venus; it must willy-nilly represent

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Venus in one way or another, say, as a star in the sky in the evening or as a star in the morning. For Goodman the nominalist, features are nothing but (the) predicates (that express them). So, we can think of the feature *as* or *by* which the picture *represents* Venus as if it were a predicate—'is-a-star-in-the-sky-in-the-evening-picture/representation'—that applies to the picture/representation itself. So, the picture of Venus that depicts it as a star in the sky in the evening is, in turn, a star-in-the-sky-in-the-evening-picture (as opposed to a star-in-the-sky-in-the-morning-picture). The full representational content of a picture will include not only the thing it represents (or denotes) but also (everything expressed by) the set of predicates that denote the picture. Those predicates characterize the kind of picture or depiction it is, and thereby classify (or, as Goodman would say, sort) it among the set of pictures.[10] Thus we capture sense or meaning in terms of intrasymbolic or intralinguistic relations.

Having said this, those of us who are not nominalists can forgo these scruples and simply include the modes, properties, or features by which a thing is represented/depicted by a picture as its pictorial sense, content, or meaning. But the important point for our present purposes is that representation and depiction for pictures, like denotation for linguistic expressions, is a semantic relation that goes from symbols to things in the world. With linguistic representations, what words denote and refer to are also their semantic values, what they contribute to the compositionally determined truth conditions of sentences. Pictures, on the other hand, are not truth-valued and do not have compositional truth conditions; instead, they are accurate or correct (as a function of their informativeness) and faithful (depending on our habits and familiarity, etc.). Nonetheless, pictorial representation, like linguistic denotation (for descriptions, names, and demonstratives), runs "downward" from symbol to thing in the world.

Exemplification runs in the opposite direction—"upward." As with representation, Goodman's own nominalistic explication of this symbolic relation is phrased entirely in terms of predicates (or, as he calls them, labels). Allowing ourselves more ontological indulgence, we will take what is exemplified to include properties, types, and other abstract entities, including linguistic entities such as phonological, syntactic, and semantic representations (see Potts 2004a). We will say that an object *o* exemplifies a property *P* if and only if (i) *o* possesses *P* (which is to say that a predicate for *P* denotes or applies to *o*) and (ii) *o* "symbolizes, stands for, or refers to" *P* (again, using

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these latter terms in a generic sense).[11] The crux of exemplification is (ii): it involves reference to and not merely possession (or instantiation) of a property. But what kind of reference is this?

Goodman's paradigm of exemplification is the sample, for example, a tailor's booklet of small swatches of cloth. Each swatch in the collection possesses or instantiates an innumerable number of properties, but it is a sample only of some of those properties: its color, weave, texture, and pattern, but not (say) its size, shape, absolute value, date of production, or weight. What makes the difference is that what is sampled is what the swatch not only possesses but also refers to. As with representation, Goodman gives no analysis of what determines this kind of reference—although it was a genuine insight to see that exemplification and sampling *are* modes of reference. To the extent to which we can explain it, it is more psychological than semantic: "establishment of the referential relationship is a matter of singling out certain properties for attention, of selecting associations with certain other objects" (Goodman 1972c, 66).[12] In other words, the given sample makes certain properties *salient*, and I assume, as Tversky showed for similarity judgments, that the salience of an exemplified or sampled property is a function both of its intensity and of the degree to which it contrasts with other features in its context, and especially with other samples in its schema. To spell this out in more detail, central to Goodman's notion of exemplification is the schema to which the exemplifying object belongs on the occasion, for example, the tailor's booklet of cloth swatches. What determines, of a given swatch's innumerable possessed properties $P_1 \ldots P_n$, those to which it refers? Each swatch s_i is a sample, not in isolation, but only as part of the whole booklet S. Two relations between the elements of S and the field of properties $P_1 \ldots P_n$ bear on what is sampled by each s_i. First, each s_i in S samples just those features *it* possesses but the other s_j do not and, second, each s_i in S samples just those properties a *contrary* of which is sampled by some s_j of S. In other words, the features exemplified by any given object o depend *both* on the set of things presupposed in the context to be the schema S of referring objects to which o belongs in that context and on the realm of alternative properties $P_1 \ldots P_n$ presupposed to be sorted or classified by the schema as a whole. Suppose the schema consists only of a heavy woolen swatch and a light cotton one; relative to the alternative features consisting in being-a-summer-dress, being-a-fall-dress, and being-a-winter-dress, the woolen swatch may sample the two latter and

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the cotton swatch the first. But if we add a medium-weight swatch to the schema, the woolen one may now sample only being-a-winter-dress and not being-a-fall-dress. Likewise, a swatch may be a sample of red relative to a feature-space containing red and purple, but a sample of pink relative to a space containing red, pink, and purple. None of these conditions is strictly speaking either necessary or sufficient. They indicate the kinds of desiderata that affect sampling, and they may be realized in practice in more than one way. Moreover, one object may simultaneously belong to more than one schema, exemplifying more than one feature relative to the different schemata, all in the same context. Thus exemplification is not only context dependent but often ambiguous.[13]

In sum, pictures both represent and exemplify. Just as important, they do both simultaneously. The same picture can represent Napoleon riding a horse at the head of his army and exemplify a color, brush stroke, style (hyperrealist or impressionistic), the texture of its canvas, or (metaphorically) a mood (suspense), emotion (fear), or moral value (courage). Depending on the kind of picture it is (e.g., a classical illusionistic painting), its representational content may be of greater interest; for another kind (e.g., abstract nonrepresentational art) its exemplified features may be paramount. And not only pictures but also words in literature or poetry and sounds in music may represent and exemplify. (Hence, 'picture' should be understood broadly here.) But what is most important for our purposes is that pictures not only represent *and* exemplify but also that they *do both without canceling each other and without being ambiguous or polysemous*. The two referential relations go in their different directions, neither conflicting nor interfering with each other.

III. Analog versus Digital

The second pictorial motif I want to recruit for our account of quotation draws from so-called structural theories of pictures, accounts that focus on the syntactic and semantic features of pictures and representations and their structural relations.[14] Looking ahead to our application to quotation, I will limit myself here to syntactic features and structure. By 'syntactic' I mean those features of the picture that enable them to depict or represent what they do: for example, the colors, hues, saturation, brightness, and shapes of color photographs or paintings, the light and dark regions of

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black-and-white photos or etchings, and the line configurations and thicknesses in line drawings. If the semantic features of a picture are those features of what is depicted (a scene, a person, anything in the world) that the picture depicts it as possessing, then its syntactic features are those features of the picture that are necessary to enable it to depict what it does—and those features will ipso facto vary with changes in what is depicted. So if what is depicted is a red round apple, then the syntactic features of the picture will include a red oval-like region.

For now I will focus on one particular syntactic feature of pictures that we can intuitively describe as the fact that any difference, no matter how small—the least discernible difference—in any of their syntactic features (color, hue, brightness, saturation, shapes, lightness or darkness, direction or thickness of a line), marks a difference in their (pictorial) identity. Change any of the above features of a picture; the result is a different picture. Different philosophers have formally articulated this pretheoretical idea in different ways. Goodman characterized it in terms of the syntactic density of a scheme, or class, of symbol-types (or characters), where a type is a class of tokens that are *replicas* of one another. Let's say that each type K_i in a scheme *S* is *finitely differentiated* if and only if for every two types *K* and *K′* and every token *k* that does not actually belong to both, determination either that *k* does not belong to *K* or that *k* does not belong to *K′* is theoretically possible. The scheme S is *dense* just in case its types are *not* finitely differentiated; no token can be determined to belong to exactly one rather than to many other types. Another way of putting this is to say that S is *syntactically dense* if it contains infinitely many types (characters) so ordered that between each two there is a third; therefore, the types in a dense schema differ smoothly or continuously (Goodman 1976, 135–141).[15]

Goodman's own interest in the syntactic density of pictures stemmed from his program to distinguish between different symbol systems (or, loosely, languages, each corresponding to one of the arts—pictures, music, dance) according to principles governing their notations. These notational principles, in turn, furnish us with criteria to identify or individuate types (simple and compound, such as works) within each symbol system. Thus, it was his concern with the identity conditions of pictures that motivated Goodman's focus on this syntactic feature.[16]

John Haugeland (1998a) proposed a second way to articulate the intuition that what is distinctive of pictures is that the least difference makes

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a difference but his motivation was different from Goodman's. Haugeland was concerned with what is distinctive about digital (and by implication analog) devices, which he conceptualized as procedures for writing and reading tokens of different types—that is, procedures for producing tokens, given the types they are supposed to belong to, and, given tokens, procedures for assigning them to types. He argued that the digital has procedures that are both "positive" and "reliable," meaning that their read-write procedures are absolutely successful and can be counted on to succeed almost always. Analog devices are those whose procedures are not positive and reliable in these ways. Since words are paradigms of digital devices and pictures are paradigms of the analog, this yields a way of distinguishing the two. Haugeland then went on to propose two sets of three conditions that have to be met by digital and analog devices respectively to enable them to yield their respective kinds of read-write procedures. Here is a slightly streamlined version of Haugeland's characterization that will make my main point.

Digital devices have read-write procedures characterized by:

D1. Flawless copyability: there are definite, perfect, always effective procedures for replicating or repeating tokens of a type (which is not the same as saying that the manner of reproduction is easy).

D2. Complexity: there are clear, straightforward uniquely determinative modes of composition of complex symbols from primitive ones.

D3. Medium independence: the same structure can be exactly reproduced or realized in different media (in writing, in braille, in italics, in morse code).

Analog devices have read-write procedures characterized by:

A1. Smoothness: all variations are continuous and gapless (or dense).

A2. Within relevant variations, every difference makes a difference. As a result, perfect success at replication may be impossible. However, approximate success—success within a margin of error—is achievable, and we can always try to do better because there is no limit to how well we can improve the procedure to stay within smaller and smaller margins.

A3. Only certain kinds of variations, or dimensions of variation, need be relevant. So, to be analog, the device need not be analog in all respects, only in relevant respects. But there is no saying a priori which of the variations or dimensions are relevant on any given occasion.

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The most important of these features for our purposes are D1, A2, and A3. The key to understanding why digital devices perfectly succeed in replication is *not* because they get every feature right and nothing wrong, but because the class of features that must be right and could count as wrong—the class of features whose rightness or wrongness *matters* for replication—has been delimited in a precise way. Hence, digital replicas do not maximally resemble one another; they must resemble one another only in limited and defined respects, allowing most differences not to count either for or against perfect digital copyability. The analog, on the other hand, is that for which there is no limit to finer and finer discriminations, all of which matter for replication. Hence, a positive procedure, perfect success, is never possible. The best we can ever do with analog representations is achieve approximations: however close we come to success, there is always room for improvement. Unlike digital systems, for whom certain differences do not count against perfect copyability, for the analog, every possible difference counts, hence, nothing ever perfectly succeeds. Only in a context do we make an overall judgment that settles the question of replication in, but only in, that context.

IV. The Transparency of Pictures

Intuitively, what it means to say that pictures are transparent is that we see right through them to what they are about. Of course, none of us make that mistake, taking a picture to be what it is about. Instead Kulvicki (2006, 2014) proposes that transparency is not a property that pictures bear in relation to what they represent, but instead a relation that representations bear to one another relative to a pictorial system.[17] So, talk of 'transparent representations'—representations that see *through* one another—is short for 'representations in transparent representational systems.' To begin with an example, take a clear, focused photograph P_i of a scene S. A (head on) clear, focused photograph P_j of P_i with no remainder will have the very same pictorial properties, shapes and colors, as P_i. And likewise a (third) photograph P_k of P_j of P_i. Contrast this case of photographs with a verbal description D_i of *S*. A description D_j of D_i will have very different features than D_i itself; rather than describe *S*, it will describe the words, phrases, and grammatical structure of D_i. What D_j, a description of the description D_i, is about is not what D_i is about; they have completely different contents. Pictures constitute a transparent representational system, natural language (exemplified

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by verbal descriptions) a nontransparent representational system. In a pictorial system, a representation *P* and a representation *P** of *P* are about the same thing; in language, the description *D* and the description *D** of *D* are not. Transparency is both a syntactic and semantic notion. Representations of other representations in a transparent system are syntactically identical to each other. And because the one is semantically a *representation* of the other, and "because syntactic identity entails semantic identity, representations of representations in transparent systems are about just what their objects are about" (Kulvicki 2006, 49–50). Hence, in a pictorial (and, in particular, photographic) system, both the picture *P* and the picture *P** of *P* have the same content and are equally about the scene *S*.[18]

Of course, there is *another* sense of content in which the picture *P* of *S* and the picture *P** of *P* are not about the same thing and do not have the same content. One is a picture of a scene, the other a picture of a picture. The sense in which the pictures are semantically identical—same content, about the same thing—in a transparent symbol system is that their syntactic identity that, in turn, determines their semantic identity is determined by, and limited to, the *syntactically relevant* properties (SRPs) in their pictorial system, *qua* pictures. The SRPs of pictures are, roughly speaking, the shapes and colors on their surfaces. More specifically, they are the planar shapes and determinate colors on the picture's surface and, even more specifically, and in a pictorial system in linear perspective, they are the shapes that are invariant under projective transformations (corresponding to different perspectives or angles) and their determinate colors. Thus the kind of content that representations in a transparent symbol system share—what both *P* and *P** are equally about—is their perspective-invariant shapes and determinate colors. This notion of content is what John Haugeland called the "skeletal" or "bare bones" sense of content: "certain variations of incident light with respect to direction" (Haugeland 1998b, 189) or, as Kulvicki puts it, "the abstract pattern of light and dark [depicted] from a certain angle" (Kulvicki 2014, 101). Furthermore, this is not only what the representation and the representation of the representations are about but also what is *manifest* by the representations (in a transparent system) (see Haugeland 1998b, 189; Kulvicki 2014, 101). And insofar as both the representation and what it is about possess the same skeletal features constituting the representation's transparent semantic content, there is a sense in which they also resemble each other (Kulvicki 2014, 102).[19]

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In contrast to bare-bones or skeletal content, Haugeland and Kulvicki distinguish the *fleshed-out* or *full* content of a representation. This kind of content is determined by more than the SRPs—hence, more than shapes and colors—to include all features that we infer from or are implied (hence "implicit" in) or communicated by the representation, based on common or background knowledge as well as communicative skills, topical associations, and more (Haugeland 1998b, 187).[20] Thus, that a picture is a representation of Napoleon or of an English landscape as opposed to being a representation of another picture or photograph is part of its fleshed-out content. This feature does not determine a picture's pictorial identity, is not determined by SRPs of its system, and counts neither for or against the transparency of the system to which the representation belongs. So, in answer to the objection with which we began, the picture *P* of *S* and the picture *P** of *P* share the same bare-bones content but differ in their fleshed-out content. Finally, natural languages, we have said, are not transparent systems of representation. The interesting question, to which we will return in chapter 8, is whether quotation, notwithstanding the fact that both what quotes and what is quoted are linguistic, is itself transparent.

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5 Quotations as Pictures I: Representational Content

With our toolbox from the theory of pictures in hand, we now turn back to address Davidson's challenge. Quotations (or, more precisely, the quoting words) simultaneously refer in two directions. In one, the words (with the exception of indexicals and demonstratives, to which we next turn) are used with the ordinary referents and meanings they would have were they not quoting. In the other direction, the quoting words refer metalinguistically to words or to something related to the quoting words. This second referent is, if not itself the value the quoting words contribute to the truth conditions of the complete quotation sentence, then an intermediary to that semantic value. The complete quotation-sentence is true just in case the quoted subject *S* produced (said, wrote) a quot*ed* token *related* to the quoti*ng* words. That relation is what involves metalinguistic reference. But before we enter into details, the more general question is how this double reference is even possible, given that the quoting words are not ambiguous. As you may have probably guessed by now, I propose that we explicate the two directions of quotational reference by way of the two directions of pictorial symbolization. The quoting words both represent, that is, denote, objects and individuals, events, and states of affairs *and* exemplify, or serve as samples of, properties, types, or other abstract entities, that in turn are instantiated by quot*ed* tokens. The way the quoting sentential or subsentential phrase is used—that is, understood and truth-evaluated according to what it would mean were it simply used as a self-standing assertion—is analogous to how a picture represents. How the quoting expression refers to the quoted token of the subject is by way of exemplification followed by instantiation.

In this chapter, we address the representational content of a quoting phrase: its compositionally determined propositional content or truth conditions, either extensional or intensional (whose details will vary with one's

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semantics).[1] But keep in mind that the content, or truth conditions, of the *quoting phrase* ("Snow is white") are not those of the *quotation-sentence* ('Tarski said: "Snow is white"'), and that the semantic value of the latter is not a function of the truth-value of the former. We return to the truth conditions of the quotation-sentence in chapters 6 and 8.

I. The Representational Content of the Quoting Phrase

Our job would be much easier if we could read the representational content of a quoting phrase directly off of the phrase itself. But where it contains context-dependent expressions such as indexicals or demonstratives, what does the representing is not just the phrase (type) but its token occurrence (utterance or inscription) in a context. This raises the critical question: What is the relevant *use* relative to which we determine the representational content of the quoting token and in *whose* context—that of the speaker of the quotation sentence '*S* said: "*P*"' or of the quoted subject *S*?

Previous discussions of these question have almost entirely focused on subsentential (mixed) quotation since it was assumed that sentential (direct) quotation was a matter of mentioning, or naming, the sentence enclosed in the inverted commas or q-marks. But by now it should be clear that the same issue arises for sentential as well as subsentential quotation. These discussions have largely revolved around two theoretical questions. The first is whether quotation is a semantic or pragmatic phenomenon and, in particular, whether the inverted commas or q-marks are semantically significant—whether their presence and absence affects the truth conditions of the quotation-sentence and, within it, the quoting phrase—or whether, as C&L (2007) put it, the inverted commas or q-marks are "semantically redundant" and "superfluous." In the latter case there should be no difference in the truth conditions of '*S* said: "*P*"' when we "remove" or "strip off" the inverted commas or q-marks, yielding '*S* said (that) *P*.'[2] But this consequence faces an obvious problem.

Suppose I am talking to my colleague Michael, and I utter:

(1) Quine said that his disagreement with Carnap was "a source of displeasure for each of us."[3]

On the pragmaticist interpretation, according to which the q-marks are semantically insignificant and can be stripped off, (1) ought to have the same truth conditions as (2):

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(2) Quine said that his disagreement with Carnap was a source of displeasure for each of us.

However, 'us' has different semantic values (referents) in (1) and (2). In (1) 'us' apparently refers to the subject Quine and, in the absence of any other contextually *more* salient individual, to Carnap by default.[4] In (2) 'us' refers to some plurality including me the speaker (JS) and (absent a more salient candidate) Michael. Hence, semanticist theorists like C&L conclude, the quotation marks are *not* truth-conditionally superfluous or eliminable; to the contrary, the quoting words exclusively mention the words between the inverted commas and are not used at all.[5]

The second issue arises as part of the pragmaticist's response to the previous objection. Since David Kaplan's (1989) seminal work on demonstratives and indexicals, it has become a dogma in the philosophy of language that these expressions are directly referential terms whose referent (at any world) depends on, varies with, and is fixed in its actual context of utterance—and not in any other counter-actual context. According to the pragmaticist's response to the problem raised by (1)–(2), demonstratives and indexicals in quotation contexts are an exception to this rule. In order to spell this out, I want to digress for a moment to fill in some background from Kaplan's theory of demonstratives, which I will be employing at various points over the next several chapters.

II. A Detour through Kaplan's Contexts and Circumstances

Using demonstratives and indexicals as his paradigms of simple expressions with semantic values—in their case, individual referents—Kaplan argues that we must distinguish two strata within the received conceptions of meaning, sense, or proposition. Consider the first-person indexical 'I.' Any account of this expression must explain (i) how its linguistic meaning—what competent speakers of the language know about the expression in virtue of their linguistic knowledge—namely, the rule (I)

(I) Each occurrence of 'I' directly refers to the agent of the context, e.g., its speaker

is the same for all speakers and across all utterances, while (ii) the referent of each utterance of 'I' varies with the identity of its speaker. According to the received (Fregean) picture, a rule like (I) is the constituent that 'I' contributes

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to propositions or thoughts, identifying the meaning of a term with its truth-conditional component. Call that propositional component the 'sense' of the expression. This leads to the obvious problem that the same sense should determine the same referent on all utterances, contrary to (ii). But this is not the only problem. The truth-value of an utterance depends on two factors: what it says and the facts in the world. Suppose Quine and I (JS) each utter (3), while speaking to Carnap:

(3) I disagree with you.

Keeping the facts constant, it is surely possible for Quine's utterance to be true and mine false at a given world. Therefore, *what is said* by our respective utterances, not only their referents, but also their propositional components or truth conditions must differ. For Kaplan this notion of *what is said* is basic. What is said by *my* utterance of (3), the proposition it expresses, can be represented as:

(3a) <JS, Carnap, *Disagrees*>

and Quine's by:

(3b) <Quine, Carnap, *Disagrees*>

So, while the linguistic meaning of (3) remains constant, *what is said*, its propositional content or truth conditions, like the referent, also varies from utterance to utterance. Therefore, Kaplan concludes, linguistic meaning and what is said/propositional/truth-conditional content must be distinguished within the received theory's multipurpose notion of sense. Kaplan calls these two substrata its *character* and (propositional) *content*.

The *content* of a sentence (uttered in a context), a proposition, is what is evaluated at a circumstance (a pair of world and time) to determine its truth-value (at that circumstance). The contents of subsentential expressions are their contributions to their respective propositions. In a possible worlds semantics, contents can be represented as intensions: functions from the set of possible circumstances to the appropriate type of extension (or, equivalently, as sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true). For our purposes, no particular formal analysis of content is necessary, but Kaplan also represents propositions as more sentence-like structures (like (3a) and (3b)). For reasons that will become clear, this way of representing propositions (rather than as functions or as sets of possible circumstances, or worlds) will also be helpful for us.

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This notion of content is more or less familiar; what is novel in Kaplan's theory is *character*, the notion he proposes to correspond to the linguistic meaning known by speakers that remains constant across utterances, such as (I) for 'I.' More formally, *character* is the semantic property (or value) of an expression (type) that determines, for each context of utterance, the content of (a token of) the expression (type) in that context. As in (I), a character can be informally stated as a descriptive rule that specifies the feature of the context on which the content of the expression depends. And as with contents, Kaplan also proposes that we represent characters as functions—from the set of possible contexts to the appropriate type of content.

I should add—and it will be important for our coming discussion—that all expressions in the language are assigned characters (just as they all have linguistic meanings), but only those that are context sensitive (like indexicals) have *nonconstant* characters that determine different contents in different contexts. Eternal expressions have *constant* (or stable) characters, determining the same content in every context. Hence, any two eternal (non-context-sensitive) expressions will have different (the same) characters if and only if they have different (the same) contents expressed in all the same contexts. This is not an entirely happy consequence, as we will see.

Following Kaplan, let's symbolize the character of an expression *ø* by '{*ø*}' (a function from contexts to contents) and its (propositional, truth-conditional) content (a function from possible worlds to extensions at a world or, for sentences, its truth-value at a world) by '{*ø*}(*c*),' where *c* is a context. Finally, if we evaluate the content of *ø* uttered in *c* at a world *w* (namely, '{*ø*}(*c*)(*w*)'), we yield its extension or referent at that world.

In addition to this new trilevel semantics, Kaplan also makes the claim—mentioned earlier but let's now call it "direct reference" (DR)—that indexicals and demonstratives are directly referential terms, whose contents are always fixed by their characters in their context of utterance as opposed to determined by a content evaluated at a circumstance. What this means in nontechnical language is twofold. First, it means that the rule of use (I) for 'I' should not itself be taken to be its respective propositional content that we then apply at each circumstance to determine its referent at that circumstance. Rather, the rule (I) picks out the relevant feature or parameter in the context—namely, the individual agent making the utterance—and makes *him* the propositional component.[6] So, given an utterance of (3) in a context *c*, in which Quine is speaking and Carnap addressed, the factors

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relevant to determining its truth at any circumstance (*w*, *t*) will be whether Quine disagrees with Carnap, not whether some speaker in that circumstance disagrees with an addressee in that circumstance. Because this is true at any circumstance at which we evaluate (3) uttered in *c*, this also entails that indexicals and demonstratives like 'I' are rigid designators (in Kripke's sense). But what is more important for Kaplan than the fact that the same individual *turns out* to be designated in all circumstances is that it is the individual referent fixed by the character in the context who then becomes the propositional component. Hence, it is no surprise that *that person* is the same value for 'I' at all circumstances. In other words, it is because of DR that Kaplan thinks of the proposition expressed by (3) in *c* as a singular proposition (like (3a) or (3b)) containing the individuals themselves, rather than as a conceptual or descriptive set of conditions that uniquely determines the same individuals when evaluated at all possible circumstances.[7]

The singular propositions that Kaplan takes to be the (propositional) content for utterances of sentences containing indexicals correspond in language to what Haugeland calls (see chapter 4) bare-bones or skeletal representational content for pictures; their perspective-invariant—or perspectivally neutral or free—shapes and determinate colors. This bare-bones content is to be distinguished from fleshed-out content, which includes information drawn from extralinguistic skills, inferences, presuppositions, and implicatures—in a word: context. Similarly, I propose, for the representational content of quotations. Their content is what remains invariant when we abstract from extralinguistic skills, inferences, presuppositions, and implicatures; hence, it is skeletal relative to fleshed-out content. Likewise, although the individuals and properties in singular propositions may be fixed *in* a context, the different contextual perspectives carried by (the characters of) the indexicals in the quot*ing* and quot*ed* phrases are not *part* of their content.[8] However, for reasons that will become clear, in the coming chapters we may prefer to represent bare-bones content (a.k.a. singular propositions) not by using names of individuals and properties, but as the values of characters applied to contexts (e.g., {*e*}(*c*)).

The second claim made by DR—that the semantic values (contents, direct referents) of directly referential terms are always fixed in their contexts of utterance—is that there can be no operators—Kaplan calls them 'monsters begat by elegance'—in natural language that applied to their characters shift the fixing of their semantic value to a *context* other than

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their actual context of utterance.[9] So, for example, there can be no operator 'In some context it is true that' that would render

(4) In some context it is true that I disagree with you

true in my context of utterance *c* just in case in some other context *c** the speaker in *c** disagrees with the addressee in *c**. If there were such an operator, then the occurrence of "I" in its scope, Kaplan argued, would violate DR: it would take the propositional content of the indexical not to be the individual fixed in its context of utterance but some sort of descriptive condition that is evaluated in the (circumstances of a) nonactual context. Rather, as Kaplan puts it, the "uncontrollable" (character of) the indexical "will simply leap out of [any operator's] scope to the front of the operator" (Kaplan 1989, 510). Hence, the direct referent of any term, indexical, or demonstrative will be fixed in its actual context of utterance, never shifted to another possible context.

III. Back to Quotation: Two Undesirable Solutions

At the end of §I, we left off with the problem that arises on the pragmaticist's view that the inverted commas around quoting phrases are semantically insignificant, superfluous, and eliminable. On her view, the truth conditions of (1) and (2) ought to be the same. But they aren't, because in (2) the indexical 'us' refers to the speaker of the utterance and a salient member of *that person's* context while in (1) it refers to the subject of the quotation-sentence, Quine, and the most salient member of his context, Carnap. Now, with Kaplan's DR thesis in hand, we understand why 'us' in (2) directly refers to what it does, but how does Kaplan account for the indexical in (1)? One might think that this passage answers our question:

> There is a way to control an indexical, to keep it from taking primary scope, and even to refer it to another context. . . . Use quotation marks. If we *mention* the indexical rather than *use* it, we can, of course, operate directly on it. . . . If [these operators] stay in the metalanguage and confine their attention to sentences as in
>
> In some contexts "I am not tired now" is true
>
> they are rendered harmless and even do socially useful work. (Kaplan 1989, 510–511)

But in fact Kaplan's positive proposal in this passage does not solve *our* problem. Our problem is to explain the behavior of indexicals in quotations

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like (1) in which their intuitive semantic values are Quine and, say, Carnap, not the speaker and auditor, JS and Michael. Kaplan proposes to *mention* the sentence containing the indexical. But, as we have already noted, an indexical that is mentioned has *no* indexical interpretation, neither the individual fixed in its context of utterance nor one fixed in some other context, like that of the quoted utterance (in which Quine and Carnap would be the values). Instead, what is mentioned is the indexical *type*, interpreted only by its character which, out of context, has no indexical content, no direct referent, either its actual speaker or the quoted subject. Our concern is to account for our intuitive understanding of quotation-sentences whose quoting indexicals do have individuals as values but, according to Kaplan's theory, the *wrong* values—unless we allow "monsters" that shift the context of interpretation of the quoting indexicals.

Kaplan makes two negative claims in DR. The first is descriptive or empirical: that natural language (or English) contains no context-shifting operators, or monsters. The second is the conceptual claim that monsters "*could not be added to*" to English because that would violate DR.[10]

It is always risky for philosophers to make empirical or descriptive claims and, sure enough, linguists soon countered with cross-linguistic data taken from languages like Ewe, Zazaki, Amharic, and Slave, all of which seem to allow monsters.[11] However, apart from the empirical claim that there are monsters in natural language, what is more important for us is that the pragmaticist theorists of quotation, who claim that the q-marks are eliminable and not semantically significant, then propose to account for counterexamples like (1) by positing a quoted-context-shifting monster lurking somewhere in the quotation-sentence; that is, they hypothesize an implicit operator that shifts the context that determines the direct referent or content of, say, 'us' in (1) to the context of the quoted subject. In fact, some propose this strategy to account not only for the referents of quoting indexicals but also for improper uses of quoting words or non-words (such as 'philtosopher' or 'refudiate' (chapter 3, (18)–(19)). If we posit a language or idiolect parameter in contexts, then a lurking monster might shift the language or idiolect from that of the speaker of the quoting utterance (in which the quoting words are improper) to the language parameter in the context of the quoted subject (in which they are not)—thereby killing two birds with one stone.[12]

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In sum, the two debates over the semantic significance of q-marks and context-shifting monsters leave us with two unattractive alternatives: either we surrender the appearance that quoting phrases have the "use" truth conditions they would have outside quotation-contexts and concede that the quoting phrase only mentions the quoted phrase (and find some other nonsemantic explanation for the intuitively understood content), or we radically revise our present DR-constrained semantics of indexicals to mandate context-shifting operators.

IV. A Fregean Proposal

I want to propose a third strategy that requires us neither to deny that quoting (sentential and subsentential) phrases are used nor to appeal to context-shifting monsters.[13] Here is another way to think about the representational or use interpretation of the quotation-sentence. Quotation has two aims: to attribute to the quoted subject *what* they said and *how* they said it, that is, the words that person used (and in some cases, its manner of speech, its pronunciation, and more). In our terminology, *what* was said is articulated by the *representational* content of the utterance of the quoting phrase; *how* it was said falls in its exemplificational content. Here we are concerned with the representational content (and we will turn to the exemplificational in chapter 6).

Where the quoted phrase contains no indexicals or (semantically) context-sensitive expressions, there is no problem reporting its bare-bones content using a replica of the same type in the quoting context, however different the contexts may be. And because *what is said* by a sentential quoting phrase (in its quoting context)—namely, its representational content—is standardly taken to be what is expressed by the complement clause of a corresponding indirect discourse report (whose subject is the quoted speaker), where it contains no indexicals, a complement clause that is a replica of the same type as the quoting phrase (or homophonic to it) will express the same content. Therefore, that complement clause will also express the (representational) content of the quot*ed* phrase. And similarly, for subsentential quoted phrases, with the added proviso that its (representational) content must be of a type that will compose with the content of the non-quoted words in the indirect discourse report complement clause to yield a proposition.

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However, where the quoting phrase contains indexicals, the two aims—to report what and how—come apart. Consider an utterance of (5) in a quot*ed* context *c** in which Quine is the speaker:

(5) I disagree.

Its bare-bones representational content in *c**, what is said, is

(5.1) <*Q, Disagrees*>

I (JS) can report this content (5.1), expressed by (5) in *c**, in a quot*ing* context *c* using the sentential quotation

(6) Quine said: "I disagree."

However, I cannot report the content (5.1) in *c*, by the indirect discourse sentence

(7) Quine said that I disagree

for the obvious reason that, when used by me in *c*, 'I' refers to JS, not Quine. Instead, in the quoting context *c* we must substitute for the quoted phrase a different phrase that tracks its bare-bones content (5.1) across the change in contexts from *c** to *c*.

How, then, should we articulate the representational content of an indexical in a quot*ed* phrase in the quot*ing* context? The one thing we know for certain is that we cannot simply "strip off" or remove the q-marks while replicating the quoted phrase (C&L 2007, 30). In principle, there are three other alternatives.

(a) Express that content using *any* other phrase with the same bare-bones content regardless of its character, for example, substitute a co-directly referring proper name for the first person indexical. In this case, we not only change the character specific to the quoted indexical; we also substitute an expression of stable character for one that is nonstable.[14]

(b) Express the bare-bones content with a characterless term (e.g., a variable or pronoun bound to the quoted subject). So, for Quine's quoted utterance of "I disagree" we report its representational content by the complement clause of

(8) Quine said that he disagrees,

where 'he' is a pronoun bound to (or whose anaphoric antecedent is) the subject 'Quine.'

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(c) Express the bare-bones content in the quoting context with a different indexical that nonetheless preserves the non-stable character of the quoted indexical, for example, with 'he himself' as a third-person "quasi-indexical" that refers to Quine in the reflexive manner distinctive of the quoted first-person indexical 'I.'[15] Such an indirect discourse sentence whose complement clause expresses what was said by the quoted utterance of (5) would be

(9) Quine said that he himself disagrees.

All three of these options preserve the bare-bones representational content of the quoted utterance in the quoting context, but the third alone takes into account the norms governing our use of indexicals, in and out of quotations, to preserve contents across shifts in context and contextual perspective. As Frege noted long ago, as speakers we know conventional "rules" for converting one indexical into another as the context of utterance changes in order to preserve the intended content of an indexical in its original context.

> If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday using the word "today," he must replace this word with "yesterday." Although the thought is the same its verbal expression must be different so that the sense, which would otherwise be affected by the differing times of utterance, is re-adjusted. The case is the same with words like "here" and "there." . . . The pointing of fingers, hand movements, glances may belong here too. (Frege 1956, 296)

To be sure, the full range of indexicals and demonstratives is more difficult to navigate than Frege's simple examples suggest. We know a rule for converting 'today' into 'yesterday,' but already the rules for converting 'here' (for proximal locations) into 'there' (for co-referring distal or remote locations), 'now' (the present time) into 'then' (a past time), and 'that' or 'this' into 'it' are less exact. And for 'I' (apart from Castañeda's quasi-indexicals) and 'you,' we have only the third-person 'she/he/they' (where it is an indexical rather than a bound pronoun or an abbreviation for the complex demonstrative 'That woman/man/person').[16]

Nonetheless, Frege's deeper insight is that when we learn the 'meanings' of indexicals, we do not learn them individually one by one, but as part of a coordinate system relating indexical expressions to their respective contexts (Higginbotham 1988). So, to learn the meaning of 'today' as uttered on d, one also learns that to refer to d on (d+1) one must substitute 'yesterday' for

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'today.' And similarly for 'I,' 'you,' and 'she,' 'he,' 'they,' 'here' and 'there,' and 'now' and 'then.' As speakers, we know that we accommodate changes in context while preserving content by converting indexicals. Therefore, in order for me JS to express in *c* what was said by Quine with (5) in *c** I must use something like (9). The same rule applies if we want to articulate the use/representational content of the subsentential quotation (1): 'us' must be replaced by 'them.' Again, the one thing we cannot do is report (1) by (2) precisely because the context has changed.[17]

In sum, two norms govern the interpretation of indexicals in quotations:

Insulation: Indexicals in a quotation (i.e., in the quot*ing* phrase) are insulated from the *quoter's* or *quoting* context,

and

Never: Never quote out of context—that is, always preserve the content of the quot*ed* phrase in its quot*ed* context (or, equivalently, never interpret a quot*ing* phrase *P* out of the linguistic context '*S* said: "*P*,"' including the reporting frame '*S* said').

If we follow those two norms, we need not surrender our intuitive understanding that the (q-mark-free) quoting phrase has a use interpretation in its context (contra the semanticist who claims that it only mentions the quoted phrase), and we also do not have to "monstrously" revise the semantics of demonstratives and indexicals to capture the *right* (representational) truth-conditional content for the quoting phrase as used in *its* context. Because the context of the quoting utterance is always different from the context of the quoted utterance—and even when one quotes oneself, it is at a different time—we should follow Frege's rules to convert indexicals into other indexicals (or at least into pronomial variables) in order to preserve quoted bare-bones representational content.[18]

Let me make this a bit more explicit (although a full analysis of the compositional semantics will follow in chapter 8). Let *c** be the context of a subject *S*'s quot*ed* utterance and let *c* be the context of the quoting speaker. Let *P* be a (sentential or subsentential) phrase containing at least one indexical *i*, and let *j* be an indexical (which may or may not be of the same type as *i*) such that $\{i\}(c^*) = \{j\}(c)$. And let *P/P′* be the same phrase as *P* except that where *P* contains *i*, *P/P′* contains *j*. So, the representational content of the quoted utterance of the phrase *P* containing the indexical *i*, uttered in *c**, namely $\{\text{". . . } i \text{ . . ."}\}(c^*)$, will be identical to the content of

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an utterance of *P/P*—namely, {"*. . . j . . .*"}(*c*)—in a quotation-sentence '*S* said: "*P/P′*" (= "*. . . j . . .*")' uttered in *c*. Alternatively, we can say that the representational content of *P* in '*S* said: "*. . . P . . .*"' is the representational content of *P/P′* in '*S* said that *P/P′*.' In other words, the norms of quotation and indexicals dictate that in order to express and preserve the representational content of *S*'s utterance of *P* in *c**, we must quote it in any other context *c* using *P/P′* whose indexicals are conversions of those in *P* with the same content.[19] There are no monsters in these conditions since each of the indexicals *i*, *j* is interpreted (i.e., assigned its content) relative to its respective context of utterance. The quoted indexical *i* gets its content in *its* context of utterance *c** and *j* gets its in *c* (cf. Maier 2016, 370). In chapters 6 and 8 we shall refine this claim, but let me emphasize again that this is not the truth-condition for the quotation *sentence* '*S* said: "*P*"'; it is simply the representational content of the quot*ing* phrase *P*.

Nonetheless, the pragmatic theorist might object that for all practical purposes my proposal takes the q-marks to be monsters. What, after all, is the difference between evaluating the quoting indexical in the counteractual context of the quoted speaker, that is, context-shifting à la monsters, and changing the indexical in order to preserve the quoted referent or content across the change in context? In response, one difference is that the context to which the indexical is anchored remains the actual one, not a counteractual one, preserving DR. Second and more important, indexical conversion to track changes across contexts is part and parcel of the norms governing our practices of reporting the contents of utterances containing indexicals in general; there is nothing here specific to quotation. Inasmuch as we learn individual indexicals as part of a system that is built to track changes over contexts, one need not populate the semantics specific to quotation with monsters simply in order to accommodate them.

To conclude this chapter, I am proposing that the use or representational (bare-bones) content of a quotation-sentence containing a sentential or subsentential quoting phrase (semantically) entails the corresponding indirect discourse statement whose complement phrase is obtained by (i) stripping the q-marks from the quoting phrase and (ii) converting any indexicals and demonstratives to quasi-indexicals in coordination with the change in context and in accordance with the norms governing the use of indexicals. Preserving its content across the change of perspectives from context to context is what makes the use interpretation of the quoting

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phrase *representational*. One might also say, then, that (sentential and subsentential) quotation is 'built up' out of indirect discourse insofar as the complement clause in the latter expresses the representational content of the former. Whatever turns out to be the true account of indirect discourse, we can now explain why the quoting phrase is *both* understood as if it were used—hence, why it semantically and syntactically interacts with its containing matrix—*and* opaque, that is, why substitutivity of co-referential terms fails.[20] The explanation is that its representational content is that expressed by the corresponding indirect discourse report which itself is both used *and* opaque![21] Contrary to Quine, it is not (sentential/direct or pure/mention) quotation that is the paradigm of opacity but indirect discourse (and, more generally, the propositional attitudes).[22]

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6 Quotations as Pictures II: Exemplificational Content

I. What Does the Quoting Phrase Exemplify?

The compositionally determined truth-value of the quotation-sentence '*S* said: "*P*"' is not a function of the representational content of the (sentential or subsentential) quoting phrase *P*. Rather, the exemplificational content of *P* is what yields the quoted inscription or utterance attributed to the quoted subject that determines the truth or falsity of the quotation-sentence, its semantic value.[1] In other words, the quotation-sentence is true if and only if there is a (quot*ed*) utterance or inscription by *S* of a phrase "quotationally related" to the quot*ing* phrase *P*. This "quotational" relation between the quoting and quoted tokens involves two steps: (i) the quot*ing* phrase exemplifies or samples a property or abstract object like a type or representation, which is (ii) instantiated by a token the quoted subject spoke or inscribed. The relation is asymmetrical: the quot*ing* token must both possess the exemplified property (type, representation, etc.) *and* refer to it, while the quot*ed* token need only instantiate the type, property, or representation (in its context). It is not enough for the quoting phrase simply to possess the property or to token a type in order to exemplify it. The quoting phrase token "has" an innumerable number of properties such as being tokened on a particular date, inscribed in ink or pencil, consisting of *n* number of letters, and so on, few of which it exemplifies or samples. Having the property or type is not enough; the quoting phrase must also refer to it.[2] For this reason, too, the exemplified property or representation is not the use interpretation or representational content of the quoting phrase, that is, it is not *what it says*. On the other hand, the quoting phrase *qua* exemplifying or sampling token is also not an uninterpreted sequence of letters or a brute shape. It is the phrase *with* its representational (bare-bones) content, interpreted in the

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same way that the quoted phrase was used and interpreted in its quoted context. Hence, even though the representational content of the quot*ing* phrase is not a direct factor in determining the truth-value of the quotation-sentence, it is nonetheless 'active' in the process.

What does a quoting phrase, or its words, exemplify, sample, and thereby refer to? The semantic value of (an utterance or inscription of) the quot*ing* phrase, its contribution to the compositional truth conditions of the quotation-sentence, is another utterance or inscription—of the quot*ed* phrase. However, our only "access" to that quoted token, which is generally in the past, is indirect: via the present quoting token. The quoting phrase-token exemplifies—both instantiates *and* refers to—an abstract entity, a property or type or something else, which in turn is instantiated by the quoted subject's phrase-token. We first 'ascend' from our concrete quot*ing* token t_1 to an intermediate *exemplified* abstract entity T from which we in turn 'descend' to the concrete quot*ed* token t_2 that instantiates T. As my choice of letters hints, the standard candidate for this 'intermediate exemplified entity' is an expression *type*. For those who don't like the detour through Plato's heaven, it ought to be possible to reroute using only concrete tokens (or interpret the type or property extensionally). However, it is important to incorporate the referential element into the story—without it, there is no exemplification—and it is not obvious how one token can directly *refer* to another token, circumventing types, even if it replicates it and no matter how much it resembles it.

Word types have been recently criticized on a number of fronts (see, e.g., Kaplan 1990, 2011; Wetzel 1993, 2002, 2008; Szabó 1999; Lepore and Hawthorne 2011). Our standard ways to individuate them by recognitional features of their tokens, either orthographic or phonological, are problematic. Some object to their Platonistic metaphysics; others propose that we think of (word) types as human artifacts or natural objects that undergo change and development over time. But even apart from these ontological problems, there are reasons specific to the phenomenon of quotation not to tie ourselves to types as exemplificanda—certainly not exclusively, and perhaps not at all.

First, the thought that the quoting and quoted expressions must be tokens of one type seems to be motivated by the verbatim requirement (VR) and conflation with mentioning. However, as we saw in chapters 1 and 2, even if VR generally requires that quoting and quoted tokens be word-for-word and order-identical replicas of each other—hence, of one type—that

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constraint is based not on linguistic or semantic factors, but on matters of law: a particular conception of copyright and authorial ownership of one's words as private property.[3] From a semantic point of view, it is helpful to distinguish two issues here: (i) the metalinguistic dimension of quotation—the fact that the quoting word token refers to another linguistic entity—and (ii) the specific requirement that quotation obeys VR. The two are separable. Furthermore, unlike the mention-expression that exclusively denotes what is contained between the inverted commas, or m-marks, exactly as it occurs, quotation does not involve containment and what is exemplified depends not only on what is interior to or inside the q-marks but also on a variety of external contextual parameters. As I said in chapter 2, what counts as 'verbatim' itself varies with context and the purpose of the quotation. Sometimes we "clean up" quotations; other times it may be crucial not to 'correct' but to preserve the broken, defective quoted token with all its noise. To deal with these diverse cases, we need a sufficiently malleable thing that can play the intermediate role of exemplificandum in our story.[4]

A second reason not to limit ourselves to word types is that not only tokens of a type are quoted. Although all quotations must involve a vehicle for representational content, some also quote—attribute to the quoted subject—a phonological or inscriptional feature of the quoted utterance or inscription, for example, a speaker's pronunciation or intonation, the kind of sign (the font, color, size) with which he inscribed his expression, his language, or his manner of speech.[5] Recall Potts's examples of the different pronunciations of 'apricot' in (repeated here)

(1a) When in Santa Cruz, Peter orders "[eɪ]pricots" at the local market.

(1b) When in Amherst, Peter orders "[æ]pricots" at the local market. (Potts 2004a)

Or if George Washington inscribed words in script

(2a) *I slept here,*

in contexts in which we also want to quote his style of handwriting, one might truly report

(2b) George Washington inscribed above his bed: "*I slept here*"

but deny

(2c) George Washington inscribed above his bed: "**I slept here**."[6]

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And sometimes, in order to quote figures known by their accent and flair, one must replicate those features in the quoting performance:

(3) And then Greta Garbo said: "I vant to be alone!" (Recanati 2001, 2011)

At the very least, to allow for this variety of quoted things (which now include more than words and their types), we will add to the properties and abstract entities that can be exemplified by the quoting phrase abstract "linguistic objects" that represent word morphology, syntactic category, semantic interpretation, phonological interpretation, and perhaps more—such as the nonlinguistic representation of the sign in which the expression is articulated or of its manner of delivery.[7]

These examples support two additional hypotheses. First, we said that the semantic value of the quoting phrase is determined by what it exemplifies, although what does the exemplifying is in part individuated by its bare-bones representational content. Potts (2004) observes that the representational contents of

(4a) Chris exclaimed: 'I love "[eɪ]pricots," not "[æ]pricots"'

namely, the complement clause in

(4b) Chris exclaimed that he (himself) loves apricots, not apricots

and, similarly, the content of (5a) expressed by the complement clause of (5b)

(5a) Chris said: '"[eɪ]pricots" are the best but "[æ]pricots" suck'

(5b) Chris said that apricots are the best but apricots suck

are each self-contradictory. Likewise, compare (6a) with its representational content in (6b):

(6a) Chris did not know that "[eɪ]pricots" and "[æ]pricots" are the same fruit.

(6b) Chris did not know that apricots and apricots are the same fruit.

In these examples, the semantic values of the subsentential quoting phrases are a function of the phonological representations they exemplify, not their representational contents. Although these quotation sentences have these (trivial or absurd) representational contents or truth conditions, they are not the factor that determines whether or not we are truly quoting Chris. What is exemplified does.[8] So, if Chris said

(4c) Chris: 'I love "[eɪ]pricots," not "[æ]pricots"'

and I report him with

(4d) Chris said that he loves "[æ]pricots," not "[eɪ]pricots"

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I have misquoted him and (4d) is false, even though the complement clause has the same representational content as (4c). It is the different exemplified *phonological* representations that make the difference in truth-value.

By similar reasoning, I want to propose that it is their semantic representations, or characters, not the individuals or properties that constitute their bare-bones representational contents (or singular propositions), that are exemplified by quoting phrases and thereby determine whether tokens are "quotationally related." Here I take a semantic representation to be a representation of the linguistic meaning of a word—what a speaker knows in virtue of his knowledge of language proper (including his lexical knowledge)—and the linguistic meaning of an expression, following Kaplan (1989), to be its character as opposed to its (propositional) content. This is obvious in the case of indexicals, and I will return to non-indexicals in a moment. For indexicals, we might even say that their character individuates their word type. So, by exemplifying its character, a phrase in effect exemplifies its type. To quote an utterance that contains an indexical, we must therefore preserve not only the representational content of the quot*ed* utterance, but also its character. If I (JS) want to quote Clark Kent's utterance in *c**

(7) Clark: "I am Superman"

it is not enough that my quoting phrase preserve the perspective-neutral bare-bones representational content of Clark's utterance in his context *c**, namely, what is said in the complement clause of

(8) Clark said that he is Superman,

namely, <*C*, *S*, *Identity*>, where *C* and *S* are the (same) individual referent of the names. This content could be equally expressed by (9) or (10):

(9) Clark said: "Superman is Superman."

(10) Clark said: "Clark Kent is Superman."

I also need to build into our representation of that content the *character* of Clark's quoted utterance (7):

(11) <{'I'}, {'Superman'}, {'='}>

whose content in *c** is equally expressed by <{'I"}(*c**), {'Superman'}(*c**)}, {'='}(*c**)>.

Maier (2014) has observed that subsentential quotation is more flexible in its quotation of indexicals than sentential quotation. Thus both (12a)

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and (12b) are equally acceptable as quotations of someone's command to me:

(12) They: "Shove it up your ass."

(12a) They told me to shove it "up my ass."

(12b) They told me to shove it "up your ass."[9]

—Unlike (13a), which is acceptable as opposed to (13b):

(13a) They told me: "Shove it up your ass."

(13b) They told me: "Shove it up my ass."

Maier conjectures that it is VR that legislates for the acceptability of (13a), but one wonders why coordination with its sentential matrix should not equally legislate for the acceptability of (13b). It is not clear how to account for this difference, but in any case it should be noted that neither (14a) nor (14b)

(14a) They told me (JS) to shove it "up JS's ass"

(14b) They told me (JS): "Shove it up JS's ass"

are true or acceptable as quotations of (12), because they do not preserve the indexical character—the context-sensitivity or nonstability—of the quoted utterance even though they have the same representational content. Again, it is the character (or semantic representation) that is exemplified by the quoting token and that must be instantiated by the quoted token.

There is, however, one serious drawback to using character in particular as the kind of semantic representation that must be exemplified for quotation. The problem, as Kaplan (1989) already observed, is that the formal notion is not sufficiently fine-grained to capture differences of linguistic meaning between co-directly referring simple terms (e.g., proper names or common nouns) with stable, that is, context-independent, characters. Any two such terms have the same content (namely, the same direct referent) in all contexts. Since their characters are stable, they ipso facto have the same character. Here is not the place to pursue the project of how to generalize character to cover the linguistic meanings of all expressions; we need something more tightly individuated by the word itself, but we have no better available semantics. I will therefore take it as a working hypothesis that any two simple and even directly co-referring but not identical words Ø and ∂ have different linguistic meanings and (in a loose sense, ignoring the problem just mentioned) different semantic representations. We can still allow many synonyms in an ordinary sense, like 'bachelor' and 'unmarried male,'

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because these two have different characters in virtue of the one being simple and the other compound. However, on our proposal, 'sweat' and 'perspire' will also be required to have different linguistic meanings (hence, characters and semantic representations), as will 'steed' and 'mare' (notwithstanding Frege's view that these differ only in their coloring or associations). In either case, although this proposal individuates semantic representations by their word types (rather than words by their meanings), whenever it appears to be its type that is exemplified or sampled by a quoting phrase, what is really exemplified is its semantic representation and, for that reason, the quoted phrase (token) must possess the same semantic representation exemplified (and thereby referred to) by the quoting phrase (token).

II. Quoting across Languages and Mediums

Taking its character or, more generally, semantic representation to be what is exemplified by the quoting phrase has another advantage. In chapter 2, we cited the possibility of cross-linguistic and cross-medium quotation as one way in which quotation differs from mention. Others have raised these phenomena as an objection to VR and some to the very idea that quoting and quoted tokens must be of the same type. It is clear, in any case, that the practices of interlinguistic and intermedium quotation require norms that cross the standard criteria by which we individuate types by recognitional features specific to a language or medium, either orthographic or phonological. We need norms to govern quotation in one language of an utterance made in another, and the quotation of oral utterances by written inscriptions, and of inscriptions by utterances. Now, types presumably are relative to specific languages and media. But if we take what is exemplified to be a character or semantic representation—which are not language specific—we can explain under what conditions cross-linguistic and cross-medium quotation is possible: the quoting and quoted phrases in different languages or different mediums must have the same character or semantic representation. In many cases, especially in intralinguistic and intramedium quotation, this is sufficient, and we ignore the language or sign system in which the semantic representation is manifest. Sometimes, however, what is quoted is not just a word with the same linguistic meaning as the quoting word, but also—like intonation or pronunciation—the *language* in which the quoted subject spoke or wrote. In those cases, it is not enough

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that we preserve linguistic meaning; we must also preserve the language of the quoted subject and their utterance, or at least not misquote by implying that the subject spoke a language different from the one they in fact did. Here are two norms that seem to govern cross-linguistic quotation.

(A) Suppose someone utters a sentence S in language L. One can verbatim quote S in language L* using a reporting frame drawn from L* provided the quoter understands S (since he is quoting it with its representational content). So, suppose Yehoshuah meets Aisha on the way to Al-Aqsa and tells her in Hebrew:

(15) Yeshoshua: Ani gar be-Yerushalayim.

I can report him with

(16) Joshua said: "Ani gar be-Yerushalayim"

provided I understand Hebrew, in which case the quoting phrase in (16) has both representational and exemplificational content—although the sentence is a language-salad. If I don't understand Hebrew, it is less clear whether I am quoting Yehoshuah or simply mentioning his utterance. However, I can also quote Yehoshua's utterance (15), using a translation of S, S* in L*, while also expressing the reporting frame "X said: __" in L*:

(17) Joshua said: "I live in Jerusalem."

The exception is when the quoter also wants to quote the original language of the quoted utterance. For example, Aisha reports her exchange with Yehoshua, telling Maya:

(18) We met on the street to Al-Aqsa, and Joshua said: "I live in Jerusalem."

Maya might deny (18) (metalinguistically) using (19):

(19) That's not what he said. You met in front of Al-Aqsa, and Joshua said: "Ani gar be-Yerushalayim."[10]

Although there is nothing linguistically wrong with (17) or (18) as quotations of (15), in (19) Maya also quotes the language of Joshua's quoted utterance. In (19), what is exemplified by the quoting phrase is not only its semantic representation but also the property of being spoken in Hebrew.

Note that the bare-bones representational content of the quotation-sentence in (19) is

(20) that Joshua lives in Jerusalem (= <Joshua, Jerusalem, *Lives in*>

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but we cannot quote Yehoshua's/Joshua's original utterance (16) by either (21) or (22):

(21) Joshua said: "Joshua lives in Jerusalem"

(22) Yehoshuah amar: "Yehoshuah gar be-Yerushalayim"

even though their representational contents are the same as that of (20), because what must be exemplified and then instantiated by the quot*ed* token in order for the quotation-sentence to be true is the first person indexical character or semantic representation of the Hebrew quot*ing* phrase "*Ani* gar be-Yerushalayim" or English "*I* live in Jerusalem" where {'Ani'} = {'I'}.

(B) If Yehoshua originally uttered (15), I can quote him in English with (17), and I can quote him in Hebrew with

(23) Yehoshua amar: "Ani gar be-Yerushalayim."

But I cannot quote him with

(24) Yehoshua said: "Je vis à Jérusalem"

because the contrast between the languages of the reporting frame and of the quoting phrase makes the language of the latter salient and thereby exemplified in context. Hence, apart from its representational content, (24) attributes to Yehoshua a language in which he did not express himself when he uttered his original quoted expression.

In sum, there is no problem quoting someone across different languages or across different modalities so long as we preserve the characters or semantic representations of the quoted phrases by the quoting phrases—unless the speaker also intends to attribute to the quoted subject the language in which they expressed themself. These examples suggest a rough principle governing what is exemplified in a quotation context analogous to the constraints that govern sampling that we mentioned in chapter 4. In the case of the tailor's booklet of cloth swatches two contextual parameters are at work: what any single swatch samples depends both on the other elements in its schema (the other swatches in the booklet, each of which samples a contrary of each of the others) and on the range of features sorted by the entire schema (color, weave, weight of fabric, etc.). In our examples of quotation across different languages, the context can make salient not only the linguistic meaning, character, or semantic representation of the quoting phrase, but also its *language*, in part by contrast or comparison with

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the language of the reporting frame and in part by contrast with the languages of other utterances in the context. So, when we are trying to quote not only the words of the quoted subject (interpreted with their representational content) via exemplification of their linguistic meaning or semantic representation but also the subject's language, then there must be salient contraries within the language range in the context. To be sure, this is typically much less articulated than the tailor's book of swatches, but there is one moral we can draw from this story, and it also distinguishes quotation from mentioning. Regardless of how the contextual parameters affect it, what is exemplified by the quoting phrase—and, hence, what is quoted—*does not depend solely on features of the quoting phrase itself*, that is, the phrase contained within the inverted commas. This contrasts with the practice of mentioning, or at least with a number of prominent theories of mentioning, according to which what is referred to is always the thing (word type, token, shape) "contained" between or "interior" to the inverted commas.[11] For many authors, this kind of containment or interiority is also what captures the special "intimate" relation that a quotation (or, more precisely, mention-expression) bears to what is quoted (mentioned), which they in turn identify with its pictoriality. On our view, the pictorial dimension of quotation depends instead on the role of exemplification (as distinct from and in addition to representation) in quotational attribution. And what is exemplified depends on the context that determines salience, which is 'outside' the inverted commas. Hence, what is referred to in quotation is not simply a function of what is insulated *within* the inverted commas. On the other hand, since what is exemplified and therefore referred to must also be possessed or instantiated by the quoting expression, what is interior to the inverted commas constrains what is exemplified.

III. Analog versus Digital in Quotation

The distinction between the representational and exemplificational contents of quoting phrases parallels a second theme from the theory of pictures: the analog/digital distinction. The word types of natural languages are paradigms of digital representations that allow perfect copyability or replication, as we saw back in chapter 4. Syntactically, there are perfect, always effective procedures for replicating tokens of one word-type, and there are determinative modes of composition of complex phrases given

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simple ones. However, recall that the reason why digital representations can be replicated perfectly is *not* because their tokens maximally resemble one another but because the number and kinds of features and respects that determine whether a token belongs to a type are severely restricted. Digital identity disregards most features; they count neither for nor against perfect digital copyability. For the analog, on the other hand, there is no limit to differences in features and no end to discriminations that matter for replication; hence, we can never do more than approximate perfect success. Since every possible feature counts in the individuation of an analog representation, only in a context do we make an overall judgment that settles the question of replication in—but only in—that context. Hence, for the analog as for the digital, resemblance is never the measure of replication.[12]

However, their digital status characterizes quoting phrases only insofar as we focus on them as vehicles for their bare-bones representational content. When we focus on the quoting phrase in its role as an *exemplifier* or *sample* of a property or semantic representation, character, phonological representation, or manner-feature, it becomes much more difficult to predict, independently of its context, which of its features matter and which can be ignored, hence, which features need to be preserved and which do not for copyability or replication. For its exemplifying function, we attend to features of the quoting phrase token as a concrete linguistic object, for example, its medium (whether oral or aural or inscribed and seen or heard), the mode by which it refers, the nuances of its linguistic meaning, its associations or coloring, or to the sound or visual features that it makes salient. This in turn has the effect of heightened sensitivity to variation along a potentially unbounded number of relevant dimensions. The same utterances that differ discretely qua representations differ along more continuous and smooth dimensions qua samples or exemplifying objects. So, if what makes a representational system digital, and its symbols replicable, is that we can specify exactly which features are determinative of each type—and which can be ignored—then if every feature may be determinative for *exemplifying* quoting phrases, their exemplificational symbol system is analog or analog-like. Just as there is no way, a priori or in advance, to delineate the necessary features for membership in a type in a pictorial system, the least or most minute difference in features of the quoting phrase (or more precisely, any feature associated with a phrase that belongs to a quotational system) might make a difference to its identity. Thus, the quoting phrase

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that is digital when we attend merely to its representational function (and as it would occur in nonquotational contexts) suddenly takes on new life as an analog symbol when we focus on its exemplificational role. This is a second way in which quotations are pictorial.

IV. Summing Up

At the end of chapter 3 we took up Davidson's challenge to give an account of the double-faced semantic behavior of quotations: the fact that quoting phrases show signs of both ordinary extraquotational use and metalinguistic reference. We then examined and rejected two-dimensional accounts in the literature for failing to explain how the very same quoting phrase can have *both* its ordinary meaning as if it were being used in autonomous assertions *and* a semantic value consisting in the quoted token. Since quotations are not ambiguous or polysemous, we therefore proposed to step outside our standard semantics repertoire to adopt the two-directional model of reference of pictures that simultaneously represent and exemplify. Qua representations, quotations express the bare-bones content of complement clauses of indirect discourse reports of the quoted token with all their internal semantic structure. Qua exemplifier or sample, the quoting phrase refers to a meaning, representation, or property, which, in turn, is instantiated by the quoted token attributed to the quoted subject.

The particular property or linguistic (semantic, phonological, syntactic, lexical) representation exemplified by the quoting phrase on an occasion depends on various features of its context. However, this role of the context is neither semantic (like the role of a contextual parameter, e.g., the speaker, for an indexical character) nor 'presemantic' like the part played by presuppositions in assigning a linguistic type (with a meaning or character) to a sound or shape, for example, the name of a state, person, or river to the sound 'jordan.' Context does function presemantically in determining *whether* the inverted commas are q-marks or m-marks and whether we are facing an instance of quotation or mentioning, but its role in rendering salient what the quoting phrase samples or exemplifies is part of the input to general symbolic skills we employ for pictures as much as for verbal speech.

In chapter 8 we will compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of current proposals in the literature to give compositional semantic analyses of quotation-sentences. Here I will only repeat that the full content of

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a quotation-sentence involves both the representational and exemplificational contents of the quoting phrase. Unlike the two-dimensional accounts of chapter 3, these are not two independent contents. The property or semantic representation exemplified by the quoting phrase that in turn is instantiated by the quoted subject's token is exemplified by the phrase understood according to its representational content, and different representational contents yield different exemplificanda. (Example: 'Trump said: "Build walls around the banks of Mexico!"') So, while the representational content of the quoting phrase does not directly contribute to its exemplified semantic value, it depends on it. To that extent, the representational content of the quoting phrase is *active* in exemplification even if it is not *part* of what is exemplified.[13]

To make this a bit more explicit (but not as explicit as we will get in chapter 8), let *S/S'* be the indirect discourse complement sentence uttered in the speaker's context of utterance *c* that reports (and therefore expresses) the content of *S* as it was uttered in the quoted subject T's own context *c**. Hence, if *S* contains an indexical *i*, *'S/S'* is the sentence that results from substituting for *i* in *S* either a perspectival-free pronoun (or variable) or a quasi-indexical *j* that refers in the speaker's context *c* to what the *i* in *S* referred in the quoted subject's context *c**. As a first stab, the truth conditions for quotation-sentence 'T said: "*S*"' are:

(SQ) "T said: '*S*,'" uttered in *c*, is true in *c* iff, when the content that was, and would be, expressed by *S* in *c** is the content of *that S/S'* in *c* and T expressed that content by uttering a token in *c** that instantiates the representation or property exemplified by the token of '*S*' in *c*.[14]

For example, the quotation sentence 'Trump said: "I'm the greatest"' uttered in *c* is true in *c* if and only if Trump uttered in *c** a token whose representational content is expressed by the complement clause of "Trump said that he's the greatest" (uttered in *c*) and that instantiates the representation (e.g., character) and/or property exemplified by the speaker's token of 'I'm the greatest' in *c*.

Similarly for subsentential quotation: Let '*P*' be a subsentential phrase and, where '*P*' contains an indexical *i*, let '*P/P'*'be the result of substituting for *i* in *P* either a perspectival-free pronoun (or variable) or a quasi-indexical *j* that refers in the speaker's context *c* to what *i* in *S* referred in the quoted subject's context *c**.

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(SSQ) "T said that . . . '*P*' . . . ," uttered in *c*, is true in *c* iff, when the content of '. . . *P/P*' . . .' in *c* is the content of '. . . *P* . . .' in *c** and T expressed that content by uttering, together with other words he used in *c**, a token phrase that instantiates the property or representation exemplified by the token of '*P*' in *c*.

I conclude this chapter with one question many readers may be asking themselves. If exemplification, which is a more general kind of symbolization, is the reference relation by which we fix the semantic value of a quotation, why not say that it is also what determines the semantic value of a mentioning phrase, namely, the mention*ed* phrase, rather than a semantic relation like denotation, naming, or demonstrative reference? Indeed, some examples of mention, such as,

(25) 'BOSTON' is a louder token than 'boston' (where the capital letters signal degree of loudness) (de Brabanter, personal communication),

prima facie suggest that its mode of reference is exemplification or sampling rather than a semantic notion (although one could take the mentioning tokens to be denoting linguistic objects, e.g., phonological representations, as proposed by Potts 2004a). If exemplification and representation are both species of a generic notion of reference, how do we know that it is one rather than the other at work in a given case? And if mention rests on exemplification no different from quotation, the upshot is that there really is no great divide between quotation and mentioning!

I have no knockdown arguments to show either that mentioning is necessarily semantic reference, that is, denotation, rather than a more general symbolic relation like sampling and exemplification, or that it is the former rather than the latter at work in mention.

We saw in chapter 2 that the use of inverted commas for mentioning originated in Frege to disambiguate mention-uses from use-uses of words, and that he seemed to be working with a notion of semantic reference no different from the notion of *Bedeutung* that he employed for the word-object semantic relation. Of course, this is no proof that the present practice is what Frege intended, or Tarski or Quine. However, as Davidson and others have emphasized against the proper name theory, mention-expressions have a rule-governed structure that speakers master as part of learning the language; mentioning is not the kind of arbitrary relation characteristic of proper names. It is a good question whether exemplification captures

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this idea of a general rule speakers master that exploits the structure of mention-expressions, especially if the rule is meant to be linguistic. But even if mentioning, like quotation, employs exemplification, there would still remain one important difference between them: quotation, unlike mention, involves *both* representation *and* exemplification. There may not be conclusive reasons to take mentioning to be either representation or exemplification, but it is never *both* simultaneously—unlike quotation.[15]

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7 Other Explananda for a Theory of Quotation

Thus far we have distinguished quotation from mentioning and explained various linguistic phenomena manifest in our practices of sentential and subsentential quotation, using tools drawn from the theory of pictures. These tools include the two 'directions' of quotational reference—representation and exemplification. Although they refer simultaneously without conflicting, in interaction they give rise to some puzzling phenomena. In the first part of this chapter (§§ I–III), I address these cases.

In the second half (§§IV–VII), I will review additional phenomena involving inverted commas. Some of these examples have been raised by various theorists as problems for other theories of 'quotation'—keeping mind that 'quotation' is generally not distinguished from 'mention.' I will not review this literature, especially that focused on mentioning. But the examples prompt the question of how to identify individual utterances surrounded by q-marks (including pauses and intonation patterns as well as inverted commas) as instances of quotation distinct from mentioning.

I. 'Yes' and 'No' Quotation

Imagine an exchange in which Jack asks: "Will Trump lose in New Hampshire in 2020?," Bill answers: "Yes," and Mary next asks: "What did Bill say?"[1] Of course, I can report what Bill said by indirect discourse: "Bill said that Trump will lose in New Hampshire in 2020." But if I want to quote Bill, capturing his own way of expressing the content in words, how can and should I express myself? Suppose I say

(1) Bill said: "Yes"

or

(2) "Yes" was spoken or said by Bill.

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Whether either of these quote Bill or merely mention his word 'Yes' will depend on the context. Imagine Mary and I entered in the middle of the conversation between Jack and Bill, and neither of us was party to Jack's question when Mary asked me: "What did Bill just say?" All I could answer is what I heard: "Yes." But in that scenario, either I am just *mentioning* the word he used or, if I am *quoting* him, the only representational content I can attribute to him is the bare affirmative meaning of 'Yes.' On the other hand, in order to truly quote Bill's utterance "Yes" with its content responding to Jack's question, I cannot say "Bill said: 'Trump will lose in New Hampshire in 2020,'" because he never uttered a sentence that is even roughly a replica of this quoting phrase. The only way it seems I can quote Bill's utterance as an answer to Jack's question is by saying "Bill said: 'Yes,'" where that one-word quoting phrase expresses in my quoting context the representational content that Trump will lose in New Hampshire in 2020, and where my token of 'Yes' exemplifies the property or representation instantiated by Bill's utterance. Further evidence that I am attributing to him that elliptical representational content (answering the question) is that I can add, after reporting Bill's answer "Yes" to Jack's question:

(3) "but he is still as confident of winning as he ever was" (where the antecedent of 'he' is 'Trump').

In sum, in examples like this, the representational and exemplificational contents of the quoting phrase do not prima facie match up and require context to resolve their differences.

II. Nonconstituent Quotation

Maier (2014a) cites sentences like

(4) She allowed as how her dog ate "strange things, when left to its own devices" (Abbott 2005),[2]

whose quoting phrase belongs to no well-formed grammatical constituent (motivated on syntactic grounds), as evidence of the "transparency" of quotation. What he means by 'transparency' is neither Quine's "referential transparency" nor Kulvicki's notion of pictorial transparency. What Maier means is that the interpretation of the quoting phrase does not "see the quotation marks." 'Strange things' is the NP object of the verb 'ate' in the VP

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'ate strange things,' but it is the whole VP that is modified by 'when left to its own devices.' Thus the inverted commas in (4) do not mark off the relevant grammatical constituent for the intended interpretation, from which Maier concludes that we interpret (4) as if there were no inverted commas—or despite them. Another of his examples is

(5) The menu says that this restaurant serves "breakfast at any time" (Maier 2014a),

whose quoting phrase can be given an interpretation but not the intended one, namely, the meaning on which 'at any time' modifies 'serves,' not 'breakfast.' If we want to give the sentence that intended interpretation, the quoting phrase ought to be "serves breakfast at any time." Again, we see through or ignore the inverted commas to get the intended interpretation.[3]

The problem to which Maier is pointing is a real problem for theories that presuppose that the semantic values of quoting phrases (sentential and subsentential) belong to semantic types that directly correspond to syntactic constituent categories.[4] On our account, the 'transparency' of nonconstituent quoting phrases reflects their representational contents, the truth conditions or contents of their words as they would be *used* in the indirect discourse report of what was said in the subject's quoted context. On this representational interpretation, the quoting phrase is not segregated from its linguistic context and its categorial structure. On the other hand, as an exemplifying object, the quoting phrase is indifferent to grammatical category so long as it can serve as a sample of a property or representation that need not correspond to a syntactic category. Hence, the quoting phrase can be a syntactic nonconstituent in its sentential matrix. Nonetheless, there is dissonance between our knowledge of the constituent structure underlying that representational content and our awareness of its lack of constituent structure qua exemplifier. Hence, we recognize the word play or humor in, say, (5)—in contrast, say, to the completely prosaic

(6) The menu says that this restaurant "serves breakfast at any time,"

which lacks any tension between the representational and exemplificational contents.

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III. Do Quotations Block Wh-movement?

In chapter 2 (E), I raised the question whether quotations block wh-movement given the fact that we can quantify into them. Maier (2014a) cites

(7a) *Who did John say Mary "loves"?

(7b) *What did Quine say quotation "has"?

as evidence that mixed (subsentential) quotations block wh-movement which supports their opacity.[5] These examples contrast in turn to the indirect discourse sentences

(8a) Who did John say Mary loves?

(8b) What did Quine say that quotation has?

that allow wh-movement. However, later in the same paper he cites counterevidence such as

(9a) Who did Mary say that she would "never misunderestimate ever again"?

(9b) Who did Mary say that she would "never forgive ever again"?[6]

Both of these appear to the contrary to admit wh-movement, implying that mixed (subsentential) quotations are transparent.[7] To resolve this contradictory evidence, Maier employs Shan's (2011) idea of unquotation—the use of square brackets to temporarily suspend the scope of a quotation to show editorial adjustments to the original—together with the claim that underlying, say, (9b) is

(10) Mary said that she would "never forgive [who] ever again."

Here the unquoted '[who]' is an editorial adjustment to Mary's quoted phrase that would have included a name as the object of the transitive verb; its presence in the underlying (10) in turn allows for wh-movement. Maier then explains:

> Unquote movement first places the wh-object out of the quote, from where a subsequent wh-movement can take it to the front. As a result [9b] presupposes that Mary used the construction *never forgive . . . ever again* to refer to a two-place relation R, and asks who Mary said she bears *R* to. (Maier 2014a, 58)

The idea of unquotation nicely captures the idea that a quoter—the speaker making the quotational attribution to the quoted subject—is not merely someone who mechanically reproduces the quoted phrase but more like an editor sensitive to their author, their audience, and to changes in context.

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However, Maier's application of unquotation to (9b) raises the obvious question why we cannot also apply it to (7a, b). Thus, underlying each of them would be

(7c) John said Mary "loves [who]?"

(7d) Quine said quotation "has [what]?"

Like (9b), (7a) presupposes that John used the construction '*loves . . .*' to refer to a two-place relation R, and asks who John said Mary bears R to; similarly for (7b). In sum, we are still left with inconsistent data about wh-movement from quotation contexts.

The data concerning wh-movement out of direct, or sentential, quotations are much clearer:

(11a) *Who did Mary say: "I will never forgive ever again"? (cf. Maier 2016, 10)

(11b) Who did Mary say that she will never forgive ever again?

(12a) *What did John say: "I put there"? (K. Davidson)

(12b) What did John say he put there/where? (K. Davidson)

However, this does not help my theory, since I view the difference between (11a) and (12a), on the one hand, and (7a, b), on the other, as no more than the difference between sentential and subsentential quotation. What holds of one ought to hold of the other.

If we take into account exemplification, there may be a different reason why quotation should block wh-movement. Suppose that (10) underlies (9b). For the quoting phrase in (10) to quote John, it must exemplify a representation instantiated by John's quoted utterance. But John presumably uttered a sentence containing a proper name as the object of the verb 'loves,' say, 'Harriet,' and no utterance of 'loves [who]' or of 'Mary loves [who]' can exemplify the representation 'Mary loves Harriet' that John's quoted utterance instantiates. If this is on the right track, it is not, then, opacity that blocks wh-movement but the conditions for exemplification that are essential to yielding the quoted phrase we attribute to John. But note that if the wh-word 'who' in (10) is part of the quoting phrase that exemplifies the property or representation, then it is not only concrete surface-like utterances of words spoken by the speaker that exemplify, but also more abstract structures containing traces or wh-words. It also remains a puzzle whether the data that seems to *admit* wh-movement (as in 9a, b) can be somehow reconciled with this condition.

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IV. Recanati's "Open" and "Closed" Quotations

According to Francois Recanati (2001, 2011), theorists have misdirected their attention on one special case: "closed" quotations, which refer to their enclosed words like singular terms. The more general and paradigmatic class is what he calls "open quotation": linguistic acts or speech performances that *show* or *depict* other utterances, which he also calls 'demonstrations' (Clark and Gerrig 1990; Wade and Clark 1993).[8] This sense of 'demonstration' is not that of an ostension, gesture, or presentation that accompanies or completes a (pure) demonstrative 'this' or 'that' (Kaplan 1989). Rather, it is any act that shows or manifests how one performs (a token of) a type of act, like waltzing, riding a bike, or doing the backstroke and, in turn, enables "others to experience what it is like to perceive the things *depicted*" (Clark and Gerrig 1990, 765, my emphasis). Recanati takes Clark's use of 'depict' literally. When we quote someone, we do not merely demonstrate and thereby show *how* she said what she said—the words she used and sometimes her accent, intonation, or pitch. We produce "something like a picture" of the quoted utterance in virtue of their resemblance (as we said in ch. 4) and what we *show* (as opposed to *state*) when we quote something is its "pictorial meaning" (Recanati 2011, 247; cf. 229). In a related vein, Recanati also says that the quoting token "echoes" and "mimics" the quoted token—which presumably means that the one 'imitates' the other. But Recanati also emphasizes that open quotations (or "quotations in general") do not "refer to what they picture. . . . Open quotations merely picture" (231). That is, he resists assimilating open quotations to linguistic noun phrases or singular terms. Only in the special case when the open quotation is "recruited" (230) as a referential term, that is, when it "acquires the grammatical function of a singular term within a sentence in which it fills a slot [for a referring or singular term]" (231), does it acquire a "referent" or "referential value" (230–231).[9]

On the surface, Recanati's open/closed distinction and my quotation/mention distinction may seem similar. However, Recanati takes so-called direct (i.e., sentential) quotations to be closed, that is, NPs or singular terms, and mixed (subsentential) quotation to be a paradigm of open quotation, while I take both to be quotations as opposed to mention-expressions. Second, while he agrees that their constituent words have their ordinary meaning (which he opposes to the Tarski–Quine position), Recanati's reason for taking direct

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(sentential) quotations to be closed is that they are "*segregated from*" (234) the linguistic meaning of their matrix sentence—contrary to the evidence of chapters 2–3 that all quoting phrases, subsentential and sentential, anaphorically and quantificationally interact with their matrix quotation-sentences. Of course, both Recanati and I give central place to the picture/quotation analogy. But our two general projects are opposed to a significant degree. Recanati is interested in quotation because (1) it is a phenomenon that has been treated in the past as a semantic explanandum, whereas he claims that it is pragmatic; (2) he thinks it involves general rational interpretation that is not language specific; and (3) it is evidence for him of pragmatic contextual intrusion into the determination of truth conditions.[10] I am interested in quotation insofar as it lies on the border between products of linguistic and extralinguistic symbolic skills; by identifying what is nonlinguistic (e.g., exemplification) we can therefore put into relief what is properly linguistic in our understanding of quotation in particular and speech in general.

Let's now look at Recanati's examples of open quotations to see whether they are indeed a different species of quotation that has been hitherto ignored. Recanati introduces:

(13) . . . And then Greta Garbo said, 'I *vant* to be alone' (2011, 224)

to illustrate how a quotation can depict a "target" (= the quoted utterance) by demonstrating various properties, such as Garbo's words, accent, intonation, and accompanying bodily pose. The "depiction is effected through properties shared by the displayed token and the target" (224), that is, depiction is a function of resemblance, which is understood here as a matter of sharing properties. He adds that the speaker is not referring to Garbo's utterance; he is depicting it in the sense of mimicking, that is, imitating or simulating it. Now, inasmuch as open quotations by definition are not singular referential terms, one would presume that (13) is an open quotation. However, Recanati next says that the demonstration in (13) is grammatically "recruited" to be a singular term, hence, a closed quotation, apparently because it occupies an argument or NP position as a relatum of the 'said' relation. This implies—contrary to what we might have thought—that 'open' and 'closed' are not mutually exclusive contraries. A closed quotation is an open quotation that in addition is recruited grammatically to serve as an NP or referring term. This leaves open the question of whether there are any open quotations that are not closed.

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Nothing about Recanati's description of open quotation need conflict with our characterization of quotation as the attribution to a subject of a quoted sentence by means of a quoting sentence—although we would disagree that the quoting sentence in (13) is a denoting singular term or NP. Even if the speaker uses the quoting sentence with the extralinguistic intention to mimic, that is, imitate, the quoted utterance, that is not incompatible with it being syntactically and semantically an attribution to Garbo of the quoted phrase and of its manner of utterance (intonation, accent, etc.). To use an attribution to mimic its subject is simply an additional extralinguistic motive for the utterance of the sentence, a perlocutionary act.

Recanati's second example of an open quotation is

(14) Stop that John! 'Nobody likes me,' 'I am miserable'. . . . Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?

which he contrasts with

(15) John keeps crying and saying 'Nobody likes me.'

Recanati takes (15) to be a closed quotation because the quotation fills the slot for a singular term as the object argument of 'say.' But because (14) has no verb of saying, its quoting sentences do not occupy a referential position and simply serve to depict John's utterances.

However, it is equally possible that (14) is elliptical for the closed quotation

(14a) Stop *saying* that, John! "Nobody likes me," "I am miserable." . . . Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?

which in turn is synonymous with

(14b) John, stop saying: "Nobody likes me" or "I am miserable." . . . Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?

or

(14c) Stop that John! *You say* "Nobody likes me," "I am miserable." . . . Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?[11]

After all, if 'stop' in (14) is not elliptical for 'stop saying,' how would John know what he is to stop doing? Moreover, Recanati himself admits that the quoting sentences in (14b)–(14c) occur in the position of singular terms (as arguments for 'says'), suggesting again that it is closed notwithstanding (or in addition to) its open depicting character. The moral I draw from

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Recanati's own exposition is that (14) is an elliptical sentential quotation, though—in agreement with his conclusion, albeit for a different reason—I would also argue that the quoting sentence is not a singular term or noun phrase but a sentence used with its ordinary meaning. In any case, I see no hitherto ignored "new kind" of quotation here that is not already explained by our theory.

Recanati next turns to mixed (i.e., subsentential) quotations—beginning with Davidson's "Quine said that quotation 'has a certain anomalous feature'"—which he identifies as open quotations because, as Davidson first observed, they cannot grammatically occur as singular terms (or NPs).[12] Recanati also calls them 'echoic' (or mimetic) because they share properties with the target. But having included standard mixed (subsentential) quotations among open quotations, it is a short step for Recanati to extend them to improper or scare quotations like (16)–(18), which not only mimic their target in the sense of imitiate, but also mimic in the sense of "mock" or "ridicule." On his view, the inverted commas serve to "disassociate" (Recanati 2011, 240) speakers from the words they are using.[13]

(16a) Jay: I am presenting my dissertation at the paper session. (where he should have said 'poster' section)

(16b) Jay said that he is presenting his dissertation at the 'paper' session.

(17a) Harry: Quine there hates meanings. (where Harry uses 'Quine' to refer to an acquaintance who acts as if he were Quine)

(17b) Harry said that 'Quine' there hates meanings.

(18a) Maria: Quine is a philtosopher. (C&L 1997, who say the predicate is gibberish)

(18b) Maria said that Quine is a 'philtosopher.'

In sum, all mixed quotations, proper and improper (or scare), are open quotations because none of them are singular terms and they either echo, and thereby identify the speaker with the quoted subject, or disassociate, and thereby disidentify, them.[14] However, there is a difference between the a and b cases in (16)–(18) that Recanati does not mention. Only the b's occur in explicitly reportative or attributional contexts with a subject and verb of saying. On my view, (16b)–(18b) are examples of subsentential quotations that attribute a quoted phrase to a subject via the quoting phrase and, in addition to their attributional structure—and here I agree

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with Recanati—also involve "disassociation" or "disidentification," a point to which we will return in chapter 9.

Recanati discusses two additional examples that are not improper but still raise interesting questions.

(19) '*Comment allez-vous*.' That's how you say 'How are you' in French.

Of the two phrases enclosed in inverted commas, Recanati takes "How are you" to be a closed quotation since it occurs as the argument for 'says' (230), leaving '*Comment allez-vous*' as a demonstration—hence, an open quotation—that in turn is demonstratively referred to by the immediately following 'That.' But if 'is' is the identity sign (whose second argument is 'How are you' or "how you say 'How are you' in French," then '*Comment allez-vous*' also ought to be a singular term or NP referring to its contained words and thus a closed quotation. In our terms, (19) simply mentions both constituent phrases enclosed in inverted commas.

Recanati (2011), among others (e.g., Maier 2016, 19), also assimilates (19) to examples like (18a, b) and (20):

(20) A doctor tells him he is like a "vielle femme hystérique." (De Brabanter 2010),

Because (19) and (20) quote foreign words and (18a, b) nonwords, Recanati attempts to explain them all by a (monstrous) shift in the language parameter of the context of utterance (see chapter 5). However, it is not at all clear that language-salad sentences (like (20) and (19)) should be treated on a part with nonwords or misuses of words like (18), because the former imply, or implicate, that the speaker disassociates or disidentifies themself from the subject. Speakers competent in two or more languages, and certainly those with a literary bent, often mix languages in one sentence and context, especially where as in (20) the speaker is also alluding to a well-known description of Flaubert.

Recanati's second example:

(21) A 'fortnight' is a period of fourteen days,

seems to me to defy easy characterization on any theory. On the one hand, it seems to be synonymous with

(21a) '(A) Fortnight' designates a period of fourteen days,

which is an obvious instance of mentioning. On the other hand, it prima facie has the same truth conditions as the nonquotational

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(21b) A fortnight is a period of fourteen days.

It is not clear, then, what difference it makes whether we are dealing with use or mention, although the inverted commas serve to highlight the fact that we are defining the term.[15]

V. Allusion

Among his examples of open quotations, Recanati (2011) also includes examples like

(22) The object demonstrated is the '*Bedeutung*' ("reference") of the demonstration and its appearance is its '*Sinn*' ("sense")[16]

(23) John is very 'cool,'

which he argues "do their normal semantic work" in the sentence "while at the same time echo some other person's use of the same words" (240). The question is how to understand 'echo.' On our view, quotation essentially involves *attribution* of a quoted phrase to a subject as part of its propositional content; these sentences, like the a's in (16)–(18), contain no explicit subject or verb of saying. One might, however, argue that (22) is "elliptical" for (22a):

(22a) The object demonstrated is, in Frege's words/as Frege would have said, the "*Bedeutung*" ("reference") of the demonstration and its appearance is its "*Sinn*" ("sense").[17]

But unlike (16)-(18), there is no reason to posit an elliptical or implicit subject and verb *as part of the content* of (22), because there is no one from whom the speaker is disassociating or disidentifying themself. Hence, rather than take the elliptical subject and verb as part of the content *asserted* by the utterance (or what is called its "at-issue" content), I would propose that utterances of sentences like (22) *presuppose* as common knowledge that the quoted expressions are to be attributed to a subject whose identity is also presupposed to be known. For example, philosophers will (or should) immediately recognize that the speaker of (22) echoes Frege's words without explicitly mentioning either his name or the fact that he used (or would have used) these words for this purpose. Likewise, Recanati proposes that the speaker of (23) "echoes" an (unidentified) "certain group of people" whom "we assume" use 'cool' in a culturally loaded sense.[18]

Another strategy to treat these examples is not as quotation proper but as what literary scholars call 'allusion.' 'Allusion' is notoriously difficult to

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define but, as a rough stab, we can use the OED definition: "covert, implied, or indirect reference," where 'reference' is not naming, describing, or demonstrating but the looser idea of drawing our attention to something.[19] However, what is central to allusion is that its function is not simply to draw our attention to some statement or author but also to elicit or activate further associations with the alluded thing. For example, in (22) '*Bedeutung*' alludes not just to Frege but to his general theory of reference and sense, his puzzles, and his attempt to solve them. Likewise, 'cool' in (23) alludes to the entire culture that cultivates and develops the trait of 'coolness.' For a word or phrase Ø to allude to another Ø*, then, it must be presupposed that participants are acquainted with Ø* and its associations and can draw upon them. In contrast to quotation, which asserts that some phrase is to be attributed to a subject, allusion presupposes knowledge and information attributed to or associated with the phrase to which it directs us. Another way in which it differs from quotation is that allusion is often (though not always) 'covert.' Authors of literary works often employ allusions in order to *test* their readers' ability to recognize the alluded item. Indeed, they do not put the allud*ing* item in inverted commas or italics in order to conceal the allud*ed* item. So, if (22) and (23) are really allusions rather than quotations, it is a good question whether the alluding items like '*Bedeutung*' should be in inverted commas.

VI. Nonlinguistic Quotables

Another live question about explananda for a theory of quotation concerns the question of whether we can quote nonlinguistic events, objects, or signs, such as doodles, scribbles, smiley faces, noises or natural sounds, and pictures. As we would expect by now, most discussion of this question has focused on mention rather than quotation. Jonathan Bennett (1988, 405) denies that one can properly 'quote,' that is, mention, the nonlinguistic; C&L (2007, 23–24, 147–159) assert "uncontroversially" that we can 'quote,' that is, mention, units that are not part of "the language or sign system we typically use."[20] But whatever position one takes on the *mentionability* of the nonlinguistic, it is another question whether we can *quote* the nonlinguistic. On the one hand, if quotation *always* consists in attribution of a quoted phrase to a subject where the utterance of the quoting phrase has its ordinary semantic values and meanings, it would seem impossible to

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quote things that have no semantic value or meaning.[21] On the other hand, many languages (like English) possess dedicated verbs to report nonlinguistic sounds (as well as symbolic or demonstrational actions like (29)–(30)) made by humans and nonhumans (some of which *cannot* take propositional objects, e.g., (28b, c)). These verbs framing the report of nonlinguistic sounds parallel but differ distributionally from the quotational 'says' and its cousins.[22] Consider, for example, the use of 'go/went' in (24)–(28a) in contrast to (28b, c):

(24) When she got news of the prize, Mary went: "Wow"/"Ahhh."

(25) Morry aimed the toothbrush at David and went '[æ? æ? æ? æ?]' (Partee, 1973)

(26) So he went blah, blah, blah again, and finally he got them to come out. (De Brabanter 2017, 244)

(27) The piano went 'plonk' and the guitar goes 'twang.' (De Brabanter 2017, 244)

(28a) I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she went "Yuck."

(28b) *I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she went that she didn't, in no uncertain terms. (Ginzburg & Cooper 2014).

(28c) *I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she went: "I definitely do not want to," in no uncertain terms.

(29) Your legs go/went (bends and moves legs) while your arms go/went (bends and moves arms)

(30) The boy went [displays rude gesture] and ran away. (De Brabanter 2017, 244)

Whether or not we want to call these nonlinguistic uses of 'go/went' with nonlinguistic objects literal instances of 'quotation' will depend on whether we require that all quotation involves use that expresses propositional content.[23] For present purposes, I simply want to emphasize the importance of the mention/quotation distinction in addressing this question. Furthermore, we can surely *talk about* nonlinguistic signs, but it is not clear that, and how, one can use as opposed to mention such a sign. If Frege introduced inverted commas in order to avoid use/mention ambiguity, and if use/mention ambiguity does not arise for nonlinguistic signs, there is no point in adding the inverting commas. In fact, against the view that we can quote nonlinguistic objects, one might cite Frege's comment that in

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quotation "we have signs of *signs*" (my emphasis)–not just *any* object can be quoted, only a sign or linguistic entity that signifies and acts like a sign.[24]

VII. Quoting Thoughts

As I noted in the introduction, 'said' is only one, and probably the thinnest, verb of saying used to quote someone. Thicker verbs, and ones that quote in all the grammatical moods, include:

(31) Romeo replied/stated/ announced/retorted/asserted: "Juliet is the sun."

(32) Romeo shouted/mumbled/grumbled/growled: "Juliet is the sun."

(33) Romeo asked/wondered/questioned/pleaded: "Is Juliet the sun?"

(34) Romeo commanded/told/directed Juliet: "Act like the sun!"

Given this wide range of speech act verbs that can frame spoken and written quotations, the question arises: Can one quote in thought or with mentalistic or attitudinal framing verbs? Philosophers (e.g., Kaplan 1989) frequently use indirect discourse as a model for analyzing the propositional attitudes (e.g., belief-sentences), but it is striking that 'believe' is not an obvious counterpart to 'says' for mentalistic quotations:

(35) */?Romeo believed: "Juliet is the sun"

—even while indirect belief reports, like indirect speech reports, are perfectly fine:

(36) Romeo said that Juliet is the sun.

(37) Romeo believed that Juliet is the sun.

The problem here, let me add, cannot lie in the occurrence of the inverted commas in belief contexts, because we can use them to signal mentioning in belief-sentences:

(38) Romeo believes that 'Juliet' rhymes with 'duet.'

However, the problem may be specific to the lexical item 'believe.'[25] We can frame quotations with all the following mentalistic or attitudinal verbs:

(39) Romeo thought/convinced himself/remembered: "Juliet is the sun."

(40) Romeo wondered/pondered/obsessed: "Is or isn't Juliet the sun?"

but not, however, with these others:

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(41) *Romeo was concerned/disturbed/worried/scared: "Juliet might be the sun."

in contrast to

(42) Romeo was concerned/disturbed/worried/scared that Juliet might be the sun.

One difference between (39)-(40) and (41) is that the mental predicates in (39)-(40) imply a kind of inner discourse or inner speech, such as 'said/thought/wondered to himself' unlike the statives in (41).[26]

A more curious phenomenon to which linguists have given considerable attention in recent years is free indirect discourse (FID). This is a relatively recently created or discovered style of reporting speech or thought, most often employed by novelists in narrative literature. A character's thoughts are expressed sometimes from the perspective of the speaker or narrator and sometimes from the perspective of the character, a difference that emerges in the behavior of indexicals, tense, and pronouns in FID contexts. For example:

(22) Mary was packing her bags. Tomorrow was her last day. Oh how happy she would be to finally walk out of here. To leave this godforsaken place once and for all.

The temporal and locational indexicals 'Tomorrow,' 'here,' and 'this godforsaken place' are all interpreted from Mary's perspective, as if they occurred between the inverted commas in a quotation whose subject is Mary. The personal indexicals (e.g., 'she') and the (past) tense ('was') are interpreted from the perspective of the narrator or speaker in the context of utterance. Thus free indirect discourse is a hybrid of quotation and indirect discourse with a rather rigidly fixed division of labor among its deictic or context-sensitive constituents. In recent years, a number of different analyses or explanations have been proposed for this construction. Some semantic accounts appeal to context-shifting operators (monsters) to account for the temporal and locational indexicals; others posit multiple contexts for the interpretation of the different classes of constituents; and yet others are pragmatic.[27] I have nothing new to add on this interesting—but possibly artifactual—phenomenon. However, the fact that the different kinds of context-dependent expressions and constructions behave differently according to such a rigid division is a problem both for semanticists and pragmaticists: no one kind of theory can account for the different behaviors of the two classes of expressions.

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8 What Do the Inverted Commas Do?

On the picture I have been sketching, the quoting phrase does all the work, representational and exemplificational. What is the role, if any, of the inverted commas, the quotation- or q-marks?

I. Three Current Approaches to the Inverted Commas

Three general approaches to the inverted commas, or q-marks, dominate the literature. Here again, because most theorists do not distinguish the practice of quotation from mentioning, and they mainly focus on mentioning, its specific desiderata have largely shaped these approaches. To briefly summarize the three approaches:

1. The marks themselves do all the referring. Most famously, Davidson (1984b) argued that quotation marks abbreviate a complex description containing a demonstrative, such as 'the expression a token of which is here' or 'the expression with the shape pictured here.' Thus 'Galileo said: "The Earth moves"' comes out as 'Galileo said the expression a token of which is here [pointing at the juxtaposed sentence]. The Earth moves.' The quoting phrase is referred to but itself does no referring.
2. Neither the inverted commas nor the quoting phrase refer separately or independently of each other. Instead, when we enclose the phrase in inverted commas, we generate a new expression which we call 'the quotation-expression,' whose first element is left inverted comma, followed by the letters of the phrase, followed by the right comma.[1] As we said in chapter 2, authors differ over the structure (or lack thereof) of the generated quotation-expression. Some take it to be a simple lexical item, with no internal structure and no semantically significant parts;

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both the inverted commas and the quoting phrase 'cat' occur only accidentally in the quotation-expression "'cat,'" no different from the way in which 'cat' occurs in 'scatter.' For others, quotation-expressions are lexically complex, generated by a general rule speakers master (with the inverted commas serving as a functor that, applied to the quoting phrase, yields a lexically complex singular term), even though they are syntactically and semantically simple.

3. The inverted commas or q-marks have no semantic or referential role; the quoting phrase does all the referring, mentioning, and quoting. The commas or marks are simply punctuation or some sort of pragmatic heuristic device that indicates or signals *that* the function of the phrase is to quote (or to mention); they contribute nothing to the semantic content of the speaker's assertion of the quotation-sentence. Hence, it is always possible to drop the marks from written inscriptions with no loss in semantic expressive power and without affecting truth-conditions or meaning, and it is assumed that there exist no q-marks in oral speech which is proof on this approach that q-marks are not semantically essential to the practice of quotation.

In previous chapters I have raised objections to these views, which I will not review here.[2] Suffice it to say that the first approach, which isolates the inert quoting phrase outside the matrix sentence, cannot explain its semantic interactions with its frame. The second approach cannot account for our intuitions about the close, nonarbitrary connection between the quoting and quoted phrases, the intuition that motivates the connection we draw between quotations and pictures. The third approach cannot account for the evident semantic differences in truth conditions due to the presence and absence of q-marks in, for example, the following pair of sentences (repeated from chapter 5) uttered in an exchange between Michael and me:

(1a) Quine said that his disagreement with Carnap was "a source of displeasure for each of us."

(1b) Quine said that his disagreement with Carnap was a source of displeasure for each of us.

Nor can it do so for the differences between these pairs of sentences:

(2a) When asked by the officer how much he had been drinking before the accident, he said: "Nothing."

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(2b) When asked by the officer how much he had been drinking before the accident, he said nothing. (Potts)

(3a) What was new in what Netanyahu told Congress about the amount of nuclear power Israel would allow Iran was zero.

(3b) What was new in what Netanyahu told Congress about the amount of nuclear power Israel would allow Iran was "zero."[3]

Likewise, we cannot cancel the exemplificational metalinguistic reference made by the quoting phrase, signaled by the inverted commas:

(4) *Doctor Lauben said: "I have been wounded"—but he never used those words.

As I have repeatedly said, the inverted commas are only one among a variety of devices with which speakers express quotational attribution and indicate that they are quoting. Where the speaker does not employ them, some other q-mark—including an intonation pattern—must be brought into play on pain of effacing the difference between quoting someone and making an assertion of one's own. Some q-mark is necessary even though it is not necessary that it be so-called quotation-marks.

On all three of these approaches, the q-marks cleave to the quoting (or mentioning) phrase they surround or contain. This is obvious on the second approach: the marks function like a functor that takes the quoting phrase as its argument and generates a new expression that refers to the quoted phrase. However, Davidson's demonstrative account points in the same direction insofar as the marks qua demonstrative are pointed at the specific inert quoting phrase in isolation from the matrix sentence. And on the third approach, the marks are "attached" to the phrase inside them which they pragmatically signal is to be interpreted as quoting. All three of these approaches emerge from the analysis of mentioning. When we apply them to quotation proper, they all treat the verb of quotational saying ('said') as a relation between one NP that designates the quoted subject and a second NP constituted by enclosing the quoting phrase within the inverted commas or q-marks.[4]

II. A New Approach to Inverted Commas

Here is a different way to think about inverted commas or q-marks: they are a syncategorematic but sometimes discontinuous lexical part, extension, or

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continuation of the "quotational verb of saying" (verb of Q-saying, for short). That is, the complete "verb of Q- saying" is (in bold) '**said** . . . **"___"** . . .'. Here '. . .' is optionally occupied by nonquoting expressions (e.g., 'loudly' in 'Biden said loudly: "Hand over the ice cream."'), making the complete verb discontinuous. '___' is filled by the quoting phrase. Thus the q-marks or inverted commas, either alone or when they are composed with the phrase that fills them, do not constitute a lexically (or semantically) significant unit within the quotation sentence. Rather, the marks or commas first lexically compose with the verb of Q-saying to constitute a minimal unit bearing a meaning.[5] Second, the argument place within the verb of Q-saying is filled by the quoting phrase to yield a predicate that is attributed to the quoted subject. The difference between the verb of Q-saying and the simple 'said' of indirect discourse is that latter reports simply *what* the subject said; it attributes a content to the subject. The verb of Q-saying attributes to the subject both *what* she said and *how* she said it—with which phrase, meaning (i.e., character), or manner (either linguistic, e.g., phonological, or nonlinguistic, e.g., a feigned accent), one or another of which is exemplified by the quoting phrase in its context of utterance. To mark this difference, in oral speech the occurrence of the verb of Q-saying is accompanied by a distinctive intonation or sound pattern and, in written speech, by the inverted commas or q-marks that graphically "spell out" that quotation-specific intonation. However, despite this difference, Q-saying is "built up" out of (indirect discourse) saying in that the quotation-sentence semantically entails the sentence of indirect discourse (reporting what was said) that results by disquotation (and, where there are indexicals, with the appropriate conversions to track changes of context). The verb of Q-saying in turn attributes this content to the quoted subject but only insofar as it is expressed by an utterance in the quoted context that instantiates the property or representation (e.g., a character) exemplified by the quoting phrase in the speaker's quoting context. So, like a function-expression, the verb of Q-saying with its inverted commas takes the quoting phrase as its argument and yields as its value the quoted token just in case the latter instantiates the property or representation (e.g., a character) exemplified by the quoting phrase in *its* (quoting) context. This exemplified property or representation is *not* the (bare-bones representational) *content* of the quoting phrase in the quoting speaker's own context of utterance, but that content nonetheless plays a role in determining what is exemplified.

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There is, then, no distinct semantic unit in the logical form of the quotation sentence that corresponds to the quotation phrase '"*P.*"' Instead, there is 'Said: . . . "__" . . .' (whether __ is sentential or subsentential), and the semantic properties of quotation are articulated by the truth conditions for the whole sentence in which the quotation phrase occurs. By comparison, think of Russell's analysis of the definite description 'The *G*' in "The G is F." There is no semantic unit or constituent, such as a singular term or constant, in the proposition corresponding to the grammatical definite description in the sentence. Instead, "The G is F" has the same truth conditions as the complete proposition '$(\exists x)$ (Gx & $(\forall y)$ Gy $\leftrightarrow$ x=y) & Fx)' in which the complex of existential and universal quantifiers do not themselves constitute a single syntactic or semantic unit corresponding to 'The G.'

I will leave the attempt to work out the (lexical) structure of the verb of Q-saying in a theoretically kosher way—which will surely be a non-trivial project—to lexical semanticists who are more expert than me. However, in informal terms, we might analyze 'Says: . . . "__" . . .' either as the root or stem 'Says' with a suffix '"___"' or as the root or stem '___' with the prefix 'Says: " ' and suffix ' " '. (This is also known as a 'circumfix,' e.g., 'embolden,' formed from the stem or root 'bold' and the prefix 'em' and suffix 'en,' both of which are obligatory.) In at least one dialect of the Khabardian language, spoken by the Circassians, a Northwest Caucasian ethnic group, the verb of Q-saying undergoes "grammaticalization," a process by which it loses some of its properties as a full-fledged verb, through attachment of a morpheme that restricts the use of the verb of Q-saying to the introduction of reported speech (either direct or indirect, i.e., what we would represent with inverted commas or the subordinating complementizer 'that'). I will not go into more detail, but this should make it clear why the semantics for both sentential and subsentential quotation will be defined, à la Russell, 'contextually' at the unit of the whole sentence in which the quotation occurs.[6]

In chapter 6 I proposed the following informal truth conditions for both sentential (SQ) and subsentential (SSQ) quotation.

(SQ) 'T said: "*S*,"' uttered in *c*, is true in *c* iff, when the content that was, and would be, expressed by *S* in *c** is the content of *that S/S'* in *c* and T expressed that content by uttering a token in *c** that instantiates the representation or property exemplified by the token of '*S*' in *c*.

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(SSQ) 'T said that . . . "*P*" . . . ,' uttered in *c*, is true in *c* iff, when the content of 'that . . . *P*/*P*' . . .' in *c* is the content of '. . . *P* . . .' in *c** and T expressed that content by uttering, together with other words he used in *c**, a token phrase that instantiates the property or representation exemplified by the token of '*P*' in *c*.

Here, as earlier, *c* is the context of the speaker of the quotation-sentence "T said: '*S*'" and *c**, the context of the quoted subject T. To simplify matters, I will limit my discussion here to the quotation of utterances of phrases with their linguistic meanings, and leave the analysis of quotations of pronunciations, accents, signs, and nonlinguistic manners to another occasion. So, what are exemplified by quoting phrases in their respective contexts are their semantic representations, which, in turn, I will analyze as Kaplanian characters (despite their shortcomings for co-directly referential simple context-independent expressions, as mentioned in chapter 6). By employing character, we can also now "unify" the *exemplificanda* and representational contents of phrases insofar as what is exemplified by the phrase Ø in *c* is its character {Ø} and Ø's bare-bones representational content in *c* is {Ø}(*c*). Finally, to avoid a monster that shifts contexts to fix the content of quoted indexicals, I will continue to follow Frege's directive to convert indexicals in indirect discourse reports across changes of context in order to preserve the same content in the quoting context that was expressed in the quoted context. When we treat indexicals in quotations, I therefore employ '*S*/*S*'' and '*P*/*P*'' to refer to the sentential and subsentential results of replacing (in the quoting phrase *S*'/*P*') an indexical that occurs in a (quoted) phrase (*S*/*P*) by another indexical to accommodate the change from the quoted context *c** to the quoting context *c* in order to preserve what had been the content of the indexical in *c**.

The idea in both (SQ) and (SSQ) is that the quotation-sentence is true (in its context of utterance) just in case the subject uttered the quot*ed* token in *their* context *c** and that the quoted token possesses the character exemplified by the quoter's quot*ing* token in their context *c*. Hence, these tokens are not uninterpreted shapes but themselves possess meanings (or characters) that yield (modulo conversions of indexicals) the same bare-bones representational content for the quoting and quoted utterances in their respective contexts. So, in formulating a formal compositional semantics for quotation, we must proceed on two tracks: one representational, the

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other exemplificational. Unlike other accounts that give primary focus to *what* the quotation says, I will primarily focus on its exemplificational side and read off it the representational content. Even so, we will see that my account is not compositional in any standard sense. But perhaps that is to be expected if my 'semantics' is in part pictorial.

III. A Formal Semantics for Quotation and Its Problems

To sketch the semantics, I proceed in stages, beginning with sentential and then subsentential quoting phrases, neither containing any indexicals. Finally, I turn to phrases containing indexicals, which is where the real difficulties for our semantics of quotation arise. The characters of the quoting and quoted phrases in the first two cases will be stable—determining the same content (or direct referent) in different contexts; therefore, differences between the quoted and quoting contexts will make no difference to their content. Following much current practice, I adopt a semantics for natural language quantifying over events (see Richard 2015; Maier 2014). Let 'saying$_Q$' be the quotational verb of saying, and let S be the (quoting) sentential phrase uttered by the speaker of the quotation sentence. Suppose Romeo uttered in *c**

(5) Juliet is the sun[7]

and I, Stern, quote Romeo's utterance in *c*:

(6) Romeo said: "Juliet is the sun."

The conditions under which (6) is true are:

(SQ*) 'Romeo said: "Juliet is the sun"' (uttered by Stern in *c*) is true (in *c*) iff

(i) There is an event *e* such that *e* is an assertive utterance or speech act.

(ii) Romeo is *e*'s agent.

(iii) *p* is the sentential phrase uttered in e [*p*(*e*)].

(iv) *c** is the context of utterance of *e*.

(v) (The character) {'Juliet is the sun'} is exemplified by Stern's utterance of *p* (= "Juliet is the sun") in *c*.

(vi) *p*(*e*) possesses the character {'Juliet is the sun'}.

(vii) The proposition {'Juliet is the sun'}(*c*) is identical to the content of *p*(*e*) in *c** [= {*p*(*e*)}(*c**)].

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The structure to be interpreted is of the form



Here QV is the verb of quotational saying 'said "__",' indexed to the sentential phrase S_i. Let the event variable *e* range over a (restricted) domain of assertive utterances of sentences. Let QV be assigned a function *f* that takes (the co-indexed) phrase S as argument and yields as its value a function *g* (assigned to Q'VP) that takes as its argument the event *e* to yield the semantic representation of the quotational verb phrase (QVP) composed of the character of 'said' and the character of *p*(*e*) [{*p*(*e*)}] just in case the latter is exemplified by S (in *c*). In other words, event *e* is an utterance that instantiates or realizes the exemplificandum of (the quoting phrase) S, the character of 'Juliet is the sun.' (6) is then true just in case the agent of *e*, Romeo, said some phrase in *c** whose character is identical to the character of 'Juliet is the sun.' This accounts for the exemplificational content of the quotation-sentence. What about the representational content of the quoted *p*(*e*) in *c**? By the definition of exemplification, the quot*ing* phrase S possesses the character it exemplifies, so that character will ipso facto determine a representational content for the phrase S in its context *c*. But (by assumption) the phrase S contains no indexicals and its character is stable across contexts. Therefore, whatever is determined by that character (realized by *p*(*e*) in *c**) will ipso facto be identical to the representational content of the quoting phrase S in its (quoting) context c.[8]

For subsentential quotation, the story is more complicated. Suppose again that Romeo uttered (5), and I now quote him by reporting

(7) Romeo said that the beautiful lady on the balcony (TBLB) "is the sun."

Assume that 'Juliet' and 'TBLB' are directly co-referring terms for the same individual *j*. Here the bare-bones representational content of the subsentential quoting phrase (VP) "is the sun" must be something that can compose with the propositional value(s) of the rest of the complement clause (in our case, the individual *j*) to yield the proposition that was said by Romeo. The

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natural candidate is a property. Hence, the character of the quoting phrase VP must determine in its context of utterance a property *P* that can compose with the individual *j* to yield the bare-bones representational content <*j*, *P*>. But the verb of saying in sentences like (7) that contain both a complementizer 'that' marking indirect discourse and a subsentential quoting phrase is not just a simple verb of saying whose object is a proposition, what was said. It does double duty as a verb of Q-saying whose scope is the indexed VP 'is the sun.' Using an event semantics, the truth conditions of (7) are:

(SSQ*) 'Romeo said that the beautiful lady on the balcony "is the sun"' (uttered by Stern in *c*) is true (in *c*) iff

(i) There is an event *e* such that *e* is an assertive utterance or speech act.

(ii) Romeo is *e*'s agent.

(iii) *p* is a subsentential phrase uttered in *e* [*p*(*e*)].

(iv) *c** is the context of utterance of *e*.

(v) (The character) {'is the sun'} is exemplified by Stern's utterance of "is the sun" in *c*.

(iv) *p*(*e*) possesses the character {'is the sun'} which composes with the characters, whatever they are, of the other expressions uttered in *e*.

(v) The bare-bones representational content <*j*, {'is the sun'}(*c*)> is identical to the proposition composed of the content of *p(e)* in *c** (= {'is the sun'}(*c**)), namely, a property *P*, and the contents of all other expressions in the sentence asserted in *e*.

The structure to be interpreted in the subsentential case is also a bit more complicated:



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Again, we assign a function to QV but now QV_i has in its scope only the sub-sentential phrase VP ('is the sun') to which it is indexed, and the event variable *e* again ranges over a (restricted) domain of assertive utterances of sentences. The function *f* we assign to QV takes the co-indexed VP as argument and yields as value a function *g* (assigned to Q'VP) that takes the speech event *e* to the semantic representation of the quotational verb phrase (QVP) composed of the character of 'said (that)' and the character of its sentential complement S, just in case the character of its VP is exemplified by the VP ('is the sun') in *c*. The quotation sentence is then true (in its quoting context *c*) just in case Romeo performed an event of saying (in *c**) the character of whose VP is the character exemplified by VP in *c* and whose bare-bones representational content is identical to that of 'The beautiful lady on the balcony is the sun' uttered in *c*. Although *e* is an assertive utterance whose content is a complete proposition, its exemplificational content (namely, the exemplified character) is limited to the subsentential phrase; the remaining expressions in Romeo's utterance in *c** need not have the same character as the other expressions in Stern's utterance (7) in *c*. As for the representational content of the quoted phrase, again, all the quoting expressions in (7) have context-independent stable characters; hence, the same bare-bones content will be determined by the characters of the quoting and quoted phrases in *c* and *c**.

SQ* and SSQ* are easy cases, because their quoting phrases contain no indexicals. The real problems arise, as we saw in chapters 5 and 6, when the quoting phrase contains an indexical. In those cases, we need to preserve the indexical character used in the quoted phrase in the quoting phrase to capture the exemplificational content. But given the differences between the quoted and quoting contexts—Romeo is the agent in one, Stern in the other—the indexical, say 'I,' will necessarily determine different representational contents (direct referents) in the two contexts. In short, exemplificational and representational contents come into tension where there are indexicals.

To address this problem, the strategy I proposed in chapter 5 was to follow Frege's directive to convert indexicals to track changes in context. That is what we do when we indirectly report the content of a quoted utterance containing an indexical, and the representational content of a quoted phrase *is* the bare-bones content expressed by the complement clause of its respective indirect discourse report. However, this move challenges the strictly compositional character of the semantics of quotation-sentences,

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since we can no longer compute the representational content of the quotation-sentence from its explicit constituents. We might try to explain away this undesirable consequence by appealing to the pictorial nature of quotation, which involves notions (such as exemplificational reference) that are not strictly linguistic.[9] However, an additional question is whether there is any better alternative to deal with indexicals. In the next section I will briefly compare our account to two other compositional semantics for quotations in the literature.[10]

IV. Two Other Formal Semantics for Quotation: A Comparison

Mark Richard (2015) has proposed an elegant semantics for subsentential quotations or, in his terminology, 'indirect quotational attributions.' He also employs an event semantics that he introduces, first, in order to articulate ambiguities in the interpretation of iterated quotations that contain indexicals (e.g., 'Pence said that Trump said that . . . "_I_" . . .'), a topic to which I return below, and, second, to account for "collective" or quantificationally subordinated quotations such as

(8a) Every day John said that he would "finish the job tomorrow."

(8b) Every day John said: "I will finish the job tomorrow."

In these kinds of examples, monstrous context-shifting cannot work since there is no single counteractual context to which we shift to fix the interpretation of 'tomorrow'; instead, Richard argues, we need a whole collection of contexts in every one of which John said the quoted phrase. Thus, if we quantify over events, (8a) comes out as true just in case

(8a*) In every c and day of c, $d(c)$, there is an e such that e is a saying & e's agent was John & John used the words "finish the job tomorrow" (in the phrase 'he would "finish the job tomorrow"') with their content in c (namely, <finish the job on $d(c)$+1>) composed with the content of the other words in the sentence as they would be interpreted in the context of the speaker's utterance of (8a).[11]

However, there are important differences between Richard's account and mine. First, he adjoins the event variable to the quotational phrase rather than to the quotational verb and, second, the event variable plays more roles for him that it does for me.[12] First, restricting the values of the event variables to a universe of sayings manifest in assertive utterances, Richard

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assigns a function Q to an operator Quote adjoined to a phrase of any category (XP) yielding the quotational phrase (QXP). Q takes a phrase p (of category XP) and "returns a (partial) function from events to interpretations," namely, "the interpretation that p has *as used in e*" (Richard 2015, 229, my emphasis). Here the q-marks are treated as an operator on the quotational phrase rather than as part of the verb of quotational saying, as I propose. Second, on my view, *e* just is an event variable which is assigned a saying as its value. Richard's events are this and more. His own example (the quotational phrase 'is a horse's patoot') does not itself contain an indexical, but his further discussion involving quotational phrases containing indexicals demonstrates that he thinks of *e* as something like a (possible, nonactual) context. For example, he writes that the quotational phrase "is interpreted as it is in *e*" while the nonquotational remainder of the quotation-sentence is interpreted "as it is in *c*," namely, the context of the quoting speaker. Richard thereby treats the q-marks or inverted commas as a monstrous construction that shifts the interpretation of words, including indexicals, in the quotational phrase to an alternative context, the quoted context *e*.[13] On his semantics, then, Richard succeeds at constructing a compositional analysis but at the cost of introducing indexical monsters. By contrast, my proposal to convert indexicals was introduced precisely to avoid monsters but ends up noncompositional. Since one person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens, we have a clear choice here: noncompositionality or monsters.

A second well-developed account of indexicals is offered by Maier (2020) according to his "deferential" or "free relative" analysis of subsentential quoting phrases, so-called 'mixed quotations.' Because the quoting phrase in

(9) Bush said that the enemy "misunderestimated me" (Maier 2008, 2016)

is a VP, it is analyzed as

(10) what the source speaker referred to with the phrase 'misunderestimated me'

or, in more regimented form, as the definite description

(8*) The property A such that the speaker uses 'misunderestimated me' to refer to A.

But this analysis raises two issues. First, since 'misunderestimated' is not a word in English, or the speaker's language, it cannot strictly speaking be *used*. We shall return to this issue in chapter 9, but Maier avoids this problem

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by arguing that the word—or string of letters, whatever it means—is only mentioned and not used "as far as the semantics is concerned" (Maier 2016, 24). This leads to the second problem: the indexical 'me.' How can Maier explain its reference to Bush in (9)? If the indexical is, as we just said, mentioned, not used, then what is mentioned is its type. There is no token occurrence of the indexical in any context; hence, no referent is fixed, let alone Bush, the intuitive referent in the quoted context. Maier next argues that Bush, the source of the quoted words, is supplied by context (here the linguistic context). Turning to the indexical, he then writes: "assuming that Bush at least uses *me* as a first-person pronoun, we can infer that [the phrase] is a property of relating in some way [whatever way is referred to by 'misunderestimated'] to himself." Here he appeals simply to a default assumption and a general not-language-specific inference. To be sure, the alternative he next considers, and persuasively criticizes, may be worse: a monstrous explanation shifting to a counteractual context (including a language parameter in the counteractual context) both to interpret the indexical and to interpret 'misunderestimated.'[14] And Maier's own explanation is pretheoretically plausible. But at the end of the day it amounts to little more than a case-by case pragmatic story that appeals to unconstrained principles such as accommodation and contextual cues.[15] In fact, as mentioned back in chapter 3, since the referent of the free relative definite description is *whatever* the source speaker uses the quotation to refer to, the presumption that Bush uses 'me' as the first-person pronoun to refer to himself is just a reasonable presumption; there is no guarantee.

In sum, my semantics of quotation, especially of quoting phrases containing indexicals, is not free of difficulties. But neither are its rivals. Either we must give up some of our strongest-held views about indexicals and allow for monstrous (i.e., unnatural) indexical context shifts, or the most we can say by way of explanation is a case-by-case pragmatic story drawing on general inferential abilities with relatively few constraints. As I mentioned earlier, because my account is rooted in a theory of pictures, and pictures contain no indexicals, perhaps we should have expected trouble. However, we will see in chapter 9 that this problem is not restricted to the relatively small number of explicit indexicals; it infects a much larger and somewhat amorphous body of data concerned with scare quotation. In sum, no account is optimal; we have to balance alternative theoretical approaches among which there are definite trade-offs.

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V. The Homonymy of Inverted Commas and Other Marks

At the end of my histories of quotation and mentioning in chapters 1 and 2, I hypothesized that the inverted commas '". . ."' are ambiguous, indeed, homonymous, like the word 'bank,' which has two independent meanings accidentally attached at present to one morphological shape. One is derived from the Germanic *bankiz* for a side of a river, the other from the French *banque* or Italian *banco* for the financial institution.[16] We are now in a position to make this homonymy of the inverted commas (and other q- and m-marks) more precise: they are two different species of lexical creatures. Where the inverted commas serve the function of mentioning, they operate on an expression *e* in any syntactic category as 'argument' and yield a nounphrase or singular term "*e*" as value. Where they serve the function of quoting, they do not "apply" to the expression they superficially enclose to yield a singular term; rather they are to be analyzed as a lexical part of the verb of Q-saying, which attributes a token quotationally related to the quoting phrase to the subject as his quoted phrase (via exemplification by the quoting phrase and instantiation in the quoted phrase). Like a function-expression, the verb of Q-saying, including the commas, takes the quoting phrase as its argument and yields the quoted utterance, an event with a particular semantic representation (e.g., a character) that was exemplified (by the quoting phrase) in its context of utterance. But the commas or marks do not separately "operate on" the quoting phrase. Therefore, we do not face the problem that many others do with the syntactic category or semantic type of the quoting phrase. Quoting phrases of any category can both represent and exemplify.

If we simply encounter marks, say, inverted commas '". . ."' on the surface of an inscription, in isolation from any context, we cannot know with certainty whether they are q-marks, hence (lexical) parts of the verb 'said "__"' or m-marks, hence, (lexical) parts of the nounphrase '"___."' As a rule of thumb, either the fact that there is a subject and verb of saying or the fact that the expression occurs in an argument or NP position in a sentence without a verb of saying will suffice to disambiguate individual tokens as q-marks or m-marks, respectively. However, with a sentence like

(11) 'Snow is white' was a sentence uttered by Tarski,

it may be unclear whether we are quoting an utterance by Tarski or mentioning the sentence in order to say about it that it was a Tarski-utterance. Another controversial case is

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(12) On the sign were inscribed the words "George Washington slept here" but I doubt he ever really did.

Emar Maier (2014, 15) has suggested that although (12) is prima facie a case of mentioning (pure quotation), it also shows symptoms of use—anaphoric co-reference—characteristic of quotation. However, one might equally well argue the opposite: despite the reference to words, the anaphoric behavior shows that really we are quoting: 'to inscribe words' is a verb of Q-saying-in-writing. Hence, (12) means that someone Q-said by inscribing on the sign: "George Washington slept here." The metalinguistic reference is the exemplification integral to quoting.

A more interesting example that might seem to challenge the quotation/mentioning distinction is

(13) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand," to use Rupert's favorite phrase. (De Brabanter 2010, 111)

If we were told only the main clause "Alice said that life 'is difficult to understand,'" we would interpret it as a subsentential (mixed) quotation, hence, that Alice said that life is difficult to understand for which she used those very words "is difficult to understand" to which the quoter is metalinguistically referring by way of exemplification. However, adding the subordinate clause 'to use Rupert's favorite phrase' makes the main clause ambiguous. Either we can preserve our initial interpretation of the main clause as a subsentential quotation and simply add the fact that we are *also* mentioning Rupert's favorite phrase. In that case (13) makes two appositive claims:

(13a) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand."

(13b) Rupert's favorite phrase is "is difficult to understand."

Alternatively, the addition of 'to use Rupert's favorite phrase' may transform "is difficult to understand" exclusively into a mention expression referring to Rupert's favorite phrase. The main clause would be, then, nothing more than an indirect discourse report of *what* Alice said, the representational content of her utterance, without any metalinguistic reference to the words *she* used. On this reading (13) also makes two appositive claims:

(13c) Alice said that life is difficult to understand.

(13b) Rupert's favorite phrase is "is difficult to understand."

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Proof of this reading is that it is possible to cancel the metalinguistic reference to the apparent quoting phrase in (13):

(13d) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand," to use Rupert's favorite phrase—but she never used those very words.

In sum, as these examples illustrate, it is always a theoretical decision about underlying logical form whether a given utterance or inscription is an instance of quotation or mentioning; this is never itself part of the given data.

VI. Nonreportative Occurrences of Inverted Commas

At first sight, a more serious problem for our proposal that the inverted commas or q-marks are part of the verb of Q-saying is the fact that subsentential quotations occur outside of reportative contexts, that is, absent an explicit verb of saying, for example, as in:

(14) For Quine, quotation is interesting because it has "a certain anomalous character." (Maier 2014)

However, despite the fact that (14) contains neither a subject identified as such nor an explicit verb of saying, both are understood and recoverable. First, because he is explicitly mentioned, Quine's salience makes him the presumptive subject of the quoted phrase. Since we can cancel that presumption, as in:

(15) For Quine, quotation is interesting because it has "a certain anomalous character" but those are Davidson's words; Quine never used them,

it would seem to follow that by default in (14) Quine is the subject. Indeed, subsentential quotations in nonreportative contexts always presuppose that someone said them (hence, that a subject and verb of saying is understood). This can be inferred from the fact that it is impossible to cancel that presumption:

(16) *Climate change is a "contrived phony mess," but none of us know who or that anyone ever said that in those very words/but no one ever said that in those very words.

It is also arguable that it is generally contextual salience rather than syntactic position in a sentence that identifies the quoted subject: consider (17) (cited earlier in chapter 2):

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(17) Ellen: *The Godfather II* is a total snooze.

> Frank: Well, Pauline Kael said that this "total snooze" is a defining moment in American cinema. (Potts 2007)

Here, Frank is quoting Ellen while reporting what Pauline Kael said—and despite the fact that 'Kael' explicitly occurs as the subject term of the quotation-sentence; Ellen is the more salient speaker in the context whom Frank is quoting.

In sum, even in nonreportative contexts, there is a presumption that a quoted subject exists for the quoting phrase—one whose identity is also frequently known, either because it is common knowledge or because the context reveals it. The very presence of the inverted commas is sufficient to make it understood that there is an elliptical verb of Q-saying of which they are part—as it were, they are the tip of the iceberg that lies beneath the surface—proof of which is again the fact that we cannot cancel that understanding as in (16). On the other hand, I know of no independent evidence of an underlying level of syntactic or logical form in which the verb of saying (and subject) occur and are then deleted.[17] Nor do I want to claim that it will always be *easy* to explicitly insert a verb of saying (including thicker verbs) in nonreportative contexts. One must attend to subtle details of meaning, but I know of no cases where this is impossible.[18]

VII. The (Pictorial) Transparency of Quotation

Analyzing the inverted commas as part of the verb of Q-saying also throws light on another contested issue about the marks that brings us to a third pictorial feature of quotation: transparency (see Kulvicki 2014 and chapter 4 above).[19] There has been considerable controversy whether iteration of inverted commas is a semantically productive operation, but thus far the debate has revolved exclusively, and without resolution, around "pure quotation," i.e., inverted commas or m-marks for mentioning. Some argue that mentioning is semantically iterative just in case "the semantic value of an *n*-level quotation [*sic*] is a function of the semantic value of the corresponding *n*–1 level quotation [*sic*] being placed inside a pair of matching quote [*sic*] marks" (C&L 2007, 116; cf. 129).[20] If we can mention an expression *e* by enclosing it in m-marks, we can mention the mention-expression "'*e*'" by attaching an additional pair of m-marks; the semantic value of the latter is a

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compositional function of the semantic value of the former. This fact about mention was then used to argue against theories like that of Davidson, who analyzes the inverted commas as a complex demonstrative description—for which iteration makes no sense. Whether or not the objection holds, this in turn led the Davidsonians to deny that mentioning is iterative, on the grounds that the inner m-marks in an iterated (e.g., doubly) mentioned expression are not semantically active. In other words, the marks in the *unstructured* term 'mark+word+mark' *mentioned* by mark+mark+word+mark+mark are not actively *mentioning* the word enclosed within *them*. Hence, the result of this exchange was an impasse: once again, one person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens.

Moving from mentioning to quotation, either sentential or subsentential, it is a different story. The predicate 'said "___"' is standardly assumed to be *syntactically* iterative: if 'X said: "S"' is a sentence, then 'Y said: "X said: 'S'"' is a sentence, and so on. So one would also think that it is *semantically* iterative. However, the story is more complicated—and here transparency comes on stage. Recall that a transparent system of representation is one in which any representation R′ of a representation R is about "the same thing" R is about, and "what a representation is about," its semantic content, is the bare-bones representational content determined by the syntactically relevant features that determine the identity of the representation, for example, the shapes and colors of a picture, but not the feature of being a picture. Now, if quotations are transparent in this sense, what are the syntactically relevant features that determine the identity of a quotation? We have argued that what does the exemplifying and representing that determines (with other constituents) the semantic value of the quotation-sentence is the quot*ing* expression, not the q-marks or inverted commas that are part of the verb of Q-saying. So, in a simple quotation, such as 'Tarski said: "Snow is white,"' the syntactically relevant features will be those of the phrase 'Snow is white.' However, when we turn to an iterated (sentential or subsentential) quotation, such as my (Stern's) utterance of

(18) Paul said: "Jesus Christ said: 'Faith saves'"

or

(19) Pence said that Trump said that "my wall" will be bigger and better than the Great Wall of China,"

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matters are not so simple. To clarify the problem, I will first discuss another example (names have been changed) discussed by Richard (2015). Suppose Trump makes the following statement:

(20) Trump: 'Pence said that McConnell said that his agreement with Schumer was "a surprise to both of us."'

According to Richard, (20) has two readings. On the first, Trump is reporting what Pence told him about McConnell:

(20a) Pence to Trump: 'McConnell said that his agreement with Schumer was "a surprise to both of us."'

That is, Pence is reporting an utterance by McConnell about himself:

(20a*) McConnell to Pence: 'My agreement with Schumer was a surprise to both of us.'

In (20a*) 'us' refers to McConnell and Schumer, absent any more contextually salient individual. Likewise, in (20a), 'his' co-refers with 'McConnell,' and the quoting 'us' refers to McConnell and Schumer (absent any more contextually salient individual).

On the second reading, Trump is reporting an utterance by Pence about himself:

(20b) Pence to Trump: 'McConnell said that my agreement with Schumer was "a surprise to both of us."'

That is, in (20b*), Pence is reporting:

(20b*) McConnell to Pence: 'Your agreement with Schumer was a surprise to both of us.'[21]

On this second reading of (20), 'his' refers to Pence (taking it to be a quasi-indexical replacing the quoted 'my'), and the quoting 'us' refers to McConnell and either Pence or Schumer.

Now, with an event semantics, as Richard argues, it is possible to make this ambiguity explicit by indexing the quoting phrase to the relevant event variable. So, corresponding to the first reading (20a), we have (20a**)

(20a**) Pence said that McConnell said (e) that his agreement with Schumer was ["a surprise to both of us."] (e)

and, corresponding to the second reading (20b), we have (20b**)

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(20b**) Pence said (e) that McConnell said that his agreement with Schumer was [“a surprise to both of us.”] (e)

How does this bear on transparency? The ambiguity of (20) is not itself an objection to transparency. If a representation R′ of a representation R is about “the same thing” R is about, and “what a representation is about,” its semantic content, is the content determined by the syntactically relevant features that determine the identity of the representation, then the two readings, (20a) and (20b), have different syntactic features (as we can see in their double-starred regimentations) since their respective quoting phrases are indexed to different saying events. This makes a difference for transparency. Where the indexing has “narrow scope” as in (20a**), no matter how many iterated occurrences of ‘said-that’ there are, each iterated said-that$_{i+1}$ report will have the same content as said-that$_i$. Therefore, on narrow scope readings, transparency holds. However, if instead we index the quotation-phrase to the widest occurrence ‘said-that,’ with each iteration the quotation-expression will be indexed to a different (widest-most) saying-event, which, when the quotation-expression contains an indexical (like ‘us’), will result in a different content. When this is the case, the quotation construction is nontransparent.

Nonetheless, one might argue that quotations are *relatively* transparent. To begin with, the source of the nontransparency in quotation is the presence of indexicals in the quoting phrase. Where the quotation-sentence contains no indexicals, as in

(21) Quine said that quotation behaves “in the anomalous fashion that Frege said was due to the fact that words ‘shift their reference in indirect contexts,’”

there will be no change in content, or what the representation is about, even when the quotation-phrase is indexed to the widest-scope saying event. And since there is, to the best of my knowledge, nothing analogous to indexicals in pictorial representational systems, one might further argue, as we said earlier, that the issue is not really with the picture-quotation analogy but with indexicals that occur in natural language but not in pictures. Another possible response would be to restrict “what a representation is about” to its character rather than its bare-bones representational or propositional content. In that case, we might still index the quotation-phrase to a particular saying-event, but the principle of compositionality

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will govern character rather than content. However, we then lose the claim that what the representation is about are bare-bones contents.

To return now to our earlier example (18), it carries another ambiguity that bears on transparency: should we take the quoting phrase to be 'Faith saves' or 'Jesus Christ said: "Faith saves'"? Again, it depends on the context. Suppose, for example, I was listening to Paul give a sermon, I was suddenly deafened by loud thunder, and I was then asked by John: "What did Paul just say? I couldn't hear." One answer might be

(22) Jesus Christ said: 'Faith saves,'

in which case the embedded sentence 'Faith saves' would be a proper part but not the whole of the quoting phrase in (18). On the other hand, if I was asked to authenticate the authority of the statement 'Faith saves,' I might reply by enumerating the chain of authorities who asserted that truth, in which case the quoting phrase would be 'Faith saves' and "Paul said Jesus Christ said '___'" would be one iterated verb of saying, not part of a quoting phrase.[22]

On the second interpretation of (18), quotation is transparent. No matter how many times we iterate the quotational verb of saying 'said "___,"' and no matter how deeply embedded is the quoting phrase, a quotational saying Q' of a quotational saying Q is "about" the same thing that the quotation Q is "about"—both what is represented and exemplified.

But on the first interpretation of (18), it is also arguable that quotation is transparent. The embedded quoting phrase is not all of what is quoting, but it is part of it, and its semantic value, or how it is understood, will be preserved under iteration or multiple embedding. Indeed, one might analyze (18) under the first reading analogous to how we would analyze (21), a multiply embedded (i.e., iterated) subsentential quotation of the form 'X said that . . . "__ '. . .'__." . . .'

In (21), the words quoted in the embedded subsentential quotation are understood exactly as they would be were they quoted only once and were they simply used. But they are only part of the semantic value of the subsentential quotation as a whole in which they occur. In sum, when we quote someone quoting someone else's statement, we quote the same statement, that is, a statement with the same semantic value as the statement quoted by the quoter-subject we are quoting. This is the picture-like transparency of quotation.

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9 Scare Quotes and the Nonliteral Use of the Inverted Commas

I. Subsentential Quotation and Scare Quotation

When I first introduced subsentential (mixed) quotation in chapter 3, among the examples were so-called 'scare' (or 'queer,' 'shudder,' or 'sneer') quotations,[1] such as

(1) Nicola said that Alice is a "philtosopher" (C&L 1997, 436)

(2) Palin tweeted that "peaceful Muslims" should "refudiate" the mosque being built at Ground Zero. (Maier 2014)

But I deferred their discussion to this chapter in order to lay out my general theory before turning to this special phenomenon. Until recently, scare quotes have received relatively little attention in the philosophical and linguistics literature.[2] However, as a result of interest in subsentential/mixed quotations such as

(3) Life is "what happens while you are making other plans" (John Lennon, "Beautiful Boy," from the album *Starting Over*, cited in Predelli 2003)

(4) Life is "the farce which everybody has to perform" (Arthur Rimbaud, *Une Saison en Enfer, "Mauvais Sang,"* cited in Predelli 2003),

philosophers and linguists began to subsume strings like (1) and (2) under the same rubric. Like subsentential/mixed quotations, they exhibit the same patterns of syntactic and semantic interaction with their larger matrices; and neither occupies the argument position of a name or referring term as do mention-expressions.[3] This is prima facie evidence that scare quotations have representational, or use, content. At the same time, the scare-quoting phrases make some kind of metalinguistic reference, if not to themselves, then to some feature related to themselves. But in contrast to non-scare

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subsentential quotations, scare quotations occur much more frequently in nonreportative contexts, for example:

(5) In offset printing 'proofs' of illustrations come from the darkroom, not the proof press. (*CMS*, 172)

(6) He is presenting his dissertation at the 'paper' session. (where he should have said 'poster' session) (Recanati 2011, 250)

(7) Y. Skouratov, general prosecutor, was suspended by B. Yeltsin in March. His successor, Y. Tchaika, was 'promoted' minister of justice in August. (Recanati 2011, 248, 273)

(8) National greed has disguised itself in mandates to govern 'inferior' races. (Predelli 2003, 3, citing the *MacMillan Handbook of English*)

(9) The 'debate' resulted in three cracked heads and two broken noses. (Predelli 2003, 3, citing *CMS*)

(10) This remarkable piece of 'art' consists of a large canvas covered with mud and old bus transfers. (Predelli, 2003, 3, citing *Handbook of Current English*)

(11) Look, it's Jack's philosophical idol 'Quine' who is coming to argue and refute us!

(12) My nine-year-old son thinks that his father teaches 'mid-evil' philosophy. (Rafi Stern, 1997)

(13) A: The freedom fighters succeeded in liberating the village.
B: Those 'freedom fighters' butchered two-thirds of the inhabitants of the village they 'liberated.' (Brandom 1994)

Even though they lack an explicit subject and verb of Q-saying, these sentences seem to be quotational attributions with an understood but elliptical subject and verb. As I argued in chapter 8, it is odd, if not impossible, to cancel their metalinguistic reference, as in:

(6a) *He is presenting his dissertation at the 'paper' session but no one ever called it that.

(9a) *The 'debate' resulted in three cracked heads and two broken noses, but no one ever described it in those terms.

Furthermore, as I argued in the general case of inverted commas in nonreportative contexts, the very presence of the inverted commas is evidence that an elliptical subject and verb of Q-saying are at least understood. One

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can make this understanding explicit by adding to the surface sentence a parenthetical 'X said' or 'so-called' (where X stands for a generic public) with no noticeable change of meaning.[4]

(5′) In offset printing [what people commonly call or say are/so-called] 'proofs' of illustrations come from the darkroom, not the proof press.

(6′) He is presenting his dissertation at [what he calls or says is] the [so-called] 'paper' session.

(10′) This remarkable piece of [what a salient individual said is/so-called] 'art' consists of a large canvas covered with mud and old bus transfers.

For these reasons, I assume that scare quotations, no different from other subsentential quotations, have bare-bones representational content, exemplificational content, and in general are true just in case there is a quoted phrase that was uttered by an (implicit) subject in their context that is an instantiation of the property or representation exemplified by the quoting phrase in its context. However, for scare quotations, the gap between the representational and exemplificational contents is much greater than it is for quotations in general.

To begin with, the bare-bones representational content of subsentential and scare-quoting phrases are determined differently. The representational content of standard subsentential (and, for that matter, sentential) quotations, what they say, is determined by the meaning with which the quoting phrase would be used in an indirect discourse report of the quoted utterance. In general, this will be the very same disquoted quoting phrase or its homophonic translation unless it contains indexicals that must be converted (following Frege's directive) to accommodate differences between the quoted and (indirect) quoting contexts. Those sorts of adjustments will carry over to scare quotations that contain indexicals. But scare-quoting phrases pose another problem due precisely to the feature that most obviously distinguishes them from other quoting phrases: there is something *wrong* about them. They are either linguistically incorrect—and therefore evidence of the quoted subject's linguistic or lexical incompetence—or expressions with meanings unknown to the speaker or without a meaning, or misuses of technical or professional terminology, or inappropriate expressions in the context of utterance—not because of *what* they say (although that may independently be the case) but because their language is not appropriate to express their intended content in the quoting context,

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for example, 'inferior' in (8). As this range of errors and improprieties indicates, 'scare quotation' is something of an umbrella term that subsumes a wide range of phrases that could be wrong for many different reasons. 'Refudiate' in (2) is a mongrel of 'refute' and 'repudiate'; 'mid-evil' in (12) is the (humorous) result of a child's mishearing or misunderstanding of 'medieval.' 'Proofs' for inked offset plates or cylinders and 'paper sessions' for 'poster sessions' show incompetence in technical or professional terminology, 'Peaceful Muslims' and "'inferior' races" display biased language in ethnic and racial talk. 'Quine' in (11) appropriates the name not just for someone other than Quine but also for someone who, in the eyes of the speaker, is anything but Quine in intellect and philosophical stature. Similar remarks apply to 'debate' in (9) and 'art' in (10): these are not just false of the intended extension but wildly false.

What is common to all these wrong uses is that there is a mismatch between the intended or presumptive bare-bones content and the (explicit or contextually presupposed) scare-quoted subject's choice of phrase or word to express it. One might suppose, then, that the function of the scare quotes is to say that the choice of words is an error, improper, incorrect, inappropriate, or deviant. This is the view of Cappelen and Lepore, who argue, while defending their view that quotation marks are semantically ineliminable, that in examples like (1) the marks indicate that the speaker does not know the meaning of the quoting words, that the (presupposed) subject misspoke, that the words are gibberish or "not words in his language"; any of these features "may explain why [the speaker] mixed quoted" (C&L 2007, 56). Hence, (1) is true only with quotation marks and false without them. But if the function of the scare quote-marks is simply to flag that the words are wrong, how do the marks themselves make a sentence meaningful or true when, without them, it would be meaningless or false? If (1) is gibberish without the inverted commas, how does their mere addition make it meaningful or true?

The moral I draw is that the function of the inverted commas in scare-quotation is *not* to express the fact that the subject misuses or improperly uses words (although they do)—*that* the word used *is* wrong. Nor can the presumptive representational content of the scare quoting phrase be its literal meaning because what is wrong is precisely the mismatch between the intended content and the phrase used—and in some cases, the scare-quoting phrase has no literal meaning. To verbally articulate the representational content of the scare-quoting phrase, the default is to substitute

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linguistically correct, appropriate, known language that expresses it. But identifying that intended or presumed content requires extralinguistic knowledge and reasoning—for lack of a better term, context—which makes it easier for some cases than for others. Apparent linguistic mistakes like 'refudiate' in (2) go over straightforwardly to correct predicates like 'repudiate' or 'refute,' 'paper session' to 'poster session,' and 'mid-evil' to 'medieval.' But apart from all the philosophical worries that attend the very idea of individuating (the same) content, other wrong word-choices are much more difficult to articulate in 'correct' language. 'Debate' in (9) might express 'exchange-turned-into-brawl,' 'art' in (10) be expressed by 'junk pretending to be art,' and 'Quine' into 'self-deluded person who imagines himself (or whom some other contextually salient individual wildly imagines) to be Quine-like in intellect and stature.' But, like many such attempts to provide synonyms or paraphrases, none of these attempts to articulate the properties expressed by the scare-quoting phrases is bound to satisfy everyone.

One example that has attracted much attention is (1), which illustrates the difficulties of spelling out the representational content of scare-quoting expressions, especially in the absence of a rich description of the quoted and quoting contexts. The example was first introduced by C&L (1997, 437) as a "not *un*common" case of the use of unknown words, "words not part of our [the speaker's] vocabulary," words "unintelligible to the reporter himself" (437). Quoting speakers put 'philtosopher' in q-marks either to indicate that they are "uncertain" of its meaning, or to indicate (positively?) that Nicola's vocabulary is larger than theirs–which is why they do not understand him—or because they are "convinced that Nicola is linguistically incompetent" (437) and they want to make that clear to everyone without saying, or committing themselves to, exactly what is incompetent. In a note (437, 12) C&L add that their explanation is "closely related to the use of mixed quotation to distance oneself from objectionable vocabulary"—a point to which we will return. In their later 2007 book they describe 'philtosopher' as gibberish, not simply a word whose meaning is unknown to the speaker, and argue that the sentence (1) without inverted commas around 'philtosopher' "doesn't capture [its] content" (56) without saying what that content is. Nor do they give any context for (1). Although they originally gave (1) as a case of mixed quotation, in their Minimal Theory of 2007, the word 'philtosopher' is simply mentioned, and indeed it has no interpretation, at least no semantic interpretation.

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The example subsequently generated a cottage industry around it. For example, Recanati (2011, 250) asserts (without explanation) that Nicola is a five-year-old boy; that "philtosopher' is a nonword and meaningless in standard English (and adds that "it's hard to say exactly what the sense of 'philtosopher' in [Nicola's] idiolect is"; 2011, 250, n. 23); and that the example requires a (monster-like) shift for its interpretation from the speaker's English-language parameter in the actual context to Nicola's (foreign) idiolect or language-parameter in *his* context of utterance.

Neither C&L's nor Recanati's analyses hit the mark. To begin with, 'philtosopher' is not gibberish or meaningless. The suffix 'er' applied to nouns refers to people either occupationally connected to or who produce what the noun signifies, namely, 'philtosophy.' Hence, we may not know exactly what 'philtosophy' means or what Nicola means by 'philtosophy,' but we know that it is something people can do as an occupation and something produced. Second, 'philtosophy' obviously sounds so close to 'philosophy' to make us wonder (or maybe presume) whether it is a mistaken pronunciation, especially if the quoted subject is a five-year-old. (Compare (12): my nine-year-old son's 'mid-evil' for 'medieval.') Second, because 'philtosopher' is not a word of English that can express representational content, there *is* something wrong, inappropriate, improper, or deviant about what Nicola said *in English*—and we want to preserve that fact about its status in the speaker's quoting language, namely, English. On Recanati's account involving language shift to Nicola's idiolect, there turns out to be nothing deviant, odd, or inappropriate about what he said because he was speaking a different language, his own, in which the word is perfectly kosher. Showing that Nicola spoke 'correctly' in *another* language does not explain the 'incorrect' use of the word in *our*, the *quoting*, language.

Nonetheless, although Recanati does not tell us how he discovered that Nicola is a five-year-old boy, I am inclined to agree that the most plausible interpretation of (1) is that it reports a child's mistaken or deviant utterance *in English*. Like Predelli's (2005, 154, 158) examples of 'subliminable [rather than 'subliminal'] ads' and 'nucular [rather than 'nuclear'] weapons,' so 'philtosopher' is a five-year-old's word for philosopher. However, the point of the scare quote marks is neither to trigger a language shift, nor to signal *that* the quoted subject's use of the word is wrong, nor to mention a shape 'philtosopher' whose meaning we do not know. Instead, I will now argue, it is to register the speaker's disavowal of Nicola's use of 'philtosopher' *as*

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his, the speaker's, own word *in his quoting language English* to express the representational content Nicola intends to express. That disavowal is what makes (1) a case of scare quoting.

II. The Representational Content of Scare Quotations

Before turning to my positive proposal, one more word about the representational content of scare quotations. As we have seen, scare quotations are a mixed bag. For one set of scare-quoting phrases, we can identify default predicates that correctly articulate their presumptive content in *our* language (e.g., (2), (5), (6), and (12)); the content of the scare-quoting phrase will then be the content of that predicate. So, the property corresponding to the scare-quoting phrase as its representational content will not be determined by the literal meaning (or character) of the scare quoting phrase, but by the meaning (or character) of the default predicate. To characterize that property, we have two possible routes. One is to treat the q-marks as monsters that shift the context to the alternative quoted context of the quoted subject in which their idiolect expresses that very property with that word. However, whatever one's view of indexical monsters, such a shift leads us (as I said earlier) to lose precisely what is wrong about the scare-quoting word—the mismatch between the word-choice and representational content—hence, the reason why the quoter disavows the quoted subject's phrase. The second route is the one I pursed earlier in chapter 5 for indexicals that occur in subsentential quotations. We substitute for the scare quot*ing* phrase in the indirect discourse report (that expresses the representational content in the quoting context) the default predicate (when we can identify one) that tracks the quoted subject's intended representational content. But this route has its cost, too (as we saw in chapter 8): the loss of compositionality.

A second class of scare quotations employs quoting phrases whose representational content corresponds to no identifiable predicate interpreted literally in the speaker's language, either because we do not understand the phrase or because of the many difficulties that attend the identification of words to express a given content.[5] In these cases, I suggest that we take the content, say, a property, to be a contextually selected complement or contrary to the content literally expressed by the scare-quoting term—even if we lack words for that complement or contrary. By 'context' here, I primarily mean mutually recognized intentions and beliefs, that is,

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shared presuppositions. Among these presuppositions, we can distinguish two sets. Some will be about the whole set of contrary and complementary properties to the literally expressed content of the scare-quoting phrase that are possible candidates for its representational content. Others will serve to constrain *which* among those complementary or contrary properties is selected and, foremost among the latter, will be presuppositions about the property or content that can be expected to elicit the speaker's strongest disavowal of the scare quoting phrase because it is literally inappropriate or linguistically wrong to express that selected content.[6] So, to determine *what* the intended scare quoted representational content is one must know *that* the quoting phrase is scare quoting! This is not much to take home, but it is crucial that the scare-quoting phrase have some content (even if we must Ramsey-like existentially quantify over it) because it is the mismatch between (the literal meaning of) the scare-quoting *phrase* and that presumptive representational content that underlies scare quoting. Thus C&L's initial characterization of 'philtosopher' as unintelligible or meaningless—if that means that it expresses *no* content—will not serve this purpose. On the other hand, the selected property must be unsuitable and inapt as possible to be the representational content of the scare-quoting phrase.

III. The Role of Inverted Commas and Other Q-Marks in Scare Quoting

If the function of inverted commas in scare quoting is to signal neither *that* the phrase is wrong nor *what* is wrong with it, what is their role? The representational and exemplificational work in scare quotation are both accomplished by the scare-quoting phrase itself. To see what else the commas might do, recall their function in proper quotation. As we saw in chapter 8, the inverted commas are part of the verb of Q-saying, which expresses the attribution of a quoted token to a subject. But as we also saw, earlier in chapter 1, this linguistic device for attribution is the product of a long history that ran along a number of trajectories. On one, signs (like the diple and S-shaped flourish) that were originally marginal annotations that gave directions to readers to attend to passages and to guide their spoken recitation, intonation, and pauses eventually became punctuation marks. A device for use in oral practice became a piece of the written language system. But this is not simply a matter of encoding a particular use within the perimeters of a graphic sign. The transformation into an inscription

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increases speakers' expressive power—because once a use becomes a sign, it becomes possible to use the sign itself for different purposes than its original one. So, as the extra- or metatextual *notae* became pieces of linguistic punctuation in the shape of the inverted commas—once their use in the practice of quotation or citation was, as it were, 'lexicalized'—it became possible for speakers to *use* those signs, the inverted commas, in more and different ways than they were originally meant. The inverted commas that were originally, or literally, intended to express attribution, became a means to nonliterally express scare quotation.

For a helpful analogy to this transformation in the role of the inverted commas from quoting to scare quoting, consider the metaphorical use or interpretation of a word. In metaphor, a word that was originally used to express one meaning, which then became lexicalized as its literal meaning, is used to express something else nonliterally or figuratively. But its nonliteral or figurative use is not independent of its literal use (or meaning once it is lexicalized)—as if we simply recycled or rebaptized the sign to express some other independent meaning. Rather, it is nonliteral or figurative because it presupposes and exploits (knowledge of) the literal meaning. Recall the old adage that the metaphorical depends on the literal. The truth in that motto is that the metaphorical interpretation of an expression Ø does not (generally) include the literal meaning of Ø (although sometimes they overlap), but the literal meaning of Ø is active in determining the metaphorical content. In particular, the metaphorical interpretation of Ø depends on and is drawn from various kinds of presuppositions we hold about literal Øs. For example, Romeo's utterance of 'Juliet is the sun' metaphorically says (among many other things) that his life revolves around her or that he cannot live without her nourishment. The properties of 'revolving around X' or 'necessary for one's sustenance' are properties literally true of or stereotypically associated with or presupposed to be exemplified by what is literally the sun. In this sense, the metaphorical depends on the literal: without understanding its literal meaning (and its associated commonly presupposed features), one cannot know the metaphorical interpretation of the predicate—even though that literal meaning is not part of the metaphorical interpretation. This is also the sense in which the literal is 'active' in the metaphorical even when it is not part of the metaphorical interpretation.[7]

A second trajectory in the history of quotation and the inverted commas is also relevant to the genesis of scare quotation. Recall again that the

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function of the original quotation sign, the *diple* or S-shaped flourish, was to draw attention to noteworthy passages, originally scriptural verses and later statements of authoritative or canonical pagan authors like Homer and Plato and then *sententiae* or wisdom statements. In so quoting or citing, the quoter—the copyist or reader—did not themself assert the quoted statement, but by citing it for its authoritative and authorizing wisdom—what everyone ought to acknowledge and believe—they conventionally implicated their endorsement of *and* assent to the correctness and perspicuity of the quoting words to express their wisdom or authoritative content. Over time, as we saw in chapter 1, and especially beginning toward the end of the eighteenth century, the practice of quotation changed with changing conceptions of common and private property. The authorizing and authoritative character of quotation declined, and the practice of quoting became more egalitarian and democratic. As a result, what was quoted was not necessarily wisdom or universal truths. Thus the earlier implication of endorsement of or assent to the truth of the quoted passage was no longer drawn. The same holds nowadays. The quoter/speaker is a neutral third party with no commitment of their own to the *truth* (or wisdom) of the quoted sentence; they exclusively use the quoting phrase to attribute the quoted phrase to the subject. However, to succeed at the attribution through their own use of the quot*ing* phrase, they must tacitly endorse or affirm that their quoting words faithfully and appropriately express the content of the attribution; their own use implies that the words express in their quoting context the attributed quoted content. Indeed the quoter implies that, like their own quoting words, the quoted subject meant by their words what the quoting words mean for them. All this is part of the contemporary literal meaning of quotation.

I want to propose that the relation between the inverted commas in quotation and in scare quotation is analogous to the relation between the literal and metaphorical (or more generally, nonliteral) uses of words. As if they were themselves words, the inverted commas literally mean one thing when they are used to quote and nonliterally or figuratively mean something else when they occur in the practice of scare quoting. When used in quotation, the inverted commas as part of the verb of Q-saying (in its contemporary or post-eighteenth-century sense) serve to attribute the quoted phrase to a particular individual subject as their "private property." This is their literal meaning. When used in scare quotation, the inverted

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commas as part of the verb of scare Q-saying still serve to attribute the quoted phrase to the (implicit or explicit) quoted subject but they make that attribution exclusively to the quoted subject—and, more specifically, they exclusively attribute to that subject *how* its content is represented, through the exemplified representation. The quoter restricts the mode of attribution, the quoted words, solely to its quoted subject, disavowing any implied endorsement or authorization on the quoter's own part. The quoter says with the inverted commas that *only* the quot*ed* subject, and not they, endorses or avows the appropriateness or correctness of the quot*ed language* as a way to express the attributed content. The inverted commas, which in quotation proper were a fence around the quoted subject's private property to demarcate exactly what belongs to them, now serve in scare quotation as a barrior, blocking off the quoting words to prevent anyone from imputing them to the quoting speaker. The quoter disowns, not only their own responsibility for the appropriateness or correctness of their quot*ing* words, but also any implied endorsement of the quoted subject's choice of their quot*ed* words to express their intended representational content. Thus, rather than express a judgment about the *words*, the scare-marks express the speaker's *attitude* toward the quoted subject's choice of language. This attitude can range along a continuum of more specific attitudes: from nonendorsement and disassociation to disapproval and opposition, to contempt, hostility, disauthorization, condemnation, or mockery. But they are all species of a genus of disavowal: the quoting speaker *S* intends that their fellow contextual participants, including the quoted subject *T*, recognize that *S* intends that the phrase by which *S* attributes a given content *C* to an utterance by *T* be a phrase attributed only to *T* to express *C* and not to *S* themself.

This attitude or stance of disavowal is the nonliteral meaning carried by the inverted commas (as part of the scare quotational verb of saying). If the literal meaning of the commas implies the quoter's endorsement of the words as an appropriate or correct expression of the attributed content, their nonliteral meaning is disavowal (by the speaker) of the propriety of the quoted words and indeed of their own quoting words used in making the attribution.

This interpretation of scare quotes as disavowal is not original to me. C&L (2005a) describe the function of scare quotes "to indicate that speakers *distance* themselves, for whatever reason, from certain aspects of linguistic behavior" (56, my emphasis). Recanati (2011, 240) describes it as "disassociation." And Brandom (1994) long ago gave a similar analysis using the

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very term 'disavowal' although it carries a much more specific valence in his inferentialist semantics. All these notions are close to what I call disavowal or disowning the quoted subject's words. But my point is that it is not simply this attitude (however labeled) that is expressed by the scare quote marks but that it is an attitude that is conceptually dependent on the literal meaning of the marks in the same way that a figurative meaning is dependent on the literal. The same "dependence" and "active-ness" that holds between the metaphorical and the literal holds for the relation between the literal quoting and nonliteral scare quoting uses of inverted commas and q-marks. If quotation is attribution with implied endorsement of the propriety of the words, scare quotation is attribution with implied disendorsement or disavowal.

In the literature scare quoting has also been associated with irony and sarcasm, although it has sometimes been taken to express weaker attitudes like skepticism and doubt.[8] This is true, but the irony and sarcasm expressed by the scare quotes cannot have the representational *content* of the quoting/quoted words as its object; it must be directed specifically to the mismatch between the words and intended content. So, if Jack suggested "Let's go for a picnic tomorrow" and the next day turns out to be stormy, then if I quote him by saying, 'Well, Jack said: "Tomorrow will be a beautiful day for a picnic,"' I am being sarcastic and ironic but I am not scare quoting. Nonetheless, what is right about the irony or sarcasm view is that what scare quotation expresses, in addition to attribution of a representational content to the quoted subject, is not more propositional content (like the contrary of the quoting expression), but an attitude: disavowal or disownership, something like an illocutionary act or manner of delivery, which, as we saw earlier, is a feature sometimes exemplified by the quoting expression.[9] And this 'meaning' is dependent on the literal meaning of the marks, which is to attribute to someone what they said in their own words, thereby implying my endorsement of the propriety of those words to express that content. Scare quoting, like other figurative uses of language, preserves—and is constrained by—the literal meaning of its vehicle at the same time that it refigures that meaning.

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10 Quotations in Pictures

In earlier chapters I argued that a linguistic quotation has a pictorial dimension: it refers, like a picture, both representationally and exemplificationally; its exemplificational content is analog while its representational content is digital; and it belongs to a transparent symbol system. This raises the question: If quotations function like pictures, can pictures function as quotations? Can one picture quote another? The question we are raising is not one of linguistic usage. Art historians as well as practicing artists frequently label the practice whereby one picture depicts another as "quotation," among a family of terms that include 'borrow,' 'lift,' 'theft,' 'inspired by,' 'appropriate,' 'influence,' 'adopt,' 'derive from,' and 'allude.' In the sixth of his *Discourses*, Joshua Reynolds terms the practice 'Imitation.'[1] The question we are raising is whether and to what degree we can find the same practices we perform with words, mechanisms of reference, and marks for quotation among pictures. In this final chapter I explore this question against the background of the previous chapters.

I. Goodman and Linguistic Mentioning

The first philosopher to have pursued the question of whether pictures can quote other pictures was, to my knowledge, Nelson Goodman (1978).[2] A central theme in Goodman's thought is that symbolic skills and modes of symbolization, like denotation and exemplification, cut across all the different media and systems of symbols: the visual and aural, the verbal systems of natural languages, systems of notation for music and dance, and pictures and sculptures. As I mentioned earlier in chapter 4, Goodman analyzes pictorial representation as a mode of denotation, and he explores whether metaphorical transfer of symbols occurs in pictures as well as in natural

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language. This in turn leads him to ask whether the mode of symbolization that constitutes verbal quotation in natural language—the way in which expressions enclosed in inverted commas refer—is also to be found in other symbol systems and media and, in particular, in pictorial symbol systems.

In light of what we have seen in earlier chapters, it should come as no surprise to discover that Goodman's examples, both linguistic and pictorial, show that what he means by 'quotation' is the phenomenon of mentioning. Following the widespread philosophical practice that I have criticized in previous chapters, Goodman conflates the two phenomena: "By putting quotation marks around A1 ['triangles have three sides'], we make a *name* for it that also *directly quotes* it" (Goodman 1978, 41, my emphasis). I have argued, in contrast, that mentioning and quotation are different practices, whose linguistic marks (e.g., the inverted commas) behave differently, indeed, homonymously. Prima facie, then, what Goodman has to say about mentioning does not directly bear on my project that concerns quotation. Nonetheless, it will be instructive to examine his analysis in order to get a sense of the problems that arise in shifting from one medium, the linguistic, to another, the pictorial.

Goodman proposes three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for mentioning in *any* medium and in *any* symbol system: Where the mentioning expression is a symbol or string of symbols Ø surrounded by inverted commas ('Ø') or some other m-mark, and the mentioned expression is the symbol(s) Ø, 'Ø' mentions Ø if and only if

(i) The mentioning symbol 'Ø' refers to (denotes (for words), represents (for pictures)) the mentioned symbol Ø.

(ii) The mentioning symbol 'Ø' contains the mentioned symbol Ø.

(iii) Replacement of the referred to and contained symbol Ø by any other symbol π in the system results in a symbol 'π' that refers to the referred-to symbol π.

The first two conditions are standard in any theory of mentioning. If

(1) "'The twentieth letter of the alphabet'" mentions 'The twentieth letter of the alphabet'

then

(2) "'The twentieth letter of the alphabet'" denotes and contains 'The twentieth letter of the alphabet.'

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Goodman's motivation for adding (iii) is to block the inference from (3) to (4):

(3) 'The twentieth letter of the alphabet' denotes and contains 't.'

(4) 'The twentieth letter of the alphabet' mentions 't.'

He concludes that (i) and (ii) are necessary but not sufficient for mentioning unless we add (iii) that requires that the first two conditions, denotation (or reference more generally) and containment, be *preserved under replacement* of the denoted and contained expression *Ø*. If we replace the contained and denoted letter 't' in (3) by another letter, say, 'd,' the resulting string 'Dhe dwendiedh ledder of the alphabed' is nonsense that does not denote, period, let alone denote 'd.' Hence, (4) does not follow.[3]

But is (iii) really necessary? On closer examination, it turns out that it is only Goodman's way of typographically stating his case that misleadingly makes it look like there is a real problem to be solved. If we look at his text, Goodman begins with the following sentence:

> *A1*. Triangles have three sides.
>
> . . . By putting quotation marks around *A1*, we make a name of it that also directly quotes it. (Goodman 1978, 41)

What is Goodman asking us to do? Put quotation marks around the entire line that begins with '*A1*' and ends with 'sides'? Or put quotation marks around '*A1*' (as we just did)? "'*A1*'" is a name of and directly quotes (aka mentions) what is contained within it—but that is '*A1*'. On the other hand, '*A1*' names but does not directly quote (aka mention) 'Triangles have three sides.' If we want to mention the sequence of four words to the right of *'A1,'* we can put single quotes around them like this: 'Triangles have three sides.' This name does directly quote (aka mention) as well as name what is contained within its inverted commas. Thus both (i) '*A1*' and (ii) "'Triangles have three sides.'" name (iii) 'Triangles have three sides' but only (ii) also directly quotes (aka mentions) (iii). Thus we could represent what Goodman is asking us to do by *A2*:

A2. 'Triangles have three sides.'

in which the mention-expression to the right of '*A2*' directly quotes or mentions the four words to the right of *A1*. In any case, both '*A2*' and (ii) "'Triangles have three sides.'" name (iii) 'Triangles have three sides.' but,

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as before, only (ii) also directly quotes (aka mentions) (iii) as we can see in (5):

(5) "'Triangles have three sides'" mentions/directly quotes 'Triangles have three sides,'

which should not, of course, be confused with

(6) 'Triangles have three sides' mentions/directly quotes Triangles have three sides,

which is nonsense. Returning now to Goodman's motivation for his third condition, the allegedly problematic consequence (4) contains no mention-expression like that of (5), nor is 't' mention*ed* in (4) any more than 'Triangles have three sides' is mention*ed* in (6). Where an expression '*Ø*' mentions, and thereby denotes, *Ø* it is *because* '*Ø*' *contains Ø*; it is not enough that the one names the other.[4]

As many authors have observed, the kind of reference or denotation involved in mentioning is conceptually related to containment or a similar notion. For example, Gomez-Torrente argues that "quotations [i.e., mention-expressions] get their referents fixed via an implicit general convention" which he labels "Interiority": "A quotation refers to the expression within its quotation-marks" (Gomez-Torrente 2013, 369–370). This, of course, is containment under another name. But the problem with Goodman's formulation of (i) containment and (ii) denotation is that they are two independent conditions. (3) is perfectly kosher, but it does not add up to mentioning because 'The twentieth letter of the alphabet' denotes 't,' *not* because it contains the latter, but because the twentieth letter of the alphabet is (=) 't' or, if 'is' is the copula, because 't' *is* the twentieth letter of the alphabet. That 't,' as a matter of accidental fact, happens to be contained in 'The twentieth letter of the alphabet' has nothing to do with why the latter denotes the former. This is the real reason why 'The twentieth letter of the alphabet' denotes and contains 't' but does not mention it. Goodman's condition (iii) is a red herring.

Nonetheless, Goodman's discussion raises an interesting question: is *anything* contained in a mentioning expression denoted by it? Does a mentioning expression like "'Triangles have three sides'" only mention 'Triangles have three sides,' or does it also mention 'have' or 'three' or, for that matter, 'ides'? Is a proper part of what is contained within the mentioning expression—between its inverted commas—also mentioned? As we have

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seen, the falsity of (4) has no bearing on this question, and my own intuitions are equivocal. But this may also be one idea behind the view that the mentioning expression is something like a simple name with no internal semantically autonomous constituents, which would exclude superficially proper parts of the mentioned expression from being mentioned. In any case, (iii) is irrelevant to this question as well.

II. Goodman and Pictorial Mentioning

It is not difficult to find purported examples of pictorial mentioning in the history of art: paintings of interiors with a painting or picture hanging on the wall, such as Paul Gauguin's *Woman in Front of a Still Life by Cézanne*,[5] Matisse's *The Red Studio*,[6] or William Delafield Cook's painting *Museum Piece* of a museum wall on which there hang two Vermeer paintings.[7] A whole genre known as 'gallery paintings' or 'pictures of collections' depict large halls in which multiple paintings and other precious items are displayed in elegant surroundings: Johan Zoffany's *Tribuna of the Uffizi*;[8] Samuel F. B. Morse's *Gallery of the Louvre*,[9] which depicts both many of its greats as well as aspiring artists copying them; or Teniers's mid-seventeenth-century paintings of the collection of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm.[10] These depict pictures known to have been part of the Archduke's collection (although their arrangement may be fictional) in order to provide a visual survey. In some of them, the Archduke is depicted visiting the collection accompanied by courtiers and other art collectors, sometimes including Teniers himself explaining a particular artwork to his patron. Here the function of the picture within the picture is to refer to the actual picture in the collection, much as one might mention the words in a book by listing them.

There are no inverted commas in pictures. How, then, can we distinguish the fact that a picture contains as a proper part a depicted picture of *X* as opposed to simply a depiction of *X*? Following a suggestion of Goodman, let's suppose that a picture of a frame around an image, or a depicted easel on which the depicted picture is mounted, or the depiction of a picture hanging on a wall, function in place of linguistic m- (or q-)marks.[11] Recall that Frege introduced inverted commas to disambiguate words when they are *used* (to refer to their ordinary referents) from when they are *mentioned* in order to avoid the confusions wrought by use/mention ambiguity. Is there a similar worry for pictures? In general, visual discontinuities between

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the depicted picture and the rest of the depiction may suffice to avoid these confusions even without a pictorial surrogate for m-marks.[12] On the other hand, an artist may deliberately intend to play up the possibility of a use/mention-like ambiguity for its visual effect. Consider Velazquez's *Christ in the House of Martha and Mary*[13] whose foreground depicts two maids in a kitchen preparing food, while in the background we see a biblical scene that is usually taken to be a depiction of Martha and Mary in the presence of Christ (*Luke* 10:38–42). It is ambiguous whether we are looking at the actual biblical scene through a hatch or an opening in the wall (or possibly its reflection in a mirror)—in which case, the foreground would be contemporaneous with the biblical scene (and one of the maids, perhaps Martha)—*or* whether we are looking at a painting of the biblical story on the wall of the kitchen. Whichever one it is, art historians now think that Valezquez wished to draw the viewer's attention to the multiple possibilities as part of the larger meaning of the composition.[14] For Velazquez, then, there is no anxiety like Frege's that would motivate a disambiguating device.[15]

The main problem Goodman himself sees for pictorial mentioning arises from his containment condition (ii). For a depicting picture P_2 to mention a real, independently existing picture P_1, it must be possible to replicate P_1 in P_2. But according to Goodman, only symbols in digital or finitely differentiated systems can be replicated, and pictorial symbol systems are neither. Furthermore, pictorial systems are singular, that is, their symbols are each unique. Hence, no picture can be replicated, implying that a picture can mention only the very picture contained within it, a restriction Goodman thinks is "surely too severe a demand" (Goodman 1978, 47). The still life in Gauguin's *Woman in Front of a Still Life by Cézanne* turns out not to contain and therefore not to mention Cézanne's picture! Nor can I pictorially mention the *Mona Lisa* by painting a picture that (let's imagine) is as close a copy of Leonardo's painting as there can be, as in (7), to say in turn that it is the most famous painting in the Louvre:

(7) is the most famous painting in the Louvre,

because the image in is not a replica of the *Mona Lisa*.

Of course, once again, one philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens. This consequence may be reason to reject replication as a strict requirement for pictorial quotation (however central the analog/digital distinction is to Goodman's classification of symbol systems). But the

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whole story is more complicated even for Goodman who in fact allows some pictorial systems, like the photographic whose symbols have multiple instances, to admit "duplication . . . as a tolerable even though admittedly inexact analogue of replication" (Goodman 1978, 48). And having come that far, Goodman then asks whether *copies* of symbols might also suffice in general. But at that point, Goodman resists:

> That would stretch the analogy [to replication] very thin indeed since . . . copying as a relation in an autographic singular symbol system differs drastically from replication as a relation in an allographic multiple one. Once we start stretching an analogy, though, where we stop is rather arbitrary. All I am inclined to say here is that what we consider to be direct pictorial quotation [*sic*] will depend upon what we are willing to take as an adequate analogue of replication in direct verbal quotation. [*sic*] (Goodman 1978, 48)

In short, Goodman rules that it is up to each of us to decide as we wish, ad hoc, occasion by occasion. However, what is problematic about stretching replication to include copying, especially for Goodman, is not *only* that it is an arbitrary decision. The two are opposed categories. Copying is a function of resemblance or shared (weighted and, for some authors, also different) features. The more (weighted) features two pictures (i.e., picture tokens) share, the more they resemble each other, and the better one is a copy of the other. Replicas are not maximally similar to each other but are a function of precise delimitation of which properties count toward individuation of the symbol and which features can be excluded. If he admits copies, Goodman would, then, be making a remarkable concession to his great nemesis: similarity as an objective standard or relation among objects or symbols.

Apart from these particular Goodmanian concerns, the subject of pictorial mentioning leaves us with the question: What is it to pictorially mention a picture? Let me try to sharpen this question by way of an example. Suppose a curator planning an exhibit draws a picture P of three pictures hanging on a wall in order to show his crew how to hang three actual pictures on the physical gallery wall (taking the white background within the outermost rectangle in P to depict the wall):[16]

(P)

Let's name each of the three pictures contained in (P) *S*, *B*, and *F*. *S*, *B*, and *F* "correspond" (in some sense to which I will return) to the actual pictures *Smile, Blank*, and *Frown*, respectively. And let's assume that *Smile, Blank*, and *Frown* represent three people: Smiley, Blanky, and Frowny, respectively.[17]

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Now, if, following Kulvicki (2006), the pictorial representational system is transparent, and if *S*, *B*, and *F* have the same pictorial properties (colors and shapes) as *Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown*, then the two triples are also about the same things, namely, Smiley, Blanky, and Frowny, respectively. It follows that each of *S*, *B*, and *F* are ambiguous or polysemous, each with two meanings: either they mean what they "correspond to," *Smile, Blank*, and *Frown*, respectively, or they mean Smiley, Blanky, and Frowny, respectively. Now, it is clear that (P) was not at least *intended* to be about the people Smiley, Blanky, and Frowny. It was mean to be *about* the pictures *Smile, Blank*, and *Frown* and the order in which they should be hung. But do the images in *S*, *B*, and *F* in (P) *mention Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown*? I said that the one "corresponds" to the other. There are two ways to unpack that "correspondence."

Either the images in *S*, *B*, and *F* are just placeholders for *Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown*. Since *S*, *B*, and *F* are contained in (P), and *S*, *B*, and *F* stand in place of the actual pictures, we might then argue that (P) *mentions Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown*. But not only does (P) contain and refer to them. As with linguistic mention, we mention a word not only in virtue of referring to it but as part of a practice in which we say something *about* it. In the supposed context, (P) mentions *Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown* inasmuch as it depicts them in the order in which they should be hung.

Or we might describe (P) as follows. Each of *S*, *B*, and *F* as a part of (P) depicts, represents, and thereby refers to *Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown*, respectively. *Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown* are not contained in (P), but (P) depicts them and the order in which they are to be hung. Under this description, (P) does not involve mentioning; it involves simply depiction or representation of or reference to three external objects (that happen in this case to be pictures) and their spatial relation to each other. The picture (P) whose depictive content includes the depictions *S*, *B*, and F simply represents or depicts *Smile*, *Blank*, and *Frown* without mentioning at all.

Thus far I have not mentioned the boxes around *S*, *B*, and *F* in (P). Perhaps they can decide the question of how to analyze (P): as mentioning, or as simple depiction or representation. In the linguistic case, an expression is mentioned when it is enclosed in inverted commas or m-marks, marks that serve to distinguish mention from use (including use of a word [token] to refer to another word [token]). As I mentioned earlier, Goodman suggests that the pictorial analogue to the inverted commas is, among other devices, a depicted frame, or a picture of a frame. So, we might suppose

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that each of S, B, and F occurs in (P) enclosed in a depicted frame such that the picture-of-a-frame + picture generates a new picture that refers to the enclosed picture. So, ☺ refers to, contains, and mentions ☺. But how does this work? Not all pictures of pictures in frames mention those pictures. Consider, to begin with, a physical (wood, metal) frame around a physical picture (the object hung on the wall in museums); the framed picture does not serve to mention the contained picture. So, it does not follow that a picture of a picture in its frame is necessarily a picture that mentions the contained picture. It may simply be a picture of a picture-in-its-frame. Second, we can obviously depict frames *qua* frames rather than as devices of mentioning. Suppose a frame-maker paints a pictorial display of three frames, one of bright silver metal, one of plain wood, and one in a rococo style, each enclosing the same image or, even better, an identical smudge where we would find an image. We would interpret this as a depiction of three frames, not as mentioning the image or smudge.[18] And we can imagine other contexts in which the frame is depicted but does not serve to mention what it encloses. In sum, we want to draw a distinction between depicting or picturing a picture in a frame, depicting a frame around a picture, and a picture of a picture in which its frame, like the inverted commas, serves to mark the fact that the picture is mentioned. In the latter case, the depicted frame is (paradoxical as this sounds) not part of what is depicted by the containing picture; in Kulvicki's terminology, the depicted frame is not a syntactically relevant feature of the picture. It functions more like a pragmatic or heuristic device commenting on how to interpret the picture as a whole.[19] In sum, the mere occurrence of a frame enclosing a picture in a picture does not settle the question of whether the contained picture is mentioned or simply depicted. To return to my earlier suggestion, mentioning is a practice, for pictures as well as for words, for which we must look to its context to interpret it.[20]

III. What Pictorial Quotation Might Be

Turning now from mentioning to quotation, we have argued that, as the linguistic practice has historically evolved, a contemporary quotation involves the attribution of a quoted phrase (token) P_1 to a subject S by uttering a phrase (token) P_2 that in the quoting context exemplifies a representation or feature instantiated by P_1 in S's quoted context, where P_1 and P_2

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have the same bare-bones representational content in their respective contexts. There is no containment requirement for (linguistic) quotation, hence, no pressure that P_1 and P_2 be strict replicas. But there is the (context-dependent) verbatim requirement (VR), and quotation must preserve representational content. SQ* in chapter 8 would suggest as a first stab for a pictorial analogue:

(PQ) P_1 quotes X painting P_3 iff:

(i) There is an event e such that e is an act of painting a picture.

(ii) X is e's agent.

(iii) c* is the context of e.

(iv) P_3 is the picture painted in c*.

(v) P_1 depicts X painting a picture P_2.

(vi) P_2 exemplifies a feature or an abstract representation F (in the context of P_1 or P_2).

(vii) P_3 possesses F.

(viii) P_2 and P_3 have the same bare-bones representational content.[21]

Just as SQ* takes the quoting and quoted phrases to be sentences, the quoting P_2 and quoted P_3 are prima facie complete pictures. But in the case of language, we saw that there are a variety of additional quotational structures: subsentential (what others call 'mixed') and sentential (what others call 'direct') and quotations in nonreportative as well as reportative linguistic contexts. Are there analogues for pictures? Notice that if a frame or easel replaces inverted commas or q-marks, then any image enclosed in a frame or on an easel will be a complete picture. But suppose we want to quote only the lower half of a picture *P*; call it *HP*. The framed picture of *HP* does not re-present it as the lower half of *P*. It is a complete picture of *HP*. Unlike subsentential quotation, where the quoting phrase retains its subsentential identity (say, as a VP or PP), it does not seem possible to capture its subpictorial identity when we quote a (spatially separable) picture part in a frame. Finally, we analyzed linguistic scare quotations as figurative uses of the inverted commas. Are there pictorial scare quotations, and if so, how do they work?[22]

Let's begin with the pictorial analogue of sentential (direct) quotation. What kind of picture would satisfy (PQ)? The obvious candidate would be a picture of an identifiable artist painting a picture that the artist is known to have painted, say, a picture of Leonardo painting the *Mona Lisa*. Or a

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picture of Leonardo standing next to the *Mona Lisa*, either on an easel or in a frame. One can easily imagine illustrations like this in a book on the history of art, but they are relatively rare in the history of art. Of course, there are many pictures of artists drawing or painting pictures on easels in their studios, including Vermeer's *The Artist in his Studio (The Art of Painting)*;[23] Adriaen van Ostade's *The Painter in His Studio*;[24] or Matthew Pratt's *The American School*.[25] But these are not attributional quotations because there is either no visible painting or no identifiable painter. However, one tradition of devotional pictures seems to fit (PQ) well: images of Saint Luke painting the Madonna with child, based on a legend that originated in Byzantium during the Iconoclasic Controversy according to which the apostle painted the Madonna in the House of John after the Crucifixion.[26] As Luke became the patron saint of local painters' guilds and of artists in general, from the eleventh century through the Renaissance, a number of images of the Virgin Mother and of Christ came to be directly attributed to Luke as their artist. And beginning in the fourteenth century continuing into fifteenth- through seventeenth-century Italian and Netherlandish art, we find a long history of paintings of Luke drawing Mary and Jesus, in many of which the artist depicts himself as Luke. These include works by lesser-known artists such Roger van der Weyden (1435–1440), Maarten van Heemskerck (1532), Jan Gossaert (1520–1530), and Cornelis Bloemert II (1603), but also major figures such as Raphael (1525) in which Raphael paints himself standing next to Luke; Vasari (1565); and El Greco (1608) in which he depicts himself as Luke holding open the page of a volume with an illumination of the Madonna and Child.[27] All these images have a common representational content but differ in their pictorial features. Each of them is an attribution to Luke of a depicted picture that instantiates a pictorial feature or representation exemplified by the depicting picture (within the containing picture), namely, a picture of the Madonna with child.

A rather different class of candidates for pictorial quotations are what we might call "After NN pictures," such as Andy Warhol's *The Birth of Venus (After Botticelli)*[28] or Sherrie Levine's series *Meltdown*, which consists of four woodcuts, each titled "*After . . .*" derived from canonical paintings by Marcel Duchamp, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Piet Mondrian, and Claude Monet.[29] Warhol's print was made from a silkscreen, highlighting sharp edges and flat areas of color. Levine produced her prints by photographing the original works, scanning the photographs, and reducing each digital

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file to twelve pixels, thereby eliminating details, brushwork, or formal traits that would distinguish between the masterworks, transforming them into abstract variations.[30] These differ from the kinds of pictures that satisfy (PQ) in obvious ways. (PQ)-pictures utilize various (separable) parts of the depiction itself to "enact" the act of pictorial quotation: the depiction of the quoted artist, the depicted quoting image, the frame or easel for q-marks, a depiction of the context in which the quoting image exemplifies what it does. The "After-NN" images themselves are closer to inseparable parts of the original, abstracted variations on the actual colors and shapes of the quoted artwork, and they essentially employ nonpictorial parts that are 'attached' to the picture itself: the verbal title, the verbal reference to the quoted artist (NN) who is explicitly distinguished by name from the actual (quoting) artist (e.g., Warhol, Levine), and the physical frame.[31]

Nonetheless, "After-NN" pictures are, I would argue, also pictorial quotations. Their frames, like the frames around (almost) all (museum) pictures, function as frames but, when composed with the reportative title 'After NN,' they *also* function as q-marks or inverted commas or, more precisely, as the reporting frame consisting of the name of the quoted artist and a verb of Q-saying: "NN said "___."[32] With these pictures, the frame *qua* inverted commas literally frames the image. Warhol's and Levine's pictures, in turn, exemplify abstract representations or pictorial features that in turn are instantiated by the quoted works of Botticelli, Duchamp, Kirchner, Mondrian, and Monet.[33] The quoting works are far from replicas or copies of the quoted artworks. However, relative to their quoting contexts, they capture something like the VR while at the same time problematicizing it. It is the artworks of Botticelli et al. that Warhol and Levine want us to know that they are "re-presenting." But through their own distinctive modes of presentation, by exemplification of inseparable parts, the contemporary artists also challenge classical assumptions about artistic originality, authorship, and uniqueness—the assumptions underlying the idea that an author or artist owns the products of their labors as if they are their private property, the assumptions that gave rise at the end of the eighteenth-century to the contemporary sense of quotation and with it, VR.

As this problematization of VR shows, these last examples raise deeper questions about the appropriateness of the language of pictorial 'quotation,' and its associated vocabulary and notions, to describe the phenomena in question. But to address this challenge, first I want to expand our corpus of

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pictorial quotations beyond complete pictures like sentential quotations to pictorial analogues of subsentential quotations.

IV. Subpictorial Quotations

In his essay "The Glorious Company," the distinguished art historian Leo Steinberg documented or, more precisely, exposed a large corpus of subpictorial 'quotations' that are strikingly similar to the subsentential or mixed quotations that Donald Davidson brought to philosophers' attention in the 1970s.[34] To give one example, Steinberg shows that the "careful posture—left knee gently raised towards a velvet mouth [of] the milk white steed" in John Trumbull's *Portrait of General Washington* (1790)—which "promises to be a likeness taken, if not from the life, at least from vivid personal recollection . . . a first-hand record"—is in fact an "unmistakable derivation" from the stance of the steed in "Van Dyck's famous *Portrait of King Charles I* (1782), which itself was "lifted" by Van Dyck from Titian's *Adoration of the Magi* (ca. 1560), which in turn (as Oskar Fischel discovered in 1917) was based on the image on an ancient gem of a "lone courser . . . its left knee gently raised" (Steinberg 1978, 8–9).[35]

Steinberg goes on to give many more examples of subpictorial 'quotations,' 'appropriations,' 'borrowings,' 'thefts,' or, as I shall refer to them, 're-presentations' in premodern art—we will return to the terminology in a moment—and of quotation-series where the quoter of the n+2nd quotation is often unaware of the source n of the n+1st quotation that he is quoting. Like subsentential quotation-phrases, subpictorial quotations are re-presentations of details of pictures, of parts rather than whole pictures. But the parts are not always spatially separable parts that are simply combined by the artist into a composite picture. Some, like the posture of the steed in Trumbull's portrait, are patterns of light and dark that abstract from the exact hue of the quoted picture.[36] As John Kulvicki argues, we should distinguish separable from inseparable parts of pictures. Inseparable parts are abstractions (e.g., patterns of light and dark) over the syntactic features of a picture (e.g., color and specific shape), which are inseparable from other constituents of the picture and from the whole (see Kulvicki 2015, 2020, chs. 3 and 8). For our purposes, inseparable subpictorial quotations are re-presentations of inseparable parts of earlier works of art that are quotations no less than those of separable parts.

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Subpictorial quotations make up Steinberg's largest corpus of evidence in support of his case for the inherent, integral role of re-presentation in the practice of art, but he also gives examples of sentential-like re-presentations of whole pictures in classical painting. His most notable example is Franciso Pacheco's quotation of Hans von Achen's *The Martyrdom of Saint Sebastian* in his own painting *Saint Sebastian Nursed by Saint Irene*. Pacheco himself describes his re-presentation as the view from "a window through which the saint is seen in the open, tied to a tree and shot full of arrows"—without acknowledging that this purported window scene is nothing but von Achen's engraving.[37] So, in premodern art, we find documented cases of both (complete) pictorial and subpictorial quotation (of both separable and inseparable parts), no different from sentential and subsentential quotation in language. To complete his story, Steinberg shows how the same practice of "recycling" and "recirculation" of antecedent artwork as an integral, intrinsic practice in premodern classical art continues in the practices of twentieth-century American art. His best example is Saul Steinberg's garden drawings, which employ "typographical ornaments and vignettes, cut up and pasted down from an old foundry catalogue" (Steinberg 1978, 18–20).

These subpictorial and pictorial examples differ sharply from the earlier examples that satisfied the conditions of (PQ); they also differ from any pictorial variant we might spell out by analogy to the subsentential conditions of (SSQ*). All of them occur in nonreportative contexts, without naming the quoted artist and with nothing pictorial comparable to a verb of Q-saying or q-marks (or inverted commas). In what sense, then, are they *quotations*? Again, I am not raising a question of terminology, what to call them, but of their proper classification or explanation. As (Leo) Steinberg says in summarizing his remarkable body of data,

> In their traffic with art artists employ preformed images as they employ whatever else feeds into work. Between their experience of nature and their experience of other art they allow no functional difference. . . . Hence, the recycling observable in all art fresh or stale, the perennial recirculation of recognizable antecedents and, consequently, at the receiving end, those triumphs of recognition that constitute the emotional life of your art historian. (Steinberg 1978, 10)

The question Steinberg is raising is whether the way artists employ "recognizable antecedents" in their own works of art, as distinct from their "experience of nature" or drawing "from life," is truly analogous to the distinction in language between assertion and quotation. Artists draw on two

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bodies of experience: "nature" and "other art," marking no "functional difference" between them. So, if (linguistic) quotation is essentially *attribution* of a quoted item to its original speaker or author—and artists give no such overt signs of performing such an act—should their practice of "recycling" and "recirculating" count as *quotation*?

Steinberg's answer to this question falls into two parts that cannot be completely separated. First, he points out that the classical artist and draftsman "disguised his readymades [i.e., the antecedent pictures he re-presented] by integration," seamlessly weaving the quoted picture into the quoting picture. But by so incorporating the one in the other so successfully that a viewer hardly notices that the former is a quoting image, he further argues that the premoderns deliberately covered up, disguised, or concealed their re-presentations—the attributions they should have made—in sharp contrast to contemporary (especially American) artists who openly "divulge," "encourage, and in fact expect, the viewer to be aware of the quoted subject and of his deliberate restyling" (Lipman and Marshall 1978, 55). In §VI I will return to this difference—between cover-up and exposure—and especially to the quotational practices of contemporary artists. However, the premodern practice of re-presentation—its "integration" or incorporation within the larger picture—is relevant to the second and more direct part of Steinberg's response to our present question: Are the phenomena of re-presentation seriously mischaracterized by the whole vocabulary we (and artists and art historians) have been employing: words like 'quotation,' 'borrowing,' 'inspired by,' 'under the influence,' or 'derived as if from a source'? Adopting a Greek nonce word coined by John Hollander, Steinberg labels all these words *caconyms*, from '*caconomasia*,' which signifies "the state of being ill-named" (Steinberg 1978, 20). What Steinberg thinks is wrong with our present caconymous vocabulary is that some of its terms (e.g., 'inspired,' 'influenced by,' or 'derived') depersonalize the practice, rendering it mechanical and nonvolitional, while other expressions (e.g. 'quotation,' 'steal,' or 'borrow') are volitional but implicate that the artist is guilty of theft. For example, 'quotation' invariably implies that there ought to be quotation marks and identification of the original artist, without which the artist is engaging in an act of plagiarism because the quoted picture (or picture-part) is the private property of the quoted artist. The upshot for Steinberg is that so long as we use "the term 'quotation' for the Renaissance habit of sporting old hats, we . . . automatically condemn a good deal of what the Renaissance

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was about" (22). Even worse, he argues, talk of 'quotation' (or 'borrowing') has also given rise to the conviction, even by art historians, that deployment of earlier art "is proof of a 'lack of imagination'" and "evidence of internal poverty" (25). Not only is this false, Steinberg emphasizes that it obscures the degree to which

> the artist invests the work he takes from with renewed relevance; he bestows on it a viability hitherto unsuspected. . . . There is as much unpredictable originality in quoting, imitating, transposing, and echoing, as there is in inventing. . . . Is there, then, no satisfactory designation for this trucking out of and into art? I doubt if there even should be, for we are not dealing with any one thing. . . . The ways in which artists relate their works to their antecedents—and their reasons for doing so—are as open to innovation as art itself. (25)[38]

Steinberg's objections are well taken, but note that what he is challenging is the propriety or appropriateness of the term 'quotation' *in its contemporary, or post-eighteenth-century, sense* as a description of the practices of classical art. I shall argue in the next section that what those earlier *artists* were doing is much closer to what (linguistic) 'quotation' meant for ancient, medieval, and pre-eighteenth-century *authors*. Once we focus on the premodern sense of 'quotation,' it becomes quite apt to so describe the premodern pictorial practice.

V. Classical Pictorial Quotation Vindicated

As Steinberg observes in a passage I quoted earlier, it is a commonplace that in learning their craft and in creating their pieces, artists draw on their experiences both of the world and of other artworks—the pictures, sketches, and sculptures of other artists, especially the Masters (see Reynolds 1774/1842, 92–105; Véliz 1999; Wolf 1999). Their training, over the centuries and still today, has always involved careful observation of the world together with close study of other great paintings and drawings in collections, museums, and, in earlier eras, churches. If art is mimesis, then the artist's skills of imitation are acquired both by "drawing from life," the world or nature, through disciplined, exact observation, *and* by "drawing from pictures," the works of other artists that manifest techniques and exceptional ways in which the world *might* be seen. In neither case is the artist's eye innocent, but whatever conventions and preconceptions shape their perceptions, those perceptions are, at least in part, acquired from other art the artist

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has seen and studied. However, in Steinberg's apt words, artists "allow no functional difference" between these two sources of their experiences. That raises the question: If artists do not distinguish between their experience of the world and of other artwork and if they do not explicitly reveal the source of their observations of the world in their pictures, why should they be expected to reveal their sources of antecedent artwork in their pictures? And if there is no good reason for them to explicitly reveal their art sources, why should we presume that they are deliberately *concealing* them? Add to this the historical fact (acknowledged by Steinberg) that many of the antecedent pictures classical artists drew on were well known and thus could be expected to be recognized by their contemporary viewers. Expanding Steinberg's pioneering work, it would be interesting to know in more detail exactly what kinds of antecedents were deployed by which artists, and how well-known they were, but it seems safe to say that we should not *presume* that the premodern artists re-presented antecedent pictures *because* they thought they could get away with stealing them without being caught. Rather, there are no explicit citations to re-present*ed* artists *because* their re-present*ing* artists presumed that their viewers, or at least those who mattered to them, would know who they were without being explicitly told.

It is not simply that there is no place in classical pictures for "footnotes, credit lines, or quotation marks," as Steinberg (1978, 22) observes, and there is also no margin in which we could enter a diple. The original use of q-marks like the diple, as we saw in chapter 1, was to draw people's attention to notice-worthy passages and to indicate to oral reciters of texts when to pause in their recitation inasmuch as pauses communicated to audiences what to listen for or attend to. This is relevant to discursive linguistic texts that are read in linear order. Because pictures are seen "all at once" (although that 'once' may be of extended duration the whole time the viewer is attending to the picture), there is nothing analogous to the pause to mark. As we also saw in chapter 1, it was only in the mid- to late-eighteenth century that inverted commas began to fence off phrases or sentences as private property "owned" by their authors. Before then, quoted texts were marked off (by the diple, S-shaped flourish, or inverted commas after they moved into the print margin) in order to draw attention to them as words of wisdom, the words of God, prophets, or sages—the kinds of universal truths that *everyone* should know and that are not the property of a single author. I propose that if we choose to use the language of quotation

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for re-presentations in classical, premodern art, it should be in this classical, pre-eighteenth-century sense—directing attention to common shared words of wisdom. Like early modern literary quotations (e.g., of Shakespeare), antecedent artworks by the Masters were models to be imitated and emulated.[39] The earlier artwork exemplified an artist's skills and powers of observation for the later artist. For the maker of pictures, that counts as wisdom, and the Masters were the counterparts of sages and authorities. In this pre-eighteenth-century sense, it seems to me on mark to employ the language of quotation to describe and explain what classical artists were doing in their re-presentation of earlier artworks.

This older sense of quotation is especially well-exemplified by the subpictorial or picture-part quotations identified and analyzed by Steinberg. Like subsentential quotations, they "syntactically" interact with and are integrated into the picture as a whole, composing with its other parts without a frame around them (or an easel or window or mirror frame) to signal their presence.[40] Not labeled by the name of the antecedent artist, they nonetheless count as quotations because they are *recognized* by their viewers as deliberately *intended* re-presentations of pictorial parts of earlier artworks that the artist *intended* his viewers to recognize. Of course, their salience depends on the viewer's knowledge and interests. Minimally, the viewer must be acquainted with the antecedent artwork. However, when we are dealing with details, the fact that it is a re-presentation is of particular interest especially to artists who look to the pictures of other artists as models and exemplars of skills they want to develop. This artist-viewer V will recognize not only that the artist A who produced the picture X with a part P_1 has re-presented a picture-part P_2 from an antecedent picture *Y*. V will also recognize a skill or fine-tuned observational acuity manifest in P_2 that made *it* worthy of re-presentation and, hence, of the attention deserved by a quotation, like the wisdom manifest in a scriptural verse or in *sententaie* that renders them worthy of quotation.

Steinberg goes on to emphasize "the renewed relevance," "viability," [and] "hitherto unsuspected . . . unpredictable originality" (Steinberg 1978, 25) that A invested in his re-presentation of P_2 by way of P_1 in X. One of his most striking examples is his analysis of the crossed legs of the Virgin in Michaelangelo's *Madonna Medici*,[41] which, he shows, take as "their point of departure" the contour of a Muse's legs in a Hellenistic marble that the great Italian sculptor then "reconceived" by adding the baby Jesus held by

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the Madonna in "an original exercise of creative imagination" (25–27).[42] Although the similarities between the legs of the two figures are "too close to be coincidental," Michaelangelo's re-presentation is no replica or "verbatim" reproduction of its antecedent. By adding the Christ child as his own invention, Michaelangelo also adds a causal explanation for the Madonna's contour and elevated leg, and thereby reconceives the opening and closing action inherent in her crossed legs as a "maternal motion counterpointing the will of the child" and making "the two figures exist together in a perpetual reaffirmation of complementarity" (25–27). In other words, Michaelangelo intervenes decisively in the antecedent artwork, but for the viewer to see his exact contribution, they must see what he contributed *to*—the original Hellenistic sculpture—and not just the object, but also the wisdom Michaelangelo saw in it, to which he applied his own skills and through which he made manifest his own wisdom. This is pre-eighteenth-century quotation. The point is not to attribute a phrase or image to its owner by origination but to draw attention to its wisdom, skill, and other objects of imitation.

The skillfulness and competence to create great art is not the only wisdom manifest in earlier artworks because of which classical artists quote them. They also re-present pictures in order for them to serve as commentary on the rest of the picture, interpreting and transforming its pictorial content, giving it new meaning or significance. As the art historian Edward Snow says about Vermeer's *Woman Holding a Balance*:

> A large baroque painting of the Last Judgment hangs conspicuously on the rear wall of the room, situating the woman within an apocalyptic frame of reference and counterpointing her gesture. (Snow 1979, 132)[43]

Just as a verse from the Old Testament is quoted in the New Testament in order to explain an action of Christ as the fulfillment of Scripture, so the painting of the Last Judgment transforms the scene in the foreground, making the woman holding a balance into a judge of people's lives, weighing their virtuous deeds against their vices and sins. The depicted painting provides a commentary on the "real" scene in the picture, transfiguring it from a snapshot of actual life, however realistic, to something like a philosophical allegory.

To conclude this section, if we return to its pre-eighteenth-century sense, I propose that the language of quotation is exactly the right way to describe what many classical through Renaissance pictures are doing in re-presenting antecedent pictures. This idea of quotation should be distinguished from

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both *mentioning* and *quoting* in our contemporary sense. I am not claiming that there are no instances in classical medieval and Renaissance art of the contemporary notion of quotation as spelled out in (PQ), pictures that depict an act of attribution of a known picture to its artist. Recall the paintings of Luke drawing the Madonna and child. However, many other images that involve re-presentation, like those Steinberg analyzes, also deserve to be considered quotations—but in the pre-eighteenth-century sense. Some conditions of (PQ) are also elements of this earlier conception: the quoting image exemplifies a feature instantiated in the quoted image and it must be somehow recognized that the quoting image is a re-presentation of a quoted image and who its artist was. But the point is not to make an attribution. It is to draw attention to something worthy of the viewer's attention. These quotations are also not replicas, as I argued earlier, and, while the recognition that X is a re-presentation of Y requires that the viewer be able to see nonaccidental similarities between the two, the one need not be a *copy* or *reproduction* of the other. Indeed the originality and creativity the quoting artist invests in his re-presentation is meant to make it more than a copy. Nor is the VR (verbatim requirement) an obviously relevant standard for the requisite recognition. Since it is context dependent, it might allow for some of the variation we find in contemporary pictorial quotation. However, as I argued in chapter 1, there is strong evidence that VR emerged as a result of the eighteenth-century revolution in intellectual property law. That whole chapter of legal history is entirely alien to pictures which, unlike words or linguistic texts, cannot be plagiarized (i.e., cannot be replicated without acknowledgment of their true creator, because they cannot be replicated, period).[44]

VI. Contemporary Pictorial Quotation and Scare Quotation

With this background in mind, I now turn now to Steinberg's other thesis that there was a major shift in the practice of re-presentation from premodern concealment and disguise of what it was doing to open advertisement of its reuse of classical masterpieces in contemporary (especially American) art. The editors of the exhibition volume in which Steinberg's essay appears endorse his point in their preface:

> There are some major characteristics that distinguish the utilization of earlier art by contemporary American artists from that of previous generations. . . . American artists are totally frank about their obvious usage of earlier works or of details from

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> their own work. Rather than camouflage a borrowed element in the total composition, and so obliterate any reference to its originator, the contemporary artist boldly uses the most recognizable quotations. (Lipman and Marshall 1978, 7)

As the editors also write, contemporary artists openly "encourage, and in fact expect, the viewer to be aware of the origin of his subject and of his deliberate restyling" (Lipman and Marshall 1978, 55).

I agree that there is a big difference between the practices of re-representation in premodern and contemporary art; but, since I have been arguing that the classical artists did not conceal or cover up their uses of antecedent works, concealment versus revelation cannot be the difference. I suggest instead two other shifts that are at work. The first is that much contemporary representational art, especially American art, is itself "about" art and its own history rather than "about" the world or nature. As Steinberg the art historian says about the painter Saul Steinberg,

> Where the seventeenth-century scene had been ostensibly about its subject, Steinberg's drawing is palpably about art. It is gives notice that it is signs we are reading. (Steinberg 1978, 19–20)

Likewise, Lipman and Marshall write in their preface to *Art about Art*:

> Since [mid-twentieth-century], there has been an increasing number of works by contemporary American artists that take as their subject other art. . . . The art-about-art theme seems to be a pervasive ingredient of much of recent American art. (Lipman and Marshall 1978, 6)

Art about art itself takes many forms. Some contemporary artworks depict the materials, tools, and techniques of art (the paintbrush, cans of paint, palette, rubber stamps, the canvas and stretcher, the brushstroke, dripping, stenciling, pixels) and the styles (impressionism, hyper-realism, illusionism) and major figures in the history of art. But depictions of these subjects all fall outside the rubric of pictorial quotation. More generally, the fact that a piece of art is "about" art or other art works does not itself entail that the one *refers* to the other, let alone quotes it. Nonetheless, there are pictures that are "about" antecedent pictures that are arguably quotations (and hence, refer to them)—and in the contemporary sense of the term, the post- rather than pre-eighteenth-century sense. But because the general focus of art has been reoriented onto art itself—and the practice of art itself has undergone significant changes as a cultural phenomenon—these contemporary pictorial quotations serve a function different from their prior role of attribution.

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Two particular changes in the cultural and social role of art have, I conjecture, affected the practice of pictorial quotation. First, as Lipman and Marshall point out, contemporary American re-presentations are almost exclusively of pictures that are "well-known, often reproduced, and thoroughly entrenched in our knowledge of the history of art" (1978, 54): Old Masters like Van Eyck, Vermeer, Leonardo, Michaelangelo, Rubens, Rembrandt, and Velazquez, and Modern Masters like Manet, Van Gogh, Monet, Renoir, Cézanne, Mattise, Picasso, Dali, Magritte, and Duchamp. That paintings by these artists are again and again quoted reflects, not or not just their greatness as art but, at least as much, their familiarity, availability through mass reproduction, and their celebrity-like status. They can be regularly found on posters and postcards and in popular art books. Their titles and the names of their artists are matters of common or socially shared knowledge. Some of their subjects like Mona Lisa or the Apostles in *The Last Supper* are "stars" (Lipman and Marshall 1978, 54) or pop heroes; you must know the names of their paintings and their artists to be pictorially competent and, if you don't, you are culturally illiterate. It is not that classical artists "disguised what they were doing" (55), while contemporary ones openly advertise it. These re-presentations *cannot* be hidden. As a consequence, explicit attribution or mentioning the name of their original artist would be superfluous. The common viewer needs to be told that Leonardo painted the *Mona Lisa* as much as the fact that Lincoln said "Four score and seven years ago." For the same reason, contemporary artists who quote these "name brand" paintings can do away with the pictorial analogues to q-marks and inverted commas like picture and window frames. When we see Warhol's *Mona Lisa* or his *Thirty Are Better Than One*, we know we are *not* looking at a depiction of a mysterious woman but at a re-presentation of Leonardo's painting—even without a frame around it. Warhol's paintings are about the *Mona Lisa*, not about Mona Lisa.

As a consequence, rather than establish or guard an artist's ownership of their original picture, the practice of quotation has moved in different directions. Some contemporary artists quote their great predecessors to "adapt the Old Masters to reflect the American experience": consider Mary Beth Edelson's *Some Living American Women Artists*[45] quoting *The Last Supper*, or Mel Ramos's *Plenti-Grand Odalisque*[46] quoting Ingres's *Grand Odalisque*.[47] Other artists demonstrate how they can re-create masterpieces in a radically new style or with new techniques: photo-realist, silkscreen,

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and pop art re-presentations such as John Clem Clarke's stencil and air-brushed *Velazquez—Maids of Honor* quoting *Las Meninas*, or his various de-mythologized re-presentations of Rubens's *Judgment of Paris*,[48] or Roy Lichtenstein's triptych *Rouen Cathedral Set IV*,[49] that quotes Monet's series of views of the cathedral and "simulates a four-color process reproduction," enlarging the Ben-Day dots as if the reproduction were being seen through a magnifying glass (Lipman and Marshall 1978, 92).[50] And most important, as Lipman and Marshall insightfully observe, the quotation of masterpieces enables the contemporary artist to give himself and his own picture "a place in the ongoing history of art" (7).

The second historical change in contemporary art that has affected the function of pictorial quotation is the proliferation—both mass production and mass dissemination—of mechanical reproductions: color photographs, lithographs, offset prints of high and low quality, and now virtual images on the internet. As a result, many re-presentations now re-present, not the original artworks, but reproductions, often museum postcards. Some quotations painted on canvas even mark the difference between the mechanical reproduction and the original painting by re-presenting the reproduction's white border, thereby "emphasizing [its] flatness" and giving an "illusionist rendering of a piece of printed paper" (Lipman and Marshall 1978, 7).[51] The quoting picture is, then, a re-presentation of a reproduction and, building on this, some artists have expanded the very idea of quotation to include the process of reproduction. We saw in chapter 1 how the technological revolution that followed the invention of the printing press transformed verbal quotation. These contemporary revolutions in reproduction technology have had an equally transformative impact on pictorial quotation.[52] The net effect is that, because what counts as art has changed, so has what counts as "art about art," and if quotation is itself a practice of art, the way contemporary art depicts its own practice of pictorial quotation has also changed.

This brings us to the second shift in the practices of re-representation from premodern to contemporary art that I mentioned at the beginning of this section. We have already noted how classical artists turned to the works of the Masters for their wisdom, skill, and vision as models to imitate. For these artists, quotation was an expression of homage. In contrast, as Lipman and Marshall (1978) comment, contemporary re-presentations "often display impudent humor, satire, and parody" (1978, 7). More generally, contemporary artists re-present their antecedents in ways that express

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their own provocative attitudes toward the earlier art they are about. These attitudes are ironic, and often ambivalent or conflicted, toward the quoted art. With one stroke of the brush, they dethrone the privileged status of the masterworks of art history; with another, they seek their "glorious company" (cf. Steinberg 1978). A good example is Robert Arneson's *George and Mona in the Baths of Coloma*, which pairs together two of the most famous portraits in the history of art, one Renaissance, the other American: the *Mona Lisa* and a Gilbert Stuart *George Washington*. The two sit side by side in the thermal baths of Balneari Termes-Orion in Santa Coloma, Spain, being cured by the mineral waters while George cozies up to Mona or, more accurately, while *George* cozies up to *Mona*. This is not an example of mentioning, but the picture celebrates the ambiguity between use and mention.

Or consider the titles contemporary artists give their re-presentations or quoting pictures: Warhol's *Thirty Are Better Than One* for his silk screen of repeated images of the *Mona Lisa*; Halsman's *Mona Dalí (What Dalí Sees When He Looks at Mona Lisa)*; Robert Colescott's *Natural Rhythm: Thank You Jan van Eyck*; Larry River's *I Like Olympia in Black Face* (quoting Manet's *Olympia*); and, probably the most famous example, Duchamp's title for his re-presentation of the *Mona Lisa*, using a cheap reproduction on which he penciled a mustache and beard: '*L.H.O.O.Q.*,' a pun on the letters pronounced in French that sounds like "Elle a chaud au cul" (literally, "She is hot in the arse").

However, it is primarily through the substitutions, distortions, and disfigurations the artists introduce into their quotations that they express their debunking, wit, and sarcasm. Duchamp, as we mentioned, pencils a mustache and goatee onto the *Mona Lisa*; Halsman adds a drooping mustache to his *Mona Dalí*.[53] In his *Natural Rhythm*, Colescott replaces the prim, pale white wife with averted eyes in Van Eyck's *Arnolfini Portrait* by a black woman with a mischievous, slightly embarrassed smile whose twinkling eyes look directly at the viewer, as it were, inviting us to share their secret.[54] Kehinde Wiley's paintings that feature young Black men and women against contemporary popular backgrounds re-enacting scenes from Old and Modern Masters (such as his *Napoleon Leading the Army Over the Alps*, which re-presents Jacques-Louis David's *Napoleon Crossing the Alps*), challenge racial and class prejudices of the Western art tradition.[55] John Clem Clarke's *Judgment of Paris IV* follows Ruben's composition very closely, but by replacing the goddesses and the judges Paris and Hermes by photorealistic depictions of contemporary females and males (in fact, his own friends),

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the women in nude posing seductively and the men in half-open robes, he not only demystifies but also eroticizes the quoted original. Likewise, Peter Saul's re-presentation of Rembrandt's *The Nightwatch* substitutes caricatures and distortions for the distinguished burghers and captains in the original.[56] Lichtenstein's simplified comic-like magnified representations popularize and commercialize, if not vulgarize, the originals they quote.

This last group of re-presentations differs, not only from premodern quotations, but also from the first class of contemporary re-presentations of mechanical reproductions. This second difference, I propose, is analogous to the distinction I drew in chapter 9 between (subsentential) quotations and scare quotations. Recall that in performing an act of linguistic quotation, attributing a phrase to its original author, the quot*ing* speaker also implies their own endorsement and approval of the appropriateness of the quot*ed* words to express the quot*ed* representational content. In scare quotation, the quot*ing* speaker disavows that endorsement of the appropriateness of the quot*ed* words to express the quot*ed* content. Scare quotations do not express an additional content; they express the quot*er*'s *attitude* or, more precisely, one on a *continuum* of attitudes, toward the quot*ed* words: from condemnation, scorn, mockery, and sarcasm to disavowal, disapproval, non-endorsement, and self-distancing.

For linguistic scare quotation, I proposed that the mechanism or vehicle for the expression of this attitude is the quoter's figurative or nonliteral use of the inverted commas or q-marks. Pictorial quotation has no inverted commas, and I am not sure, even when there is a frame around the representation, that it ever functions figuratively or ironically. It is rather the disfigurations, distortions, or substitutions in the quoting artists' representations through which they register their attitude. We said earlier that one motivation for contemporary artists to quote masterpieces (and to re-phrase them in new pictorial idioms) is to identify themselves and their works with the tradition, to situate themselves in the history of art. This again implies a kind of authorization or affirmation of the quoted tradition. In contrast, when the contemporary artist caricatures a quoted picture, distorts or defaces it, or changes it so that, in the artist's present context, they highlight an aspect of the tradition from which the quoted picture emerged that they (or contemporary society) now disapprove of or frown upon, they disavow or disown that tradition. The artist distances themself from it, or at the very least declares their independence—"That's not me!"

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When I say that the contemporary artist uses the re-presentation to express their attitude to it, what I mean is that, say, Duchamp's *L.H.O.O.Q.* does not depict a lady who, to add to her mysteriousness, has grown a mustache and goatee; his additions do not add more representational content to the original. Rather, like graffiti scribbled on a national symbol, the mustache and beard constitute an act of violence against a cultural icon, Leonardo's *picture*, not against the woman it depicts. The scare-quoting picture thereby expresses an emotive reaction to one of the great achievements of the Western art tradition.[57] In sum, although there may be relatively few explicitly attributional pictorial quotations in contemporary art, the many pictorial scare-quotations nowadays presuppose knowledge of how literal attributional quotations work, just as the figurative or metaphorical presupposes knowledge of the literal.

VII. Depicting Pictorial Quotation

If much contemporary art is about art and if pictorial quotation in its contemporary variants is a regular practice of contemporary art, we would also expect there to be pictures *about* the very practice of pictorial quotation—and I think there are. The British artist Nick Cudworth, one of whose paintings, *Reading between the Lines II*,[58] appears on the cover of this book, has done a series of paintings (of which eleven are collected together in his book *The Old Master Class*) that, in the artist's own words, "are directly inspired by and incorporate the appropriate Vermeer painting" (Cudworth 2011, 3). In our terminology, the Cudworth paintings quote the Vermeer paintings.[59] In his introduction, Cudworth writes that he

> did not approach this project as some grandly conceived homage to the master because it began simply as a need to fill up some space within a composition that had more to do with rock and roll than chilly Dutch introspection. (3)

The "composition" he is referring to is his *The Guitar Player* (2003), which depicts a Vermeer-blue men's drape jacket 'sitting' on a sofa in one of whose arms rests a vintage Gibson guitar and, behind it, an empty pale green wall.

Sensing the need to fill that space, Cudworth observed that in his own *Guitar Player* Vermeer was faced with the same formal problem. Vermeer solved the problem by filling the empty space with a landscape painting, leading Cudworth to fill *his* wall with the Vermeer painting of the same

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Figure 10.1
Nick Cudworth, *The Guitar Player*, April 2003. Oil on canvas, 36×27 inches. Courtesy of the artist.

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name.[60] Now, had Cudworth not added the Vermeer itself, the common name '*Guitar Player*' and the blue jacket would have alluded to the Dutch painting. But by incorporating the Vermeer, Cudworth's painting does more. In the classical pre-eighteenth-century meaning of 'quotation,' Cudworth's work not only refers to Vermeer's, it also quotes it by imitating it, by drawing our (or the careful viewer's) attention to its wisdom: its formal strategy for filling the empty space. But even more than that, by incorporating the Vermeer in his own painting with the jacket and guitar in the foreground, Cudworth depicts for us *how* his own picture quotes the Vermeer by using *it*, not just some other picture, to fill the space. This makes this picture not only a quoting picture but also a picture about the practice of pictorial quotation.

In the other pictures in his series, each of which contains a different painting by Vermeer, Cudworth re-presents the distinctive characteristics of the Old Master's pictorial style: his meticulously choreographed interiors, his marble diamond tile floors and Delft tile wall molding, his distinctive blue, the same wall colors, and the same careful arrangement of the furniture. The human figures in Cudworth's quoting images capture the inner states of the quoted Vermeer figures, their gaze, opacity, and mystery, transforming ordinary domestic scenes into extraordinary allegories. But Cudworth's paintings are not only quotations. For one thing, more is going on in them.[61] Like Vermeer, Cudworth often depicts musical instruments and people performing or practicing music. (Cudworth himself is an accomplished musician who played professionally.) These common features don't seem to be part of the quoting relation; rather, they "invite" the viewer to compare the two pictures, often playfully, and Cudworth wordplays with musical language in his titles to some of his works: *Perfect Pitch*, *Comparing Notes*, or *Keeping Time*. But his humor is light and witty, not sarcastic or mocking like the scare-quoting pictures we saw earlier.

More important, there are two formal strategies that Cudworth employs that make his pictures not only quotations but also about the practice of pictorial quotation and, while they are not specifically about quotation *of* Vermeer, they make use of devices that are prominent in Vermeer's artwork.

The first of these formal characteristics of Vermeer's paintings is their use of mirrors, which Cudworth adapts to show something about pictorial quotation itself. To give one example, in *Perfect Pitch* he depicts a woman with her back to us playing a piano.

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Figure 10.2
Nick Cudworth, *Perfect Pitch*, February 2004. Oil on canvas, 38×30 inches. Courtesy of the artist.

To her right stands a second statuesque woman (her teacher?). Above the piano hangs (on the left) Vermeer's *The Music Lesson* and (on the right) a mirror with the same dimensions and in an identical wood frame (as the Vermeer to its left) that reveals the pianist's face and, behind her, an empty room with a Vermeer diamond tile floor, on whose facing back wall hangs another mirror that reflects the woman pianist's back, the same back we directly see in the foreground. Vermeer's painting above the piano also depicts a woman pianist seen from the back, a man to her right (her teacher or perhaps her lover?), his hand on the piano like that of the statuesque woman in the foreground, and, above the piano, a mirror in which we can also see reflected the face of the pianist and the diamond tiled floor of Vermeer's room. Building on the picture-mirror analogy, Cudworth notes that careful observation shows that it is the same room in his foreground mirror and on the back wall of the Vermeer; Cudworth's room is simply

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emptied of Vermeer's furniture. In his explanation of the title of the painting, Cudworth writes that the "resonance of the three [mirror] reflections matches the fine tuning of the three piano strings which combine to make the perfect pitch of one note" (Cudworth 2011, 8). The same might be said of a pictorial quotation. Inasmuch as a picture shows us both the quoted and quoting pictures all at once, the image makes us ask: are they truly distinct, contextually and temporally, like their linguistic cousins, or is the whole picture, containing both at one time, one contextually and temporally inseparable image?

The second formal feature of Vermeer's that Cudworth draws on is the Old Master's depiction of interiors seen through doors, a device he exploits in four of the eleven paintings in the series. However, Cudworth makes two significant changes in his re-presentations, each of which contains a foreground with a Vermeer work and a contemporary scene in the background into which the doorway opens.

First, as we see in *Reading between the Lines I*, he enlarges Vermeer's own *Lady Reading a Letter at an Open Window* from its original 33×25.4 inches, making Vermeer's window and lady equal in size and height to his own window and girl in the background. Second, he converts the wooden door frame into a picture frame that wraps around the scene depicted within it. This effect is amplified by connecting the bottom of the right doorpost to the horizontal molding along the floor under Vermeer's own painting hanging on the wall in the foreground. While the Vermeer has its own brown frame, the dark green of the wall tends to obscure it.[62] As a result, we perceive the whole wall in the foreground, including the Vermeer, as one picture framed by the right post of the doorframe and its connected floor molding. The net visual effect is of two congruent images (the Vermeer and the contemporary scene) sharing one frame with no bottom under the left image and no top above the right one. Now, having set up this clear parallelism, it seems quite clear that the one is intended to quote the other. But what Cudworth wants us to ask is: In virtue of what? What makes for the pictorial quotation? And even: Which is quoting which? On the one hand, there are obvious differences between the contents of the two images, and the bright summer daylight strongly contrasts with Vermeer's soft dull Dutch light. On the other, the two young blond women stand in identical poses, each utterly preoccupied with the letter she is reading—with the same absorbed concentration at a private moment and the same stiff grasp

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Figure 10.3
Nick Cudworth, *Reading between the Lines 1*, September 2005. Oil on canvas, 32×32 inches. Courtesy of the artist.

of the letter in her hands. With both images, the viewer is left enigmatically asking: What is being read? And, as in Cudworth's title, what is each woman reading *between* the lines? On what, then, does pictorial quotation rest? Exactly what are the features of the images that establish the quotation relation despite their differences? Because the picture so strikingly raises these questions, I propose that it is about pictorial quotation itself.

Similar questions arise for Cudworth's *Reading between the Lines II* (on the cover of this book). Vermeer's *Woman (in Blue) Reading a Letter* (1662–1663) hangs on the wall behind the contemporary depiction of a beautiful woman—Cudworth tells us she is a "young divorcee who wears, on her

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own suggestion, her satin wedding dress" (Cudworth 2011, 22)—standing and reading a letter held in her hands before her. The Vermeer picture in Cudworth's depiction occupies the area of the map in the original, but Cudworth almost doubles the height of the figure of the Dutch woman relative to the visible part of the Vermeer.[63] The visual effect of giving them comparable dimensions is to create an illusion and thereby raise the question whether we are looking at Vermeer's painting or at a mirror image of Vermeer's model, putting them in the same room crossing centuries over time. Of course, the elegant dress of the contemporary figure differs from the then-fashionable blue smock and green skirt of Vermeer's lady, and their hair styles differ. But the carefully arranged furniture and articles are the same, and there is the same Vermeer-blue in both. And as in *Reading I*, both women stand upright stiffly holding the crisp letter in front of themselves, with total concentration and absorption in the act of reading, transfixed in a moment of absolute privacy—thereby leaving the viewer of each with the enigma: What are they reading with such absorption? I am even tempted to say that, for Cudworth's depiction to count as a quotation of Vermeer's, it may be a condition of adequacy that his quoting picture capture this enigmatic feature of the quoted original. If that is on the right track, Cudworth's picture is a picture about pictorial quotation, which it exemplifies by re-presenting the one picture quoting another—and that is something only a picture can do.

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Notes

Introduction

1. I focus on the ubiquitous inverted commas for reasons that will emerge but, as we shall see, they are not the only marks or formatting styles used for these two purposes. Apart from their use in the two practices of quoting and mentioning, inverted commas (and devices like italics) are used for titles of articles, books, chapters, poems, songs, TV episodes, and for some names, e.g., of newspapers (but not cities, countries, rivers, all of which are capitalized). Although there are rules for this use (e.g., in *The Chicago Manual of Style*), I have not been able to locate the origin of this use of the inverted commas. My guess, however, is that (as with quotation, as we shall see) the inverted commas serve to disambiguate and to graphically mark the intonation pattern or pauses before and after these expressions. Philosophers nowadays tend to use pairs of single inverted commas for mention and double commas for quotation, although for nested quotations the single and double commas are often alternated. However, this custom is not followed outside of (and not always even within) professional circles and, as far as I know, is based on no principled reason. In the text I have generally followed the current practice.

2. The argument position can either be in subject or in object position, as in "John cannot pronounce 'Gretchen'" (Moltmann 2014).

3. See, e.g., Cappelen and Lepore (henceforth: C&L) 2007, 14, 131–132; Saka 2005, 192; and Shan, 2010, 418. C&L 2007 is probably the best attempt in the literature to force quotation into the mold of mention (a.k.a. 'pure quotation'). Notwithstanding his polemic against those who exclusively attend to "closed quotation" and ignore "open quotation," Recanati 2011, e.g., 269 (and throughout 2011, chs. 7–8), also analyzes a direct quotation as a "singular term referring to the enclosed material," i.e., as a closed quotation or mention-expression, presumably because he takes 'said' to be a relation between two singular terms or NPs. For problems with this syntactic analysis, see Gomez-Torrente 2013, 367, n. 31. There are, to be sure, important exceptions who distinguish between quotation and mention: Partee 1973, 410–411; Seymour 1996; cf. also Gomez-Torrente 2013, 386, n. 53, on mixed quotation, and

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2005, especially 129–133; Maier 2014a, Forthcoming; Richard 2015, 215; and Johnson 2011, 2018.

4. See, e.g., C&L's 2007 principle:

(QS) "e" quotes 'e'

(where 'e' can be a simple expression), which they "proffer . . . as *the* semantic rule for quotation" (124). In ordinary speech, few people would say that '"e"' *quotes* "e." '"e"' may *mention* or *denote* "e," or be a Tarskian quotation-name; but the only case, I think, when we complement 'quotes' with two simple expressions is when we mention someone whom we quote, e.g., 'McCain often quoted Abraham Lincoln.'

5. The only other philosopher, to my knowledge, who has explored the historical origins of quotation marks is Michael Johnson (Johnson 2018). However, apart from mentioning the *diple*, he focuses almost exclusively on the use of the marks in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century literature to represent the direct exchange of discourse in conversation; see chapter 1. This is important, but it is only one stage in a long history.

6. See C&L 2007, 24–26. Their explanation of this "intimate relation" involves "literal containment" of the semantic value between the quotation-marks but they nonetheless lump it together with the "pictoriality" that others identify in quotation. Cf. Bennett 1988.

7. Saka 1998, 116. See C&L 2007, 95 who criticize Saka for inconsistently holding that quotations not only stand in this intimate relation but are also context-sensitive.

8. See below ch. 4; cf. Christensen 1967 and C&L 2007, 92 on the Picture Theory of Quotation and Davidson 1984b.

9. See Harth 2011 and De Brabanter 2017. Johnson 2018 is more difficult to place within this typology. He argues that quotations (although he is really only discussing mention-expressions), unlike proper names that are arbitrary, are *natural* names like onomatopoeia. However, the reason that a name with a certain pronunciation or spelling *refers* to the mentioned expression with the same pronunciation or spelling, he says, is *not* because they resemble each other. Unfortunately, he gives no other account of what determines their reference.

10. Apart from the pictorial character of (linguistic) quotation, it is an entirely different question (discussed in ch. 11) whether the phenomenon of quotation occurs within pictorial symbol systems, whether, for example, pictures can quote pictures. It is also a separate question (raised in ch. 8) whether the symbols that occur between the inverted commas that can be quoted include pictures or other nonlinguistic signs. Of course, we often use pure quotation (= mention) to introduce or baptize new expressions, or symbols, into the language but what is introduced then *is* an expression in the language.

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11. Because I do not focus on mentioning (aka pure quotation), I do not analyze in detail the many interesting theories in the literature, among which are Benbaji 2003, 2004a,b; Bennett 1998; García-Carpintero 1994, 2004, 2005; Gomez-Torrente 2013; Predelli 2008; Saka 1998, 2005, 2006; Tsohatzidis 1998; and Washington 1992.

12. See C&L 2007, 16–17, and chapter 9 in this volume. The most extensive discussions in the literature are Predelli 2003, 2005 and many of the essays in De Brabanter 2005a.

Chapter 1

1. For an overview of the history of quotation, see Finnegan 2011, which first introduced me to its rich scholarly literature. But in constructing my historical narratives, I have mainly relied on the primary research of Steinova 2016, 2018, 2019 (and for bringing her research to my attention, I wish to thank Michael Allen), Parkes 1993, De Grazia 1991a,b, and the other scholarly works cited in the notes.

2. As we shall see in chapter 5, this contrast oversimplifies the difference between direct and indirect discourse and also fails to distinguish both from mentioning.

3. This is widely preached but, as we shall see, not fully practiced. See, e.g., Trask 1997.

4. See Clements 1975 and Hagège 1974, cited in Schlenker 2003, 59; Maier 2009, 2012, which challenges the binary direct/indirect distinction both in Japanese and ancient Greek; Nikitina 2012a,b for discussion of logophoric discourse in African languages; Ershova 2013 on Besleney Kabardian; Evans 2013 for a broad overview; and Maier 2018, 13, on Kwaze.

5. Steinova (2016, 1–12), to whose research I am deeply indebted throughout this section, translates 'notae' as "technical signs" that give "meta-information about the text" (4). In Steinova 2018, she also distinguishes medieval quotation *signs* which belong to the annotational apparatus of medieval manuscripts in the Latin West from contemporary quotation *marks* which are a species of punctuation that roughly begins with the onset of printing.

6. The fifteenth century Maimonidean philosopher and Hebrew grammarian Profayt Duran, in his seminal Hebrew speculative grammar, *Ma'aseh Efod*, distinguishes between (i) the words *koh* and *kakhah* (lit: 'thus,' 'so') in speech report frames such as "So/Thus (*koh*, *kakhah*) said God" followed by a verse, which mean that God said something with the *content* or *intention* of the following verse, not that He necessarily spoke or used those very words, and (ii) phrases such as "And this is the thing/word (*Ve-zeh ha-davar*) that God commanded" which are used only by Moses to introduce divine direct quotations that not only match the content of God's utterances but also the very words He used (Duran 1965, 170). In contemporary terms, *koh* and *kakhah* introduce indirect quotations and "*ve-zeh ha-davar*" direct quotations. For a wide-ranging review of quotation in the Hebrew Bible, Rabbinics, and medieval and

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modern Jewish literature, see Marmur 2014. Thanks to Kalman Neuman for bringing this paper to my attention.

7. For the Codex Bezae, see https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-NN-00002-00041/21. Many modern Greek New Testaments follow the same convention of indentation. See, e.g., https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/imgsrv/download/pdf?id=hvd.ah5hws;orient=0;size=100;seq=56;attachment=0, and Finnegan 2011, 83.

8. See Parkes 1993, 57–58, and Steinova 2016, 276, where Steinova says that Isidore of Seville reports this example used by an otherwise unknown Leogoras of Syracuse. Often assumed to be Byzantine in origin, in fact the diple is found in Greek and Hellenistic manuscripts. Indeed, second-century BCE Greek grammarians employed a complex system of seven marginal signs, among them the *diple*. In Greek pappyri the *diple* could signal a passage for comment or commentary, e.g., a passage drawn from a canonical text like Homer or Plato; early manuscripts of the Bible (fourth to fifth centuries) also used the *diple* for similar purposes. For further discussion of ancient uses, see Lowe 1972, a,b and Wildberg 1993, which presents examples of the *diple* in manuscripts of Simplicius.

9. Steinova 2016, 288, notes that the diple persisted for another two centuries in the East.

10. For another testimony from around 970, see Byrhtferth of Ramsey, cited by Steinova (2016, 338), who writes that "the Dyple is honoured thus >. Old writers wrote this sign in ecclesiastical books to set off or indicate the testimony of sacred scriptures" ("The sign treatise" in Byrhtferth 1995, 178). Steinova adds that the S-shaped mark was sometimes combined with other marks for nonbiblical quotations, but we have no written evidence of these other signs.

11. See Steinova 2018, 2019, which document these shifts with quantitative manuscript data drawn from the CLA data base.

12. On the practices of reading and recitation as spiritual exercises, or *lectio divina*, see the various writings of Brian Stock and especially Stock 2001, 101–114. I am indebted to my colleague Arnold Davidson for bringing Stock's impressive scholarship to my attention.

13. This earlier use of citations as evidence is similar to the role that primary texts play in footnotes in histories in early modern Europe; on this story, see Grafton 1997.

14. This was first discovered by McMurtrie 1934, and is cited in Mitchell 1983, 363 (although I have not been able to locate a copy of the McMurtrie book.) In 1522, six years later, Aldus used inverted commas in Italy, in G. Budaeus' *Libri V de Asse*, and in 1529 they appeared in the printer Geoffrey Tory's *Champ Fleury* in Paris. See also McMurtrie 1922 and Mitchell 1983, 363.

15. It is easy to imagine how the top and bottom arcs of the S-shaped flourish could have been simplified (by printers) into commas. For another view, see Mitchell 1983,

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363ff. according to which the comma was descended from the virgule (/) which was originally placed above the line and later sunk to the base line and developed a curve. It first appears in handwriting in the sixteenth century and later was picked up by printers. However, double commas seem to have been "a radical new step by printers" (ibid.): as reference marks to side- and foot-notes; to mark 'ditto' (as they are still sometimes used); or for emphasis. As they came to be linked to quotation (through printing), they ceased to be used for other purposes.

16. Some insisted on differentiating single and double commas, using double commas for quotations of oral speech and single commas for extracts from a written source, or double for direct discourse, single for indirect discourse. Single and double commas were also alternated for quotations within quotations.

17. Note that the fact that block quotations nowadays are indented is not a direct descendent of the original use of indentation to mark citation or quotation.

18. See Parkes 1993, 68–69, 74, 92 on this received view that punctuation primarily serves to disambiguate sentences and other constructions and to provide emphasis. For more sophisticated views, see Nunberg 1990 and especially Potts 2004 (to which I return below). Although a number of theorists of quotation consider the inverted commas punctuation, they often advance idiosyncratic conceptions of punctuation. Gomez-Torrente 2005, 130–133, claims that the use of quotation marks, "shared by most uses of other punctuation . . . respond, in part, to the purpose of adding in an economic way some information not conveyed" by the same sentence without the marks. He is, however, equivocal over the truth-conditional status of this new information (133). Johnson 2018 relegates quotation-marks as punctuation to "recently invented decorations of written material."

19. The commonplace tradition began with Aristotle's *Topics* and Cicero and continued through the Middle Ages; 'commonplace' is a translation of the Latin *locus communis* (from Greek *tópos koinós*), meaning "a theme or argument of general application," such as a statement of proverbial wisdom. According to the OED, only at the end of the eighteenth century does 'commonplace' come to mean platitudinous because it is vulgar and common, and 'sententious,' pompous.

20. This creation of an identity for Shakespeare was due not only to the quotation books but, looking ahead, also to critical editions of Shakespeare, such as, the Tonson edition of the first half of the eighteenth century.

21. De Grazia (1991a, 66) notes, for example, that Byron and Coleridge "were hounded by charges of plagiarism."

22. "Quotation takes on new forms in the same decades that the traditional construct of authorship emerges. Both coincide with the gradual formulation of authorial rights. The author comes to have legal rights over his or her work that are fashioned after those protecting private property. Quotation marks are copyright writ small" (De Grazia 1991a, 68; see also 1991b, 214).

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23. "Quotation quadrants" were instruments used to measure the distance between passages printed in the margin. On their use, see Moxon, 1663–1664/1958, 349. 'To quote' in the sense of marking was also used for marking page numbers and for assigning numbers to objects or stocks, hence, 'stock quotes.'

24. Throughout this period inverted commas were used, not entirely consistently by different authors, for indirect as well as direct discourse. It is also in literature that one finds the invention of free indirect discourse to represent the thought of characters in novels; these are novel constructions that fall exclusively neither in direct nor indirect discourse. See chapter 8 in this volume.

25. Another form of annotation related to quotation is the footnote, particularly in works of history. The footnote documents evidence by citation of primary sources, employing quotation marks. However, an account of the footnote is a chapter in the historiography of historical scholarship, not a story about language. For a fascinating and often entertaining history, see Grafton 1997, which, in the course of the entire book, mentions 'quotation' less than five times.

26. Variation according to country and language continues to this day. For example, in Great Britain until recently pairs of single commas were primarily used for quotation while America has used and continues to employ double commas. Guillemets (<< . . . >>) are commonly used in Europe instead of inverted commas.

27. See C&L 2007, 38–39. Their principle SDS, "the strong disquotational nature of quotation," according to which "only the quotation expression "Quine" can quote the name 'Quine'"" (127) is false if one allows that speakers sometime use bold font, formatting, italics, indentation, etc. for purposes of quotation. I would also add, as Nic Kozoliak (ms.) has pointed out, that C&L's argument for SDS on 128 does not conclude that only "Quine" can quote 'Quine' but rather (invalidly) that "Quine" can quote only 'Quine.' On the impact of technology on semantics in another interesting case (the interpretation of indexicals in the "answering machine puzzle"), see Cohen 2013 and Michaelson 2014.

28. Proponents of the view that no sign, let alone inverted commas, is ever necessary include Washington, 588; Saka 1998, 118, 1999; Recanati 2011, 243; and Stainton 1999.

29. Other signs are the quotational 'like'; see Camp 2012; Camp and Hawthorne 2008; K. Davidson 2015; and Siegel 2002. See also Richard 2015, 226, n.13, which makes the interesting proposal that if one has unclear intuitions whether a given example of subsentential quotation (e.g., of syntactic non-constituents) is grammatical or not, then one should try to speak the sentence out loud using intonation to indicate the boundaries of the quoting phrase.

30. As we shall see, the contents, or direct referenents, of indexicals vary in quotation-contexts, but their meaning remains the same.

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Chapter 2

1. In the scholastic theory of supposition—where the supposition of a term is, roughly, what is spoken about by the term in subject position in a proposition (as distinct from its signification, or meaning more generally)—*suppositio materialis* was the use of a word as a name for, or to denote, itself as opposed to *suppositio formalis*, the use of the word with its ordinary or proper denotation. For examples of "paradoxes" that confuse use and mention in medieval logic, see Kretzmann and Stump 1988, e.g. Lambert of Auxerre, 155–156.

2. For example, as an anonymous referee pointed out, a Google Book search cites the title of a book from the 1850s which involves a mentioning use of inverted commas: "*An Examination into the Derivation, Etymology and Definition of the Word 'Madrigal.'*"

3. "Frege introduced the device of systematically indicating autonymy by quotation marks, and in his later publications . . . words and symbols used autonymously are enclosed in quotation marks in all cases" (Church 1956, 61). On Church's idea of autonymous use, see below. See also Quine 1951, 26 who comments "Frege seems to have been the first logician to recognize the importance of scrupulous use of quotation marks for avoidance of confusion between use and mention of expressions," citing the *Grundgesetze*.

4. The most extensive analysis of Frege's view of quotation is Parsons 1982.

5. What Frege presumably means to say is that the sense of 'Aristotle' is *the sense of* the conjoined descriptions 'The unique individual who is both the pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great.' But that is not what is expressed by Frege's own note in which the two descriptions are being used and therefore refer to an individual, not to a sense. Surprisingly, this confusion has not been discussed in the literature to my knowledge.

6. Frege does not tell us how each direct quotation token refers to the word token of the subject of the report. If it is via a type, one might avoid the ambiguity induced by different tokens for different quoted subjects. But then Frege should have said that the token refers to its type rather than to the words of the other speaker, which suggests a token.

7. Parsons 1982 objects to Frege's claim that the quoting words refer to the words of the subject because, where the subject never made the quoted utterance, the quoting expression has no referent and, according to Frege, is truth-valueless—which Parsons says flatly 'is wrong.' Whether or not one agrees, this problem is not specific to quotation but a general problem with Frege's semantics.

8. Church does not make it clear whether this treatment extends to italics and to the prefaced 'word,' although in all other respects he seems to take them to be no different from the use of quotation marks. For a similar objection to Church, see Davidson1984b, 82.

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9. See 7.63 of *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 17th ed. Thanks to my editor, Judy Feldmann, for pointing this out to me.

10. The literature on these four theories, both by proponents and by critics, is vast. For a broad overview, see C&L 2007 and, for a more thorough and critical analysis of the four, see Maier 2014b which evaluates how well each theory accounts for compositionality, productivity, and recursivity of mention-expressions.

11. I will concentrate in this chapter on Tarski's and Quine's versions of the proper name (PN) theory and not discuss either the description theory (which can be viewed as a variant of the PN theory or as a variant of Tarski's structural-descriptive names) or the demonstrative theory, to which I briefly turn in chapter 3. I discuss Richard's version of the disquotational theory by way of his interpretation of Tarski.

12. Because of problems to which this Proper Name theory leads, Tarski also proposes a "different interpretation of the quotation-marks names," according to which they are "syntactically composite expressions, of which both the quotation marks and the expressions within them are parts" (1933/1983, 160); the quotation marks "from the syntactic point of view, . . . play the role of functors" (161) that take sentential variables as arguments and yield as values "constant quotation-mark names of sentences" (161). This proposal also leads to problems, and Tarski proposes yet a third way of referring to expressions using structural descriptive names that employ concatenation, but it should be clear that none of these attempts are intended to be analyses of natural language mention-expressions.

13. For this distinction between lexical and syntactic/semantic constructions, and more generally for valuable exposition of Tarski, see Richard 1986.

14. Note that where Gomez-Torrente uses 'quote,' I use 'mention,' but our point is the same. For recent criticism of Gomez-Torrente, see Garcia-Carpintero 2018.

15. Gomez-Torrente claims that both numerical street names ('51st Street') and Old Spanish names are "not determined by . . . contextual supplementation, either in the way of pure indexicals or in the way of demonstratives" (2013, 382). I am not sure what he means by "supplementation" but I agree that they are not context-sensitive like demonstratives or indexicals and do not generate 'contextually valid' truths (LD-valid truths in Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives). However, unlike numerical street names which generate metaphysically contingent truths, mention-names generate metaphysically necessary truths. For example, suppose the rule for numerical street names assigns an alphabetically spelled numeral to the street (e.g., 'Fifth Ave.')—let's also call the street 'Hamesh'—depending on a certain point *p* from which it (Hamesh) is *actually* distant that number (designated by the numeral) of streets in a given direction in the actual world, the world of the context of utterance. But once the name 'Fifth Ave.' is fixed in the context, and then evaluated in a counterfactual world w* in which city planners added another street Shesh between

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Hamesh and the point *p*, 'Fifth Avenue' will still refer to Hamesh even though Hamesh is no longer the fifth street if we were to count streets in w*. (Shesh would be.) Thus 'Fifth Avenue is the fifth street from the center of town"' will be false in w*, and 'Fifth Avenue might not be the fifth street from the center of town' will be true in the world of its context like 'I might not be speaking.' In contrast, the rule of Interiority that fixes the referent of a mention expression generates metaphysically necessary truths: if we evaluate the sentence ' "e" refers to (mentions) 'e' ' at any world, according to what it means in *our* language (the language of the context of utterance), if it is true in the actual world, it will be true in any possible world, hence, necessary. I am indebted here to discussions with Philip Yaure and to correspondence with Mario Gomez-Torrente. However, I would add that I am puzzled by Gomez-Torrente's remark that "Kaplan's 'Dthat(ß)' terms form an artificial class of referentially original terms which are context-insensitive (at least if instances of 'ß' are restricted to context-insensitive descriptions) and unstructured by explicit convention" (876–877). Even if ß, which is a non-rigid definite description, is context-insensitive, 'Dthat(ß)' will be context-sensitive since its direct referent will be the unique individual who satisfies the descriptive conditions of ß in the *world of the context* at the time of the utterance of 'Dthat(ß)'. As Kaplan states in the Logic of Demonstratives, 'Dthat(ß)' is equivalent to 'The x: AN(x is ß)' where A is 'Actually' (i.e., the world of the context of utterance) and N is "Now' (the time of the context).

16. In this passage Quine is alluding to the Langford translation test to decide whether a word is used or mentioned. See also Quine 1960: "When we quote a man's utterance directly we report it almost as we might a bird call. However significant the utterance, direct quotation merely reports the physical incident and leaves any implications to us" (219). For a similar view as Quine, see Davidson 1984b; 79, where he describes quotation as a "device used to refer to typographical or phonetic shapes by exhibiting samples." Elsewhere (80) he says that when a word is quoted, it does not have its meaning in the language.

17. On Quine, and his differences from Tarski, see Richard 1986, 2008, where Richard argues that for Quine, lexical items are simply concatenations of letters by which we individuate the uninterpreted forms, including both concatenations that are expressions in the language and ones that are not. Unlike Tarski, there is no room for lexically productive operations that produce expressions from other expressions. For Quine, the syntactic rules or constructions take the unstructured lexical items as input, producing composite expressions. And the semantics assigns primitive interpretations to the lexical items and computes the interpretations of composite expressions as a function of their lexical parts and syntax. Mention/quotation is a syntactic construction but, because it is not transparent, its component expression does not occur as a constituent with its lexical interpretation.

18. For interesting criticisms of Quine's view as a theory of quotations as pictures, see D. Davidson 1984b, 87–89.

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19. See Maier 2016, 369–370, which raises this as an objection to Kaplan's treatment of direct quotation as pure quotation, moving an object language phenomenon to the metalanguage.

20. To represent assertive utterances of statements by speakers, I use this notation (as in (5): the name of the speaker followed by a colon and the asserted sentence, without a verb of saying. Thus the asserted statement in (5) uttered by Stern is quoted in (6).

21. Maier is explicitly discussing "mixed quotation" in this passage but, as I will argue in chapter 3, "mixed" is nothing more than subsentential "direct" quotation, so whatever holds for the one holds for the other.

22. Saka 2005, 200–203 "rejects" VR because it rules out the possibility of translations of quotations and because quotations that fully respect VR are extremely "rare," hence, most quotations will turn out to be false. In response, see my remarks on the context-dependence of VR and on translation in ch. 6.

23. Thanks here to John Kulvicki, personal communication.

24. Banfield 1973, 4–10, demonstrates that neither (direct) quotation (or direct discourse) nor indirect discourse can be *transformationally derived* from one another. My claim, however, is not about syntactic derivation but simply that a quotation-sentence semantically entails the corresponding indirect discourse report. Thanks to Emar Maier for drawing my attention to Banfield in this context. See also Richard 1986, 2008, on the opacity of indirect discourse and the propositional attitudes.

25. Johnson 2011, 211–213 uses examples of quantification into mixed (aka subsentential) quotations to criticize C&L 2007's view that these are cases of mentioning. However, Johnson stops short of drawing the full moral that quotations are a different kettle of fish from mentions.

26. See Maier 2014, 7–8, 13. Clearly wh-movement does not apply to mention-expressions.

27. See C&L 2007, 30–32, 67–70 (and references cited) and, on the other side of the dispute, García-Carpintero 1994, 2004, 2005; Reimer 1996; Saka 1998, 2005. It also seems that Potts 2004 and Geurts and Maier 2003 fall in this second group. Some of the examples cited confuse the mention*ing* expression (token) with the mention*ed* expression (either a token or the type of the token, or perhaps a related token or type, as in Garcia-Carpintero's 2004 deferred ostension account). Note also that the question whether mention-expressions are context-sensitive is a dispute about the data, and therefore should not be confused with the controversy over the analysis of the mention-expression as a complex demonstrative (description) a la Davidson. Apart from criticizing the supposed data, C&L 2007 offer several general arguments, imported from C&L 2004, against the *semantic* context-sensitivity of mention-expressions, and instead offer several possible pragmatic explanations of the supposed data. Although, as I say in the text, I will not take a final stance on this

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issue for mention-expressions, one alternative the disputants do not pursue is that if mention-expressions are context-sensitive, it is 'pre-semantic': a difference in what the mention*ing* (not the mention*ed) expression* is, what kind of a sign or symbol it is—like the choice of a language or character. I would also add that C&L's argument (69) that semantic context-sensitivity is incompatible with their disquotational rule (QS) (" ''e'' quotes 'e' ") is not valid. Given their own rule that the right-hand mention*ed* entity in QS is the same entity contained within the left-hand mention*ing* entity, one would assume that, even if both are context-sensitive, that *within one* context, the two would be the same entity. Therefore, even if QS might be instantiated in some contexts by tokens and in another by types, in one and the same context *both* occurrences of ''e'' will be either one or the other. In this respect, mention-expressions would be context-sensitive like pure indexicals (e.g., 'I') and unlike pure demonstratives (e.g., 'That'), so that in different contexts 'I=I' will express different contents but in each context a truth (insofar as the speaker remains constant within any single context).

28. Potts's own concern is to distinguish quotation, which he argues must always be given information, from focus which is "almost always new" (2004a, 139).

29. Richard is arguing against both C&L (1997, 429) and Recanati (2011, 261), who assume that (19) disquoted would mean (20) rather than what is expressed by 'Greenspan said that his agreement with Reich was a surprise to both of us' where 'us' would include the speaker of the sentence and someone else he referred to by 'us.'

30. Geurts and Maier are themselves discussing mixed quotation, and their own example is "George called the 'POlice.'" However, we shall argue in ch. 3 that the only difference between (direct) quotation and mixed quotation is that the one is sentential, the other sub-sentential.

31. We will argue in ch. 8 that the quoted token here is not only the word but a linguistic object representing the phonetic interpretation (or pronunciation) of the word. One might also argue that (23) is a case of scare quoting (see ch. 9) but that issue does not affect the present point.

32. Geurts and Maier (2003, 121) also identify a second contextual parameter: the quoted speech event itself, which could either be a single "concrete" event or "institutional or generic."

Chapter 3

1. Christensen 1967 is both an early statement of the demonstrative theory of quotation and possibly the first discussion of mixed quotation (but not under that name).

2. C&L 1997b, 1998, 1999a,b, and 2003 were the first and most vigorous defenders of the demonstrative theory which they later rejected in their 2007. Other advocates include Garcia-Carpintero 1994, 2004, 2005, 2018 and Predelli 2008.

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3. De Brabanter 2003a calls them "hybrid quotations." Partee 1973 describes examples like Davidson's as "mixed direct and indirect quotation"; see also Banfield 1973, 24.

4. Davidson says that they 'mention' them, but without distinguishing 'mention' from 'quotation.' Since I do distinguish the two—and this is an example of quotation, not mention—I use 'refer.'

5. For a detailed discussion of cancelability in quotation, see Gomez-Torrente 2005, 135–136. and Benbaji 2004b as part of his critique of Recanati 2011 (first published in 2001).

6. The examples in chapter 2 were of (sentential) direct quotations, but the same is true of subsentential (mixed) quotations.

7. Another interesting piece of evidence that mixed quotations have the ordinary syntax and semantics of their constituents comes from so-called non-constituent quotations: examples such as "She allowed as how her dog ate 'strange things, when left to its own devices'" (Abbott 2003, discussed in Maier 2014a, 10). The quotation-expression is not a grammatical constituent on any syntactic theory; instead we interpret 'strange things' as the direct object of 'ate' yielding a VP in turn modified by 'when left to its own devices.' Here, in Maier's words, we "see through" the inverted commas as if they were not present and as if their constituent words were simply used.

8. Seymour (1996, 313–314) cites similar examples to show that the quotation-expression "receives its normal semantic interpretation" (313). C&L (2007, 28) oddly cite Seymour and one of his examples of anaphora but then deny, without argument, that a quotation-expression (or its constituents) is ever used, ignoring Seymour's data to the contrary.

9. Johnson (2011, 214) employs *failure* of cross-sentential anaphoric co-reference to argue that mixed quotations involve only use and no mention, e.g.,

a. Alice said life "is difficult to understand. #It involves an infinitival verb phrase.
b. The Davidson text tells me that "in quotation, words are used autonomously." #It could use some editing.

According to Johnson, if the mixed quotation also mentions its words as a singular term, 'it' should anaphorically co-refer with the mixed-quotation-expression; since the anaphora fails, we have proof that the mixed quotation involves no mention. However, one might argue to the contrary that if the mixed quotation does mention its words, then since both sentences contain another singular term ('life,' 'the Davidson text') which might also serve as the anaphoric antecedent, both are ambiguous, hence, their unacceptability. Johnson's third example

c. #John asserted that we might be going, but he "ain't," *which* is on his teacher's list of no-no words

involves no anaphora but a relative pronoun.

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10. John Kulvicki (personal communication) raises the interesting question of whether it is possible to cancel the content, or use interpretation, of a quotation. Suppose I say: 'Jack said: "Mary is a fool" but he did not mean it. The kidnapper forced him to say it.' But here I do not deny the attribution, only Jack's sincere endorsement of the content; what is canceled is not the meaning of the quoting sentence but that Jack intended to assert and take responsibility for the content of his words.

11. Maier (2014, 8) also cites examples of "language shift" such as "If you were a French academic, you might say that the parrot was 'un symbole du Logos'" (De Brabanter 2005b) as one of "the clearest sign[s] that genuine metalinguistic reference is involved." Maier also includes among examples of language shift other idiolects, typos, and erroneous or wrong uses; see chapter 9 below.

12. Here and in the previous paragraph I have been speaking loosely. As we shall see in chapter 6, what is referred to is not a word itself but a representation of some kind individuated by the word.

13. Cf. C&L 1997, 443. Some of Davidson's (1979/1984) remarks, e.g., 80–81, suggest that he is skeptical of the distinction between use and mention and that they are not mutually exclusive. Christensen 1967 explicitly questions the distinction.

14. It is tempting to attribute such an analysis to Davidson, who says that the mixed quotation "Quine said that quotation 'has an anomalous character'" is to be analyzed as "Quine says, using words of which these are a token, that quotation has an anomalous character." But I have not found an explicit statement in his writing making the "double-proposition" claim, although C&L (1997, 443) and Lepore and Ludwig (2007, 155) so read him. Furthermore, if, as Davidson says, the quoting words are not semantically part of the sentence, but exported to serve as a semantically inert object demonstrated by the disguised demonstrative quotation-marks, it is not clear how they can themselves express the "use" proposition.

15. Potts (2004a, 406) labels the first proposition the "regular meaning" of the mixed quotation sentence, the second its "speech act meaning." As Maier (2016, 17–18) notes, Potts does not discuss quotations that contain indexicals and his "use" propositions would seem to make the wrong prediction, fixing their direct referents in their context of utterance. Maier conjectures that in order to avoid this consequence Potts would appeal to a context-shifting monster, which we will discuss in chapter 5. Another difficulty with (17d, e), also raised by Geurts and Maier (2003, 112) is that their most natural interpretation is

(17d*) Whenever he is in Santa Cruz *and he orders apricots at the local market*, Peter utters "[eɪ]pricots."

(17e*) Whenever he is in Amherst, *and he orders apricots at the local market*, Peter utters "[æ]pricots."

However, it is not clear how Potts can incorporate this additional clause into his analysis. One might try to build the italicized condition into a restriction on

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the domain of the quantifiers in (17d, e), but one cannot do that to (17c) since the restriction is in effect what the "use" proposition (or "regular meaning" in Potts's terminology) of (17a) says. Thus the use and metalinguistic propositions expressed by one surface utterance would turn out to have different quantificational domains.

16. Predelli (2003, 6) supports this idea, which is also endorsed by Bach (1999) and Neale (1999). If one takes "two dimension" in a sufficiently broad sense, most accounts of (sentential and sub-sentential) quotation turn out to be two-dimensional. C&L's Minimal Theory takes the semantics of pure and mixed quotation exclusively to mention or refer to the quoting words, but then sneaks in all meaning relevant to use in the pragmatics. Recanati uses his two notions of c-content and i-content to capture the two kinds of meaning.

17. Geurts and Maier's (2007) analysis is framed in terms of the binding theory of presuppositions which is a variant of Discourse Representation theory. However, its details are not important for our purposes here. For similar accounts, see Benbaji 2004b and Recanati 2011, 256, although he restricts this to his noncumulative hybrids.

18. See Maier 2020, which criticizes Davidson's demonstrative theory for precisely this reason.

19. To the best of my knowledge, examples like (18)–(20) were first introduced into the discussion of mixed quotation in C&L 1997b, but they have assumed a formative role in shaping discussions of mixed quotation with which they are lumped together by many. See, however, Maier 2014a, 29, which distinguishes them from the general case. As I mention in the text, I will analyze them as scare quotation in chapter 9. For a somewhat different view of mixed quotation, see Shan 2011, 422, which describes the function of mixed quotation to "curate meanings from other minds into our own utterances."

20. There is an additional problem with (20) that concerns the indexical 'me.' If the indexical is also mentioned, it does not strictly speaking have an indexical interpretation (i.e, direct referent), neither the actual speaker nor the quoted subject (Bush). Moreover, 'me' does not refer to whomever the subject used it to refer to, even if it shifts to the quoted context. I return in chs. 5–6 and 8 to the interpretation of indexicals in quotations, including Maier's 2016, 24–28 attempt to avoid monsters by going pragmatic.

Chapter 4

1. De Brabanter (2010, 2017) and Harth (2011) see themselves as following in Recanati's footsteps.

2. De Brabanter (2010, 2017) and Harth (2011) both take their accounts to be explicating the pretheoretical idea that the quoting and quoted phrases resemble one another. Harth also employs exemplification in his account (although his notion differs from the one I introduce). Neither explicate resemblance.

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3. On these issues concerning similarity, I have greatly benefited from Margalit ms.a and ms.b.

4. See Tversky 1977 on his "contrasting feature matching" model, which he opposed to the "geometric" model of similarity (that arguably underlies Watanabe's theorem) that represents objects as points in a coordinate space whose dis/similarity is a function of their metric distance from each other.

5. See, e.g., Abell 2009. For the Gricean intention-based background to her view, see Grice 1969.

6. For resemblance in occlusion shape, see Hyman 2006. On experienced outline shape, see Hopkins 1995, 1998.

7. See, e,g., De Brabanter 2017, which uses 'depictive,' a term clearly based on resemblance without any analysis, and Salkie's 2017 comment on De Branbanter's terminology. Another philosopher who uses 'resemblance' as an explanatory primitive in need of no analysis is Johnson (2018) as part of his theory of 'natural names.' I do not discuss his theory in depth because it is a theory of mention/pure quotation.

8. The first discussion of exemplification was Peirce 1955, 102; see also Goodman 1976, 52-67.

9. "An element may come to serve as a symbol for an element related to it in almost any way" (Goodman 1976, 65).

10. Goodman 1972b calls the extension of the compounds that denote a given picture/representation its secondary extension, e.g., a picture of a unicorn whose primary extension is null falls in the non-null secondary extension of the compound 'unicorn-picture.'

11. Two comments: (1) For discussion of difficulties with Goodman's nominalistic use of predicates in this context, see Stern 1988; I assume that properties, if not unproblematic, are unavoidable. (2) Goodman introduces exemplification to account specifically (though not exclusively) for the symbolic properties of works of art and in particular for pictorial expression (which he analyzes in terms of metaphorical exemplification). However, his model of exemplification, sampling, makes clear that not only works of art but objects in general exemplify features or properties. Hence, my use of exemplification is not meant to imply that quotations are works of art.

12. As with denotation, Goodman refuses to supply "general instructions how to determine what a work exemplifies" (Goodman 1984, 83).

13. On these parameters of exemplification, see Tversky 1977 and Stern 2000. In applying the notion of exemplification to quotation below, let me say immediately that it is not at all clear how to generalize these conditions to identify analogous parameters that determine what the quoting token exemplifies.

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14. The major proponents of structural theories of pictorial representation are Goodman 1976 (and his followers) and Kulvicki 2006, 2014. Throughout this section I am indebted to Kulvicki.

15. Note that Goodman's idea of syntactic density is defined relative to a scheme (or system, where a system is a scheme plus a semantic interpretation). Note also that throughout I substitute type/token terminology for Goodman's character/mark talk. (I take it that for Goodman 'character' sounds more nominalistic than 'type.') Goodman goes on to characterize the analog/digital distinction in terms of whether the types of the system are finitely differentiated. In digital systems it always possible to determine conclusively that a given token does not belong to at least all but one syntactic type. Analog representations fail this test: their tokens cannot be determined not to belong to more than one type; any token could belong to any number of types if it belongs to one. However, this attempt to capture what is distinctive about pictures in terms of the analog, in turn, fell victim to the objection that it could not account for the pictoriality of digital photographs and it is also problematic for Goodman's own account of pictorial metaphors which requires the possibility of replication (which is ruled out by density) which in turn is necessary to explain metaphorical transfer.

16. For a different definition of the digital/analog distinction, see Lewis 1971. Another explication of the pre-theoretical idea is found, more recently, in Kulvicki 2006 whose idea of *relative syntactic sensitivity* allows for degrees of syntactic difference between different syntactic schemes. Thus "one system of representation is more syntactically sensitive than another when subtler differences between representations' syntactic features suffice for representations in the first system to be syntactically distinct than in the second system" (Kulvicki 2006, 96). Although Kulvicki's proposal has advantages over Goodman's idea of density, for reasons that will emerge in the text I follow Haugland's reconstruction of the intuitive idea which falls out of his explication of the analog/digital distinction.

17. It should be noted that Kulvicki claims not only that pictures are transparent but also that "transparency "does a nice job of helping to capture what makes pictures a distinctive kind of representation" (Kulvicki 2014, 100). I do not pursue that important claim here.

18. On the transparency of blurry and digital photographs or pictures, and the possibility of degrees of transparency, see Kulvicki 2006, 64–78.

19. This is not to say that one represents the other in virtue of resembling it. See also Kulvicki 2006, 155, where he uses this consequence to explain why pictures are mimetic.

20. Haugeland 1998b, 187 uses the bare-bones/fleshed-out distinction for a project (beyond our scope) to distinguish what he calls "representational genera" for "logical' vs. "iconic" systems (and other systems that are neither, e.g., distributed

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representations (eg., connectivist networks). For critical discussion, see Kulvicki 2006, 121–137.

Chapter 5

1. One can also quote nondeclarative utterances, e.g., "John commanded: 'Close the door!'" or "Mary asked: 'Has WWW III already begun?'" How one captures nonassertional mood in a semantics of quotation will depend on one's general semantics of nondeclaratives, e.g., imperatives, questions, etc. For an early discussion, see Banfield 1973.

2. C&L 2007, 30 uses this argument *both* against Recanati who claims that the quoting phrase is exclusively used (and involves no mention) and against Davidson who claims that the quoting phrase is both used and mentioned (or meta-linguistically refers).

3. See C&L 1997, 2007, for an analogous example. Based on examples exactly like this, Johnson 2011, 217–219 nonetheless argues that there are quotations containing indexicals that are not interpreted relative to the subject's context but relative to the speaker's. For example, he imagines that he (MJ) received a negative review of a paper and, when asked whether he was dejected, replied

(i) No, quite the contrary. To quote Oscar Wilde, "Whenever people agree with me, I always feel I must be wrong."

Johnson writes: "Here I am not saying that whenever people agree with Oscar Wilde, *he* feels *he* must be wrong, though what I say entails that. Rather, I am saying that whenever people agree with me, I always feel I must be wrong. I am just using Oscar Wilde's words to do it." So, according to Johnson, in (i) 'me' and 'I' refer to MJ. Two comments: (1) On his reading of (i) no one could appropriately respond:

(ii) No, that's not what Wilde said. To correctly quote him, "Whenever people agree with me, I always feel *they* must be wrong."

which would make no sense if the indexicals in (i) were interpreted relative to the speaker's (MJ's) context. Although its explanation is controversial (as we shall see), the intuitive meaning of (i) has the indexicals referring to the subject of the quotation-sentence and his context. The speaker's own reaction to the question about being dejected is conversationally implicated from his quotation of Wilde. (2) Among various questions Johnson's example raises, one especially deserves investigation: Does the phrase 'to quote X' mean no more than that I am using X's words to make my own assertion or does a quotation require *attribution* of an utterance to X? The former may be closer to allusion. Johnson goes on to claim that "in the words of X' and 'like/as X said' are similar constructions that involve no indexical shifting. His examples do not convince me, but the question of identifying the range of linguistic constructions that are truly quotative is worth exploring.

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4. For the reason for my qualification, see (F) in chapter 2 for Richard 2005's observation.

5. Hence, if they are only mentioned, they have *no* indexical semantic value, contrary to the evidence from anaphora and quantification cited in chapters 2–3. Instead, C&L explain our intuitive 'understanding' of the quoting phrase and its truth conditions through their speech act pragmatics.

6. On this idea that indexical reference is parametric, unlike the denotational reference of demonstratives, see Stern 2000, 88–104.

7. Notwithstanding the fact that the formal apparatus of the semantics obsures this philosophically significant distinction by representing both rigid designation and direct reference as a constant function from circumstances to the same individual at every circumstance.

8. Thus the bare-bones representational content of a quoting phrase is closer to Recanati's c-content than i-content. If Kulvicki 2020 is right, one difference between the bare-bones content of pictures and of quotations (and natural language representations in general) is that the former are purely descriptive and contain no individuals, while the content of quotation and language in general contain individuals. This will not affect our analogy between pictures and quotations.

9. To be exact, Kaplan says that monstrous operators do not already exist in English and could not be added to English. Kaplan's label alludes to operators in two-dimensional modal semantics that, for all their "elegance," do not philosophically distinguish between the different roles of contexts of utterance and circumstances of evaluation, treats both as indices that can be equally shifted, and thereby "beget" monstrous context-shifting operators.

10. It is not obvious to me that indeed DR is violated by monsters but I will not pursue that here.

11. The *locus classicus* is Schlenker 1999 and 2003, which locates the monsters in indirect discourse; cf. Schlenker 2004 (where he does not use monsters but multiple parameters) and Anand and Nevins 2004b. Schlenker, it should be noted, proposes monsters only for indirect discourse locutions, not quotations, although he also employs them in his account of free indirect discourse. In addition, some ASL scholars have proposed analyzing "role shift" as a monster.

12. I use 'lurking' to describe the context-shifting monster because it is not at all clear exactly where one should locate the shift in one's theory of language. The leading advocate of context-shifting to account both for indexicals and improper use of words (what we shall identify as 'scare quoting' in chapter 9) is Recanati 2011, 256–262 and 279–284. However, Recanati vacillates between taking the context-shift to be pre-semantic (motivated by improper uses of words which he then extends to

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indexicals) or semantic (motivated by indexicals which he then extends to improper uses of words). In either case, he tries to defend the view that the quotation marks themselves merely signal the context shift, whether the shift is pre-semantic or semantic (in which case, he posits a syntactically and lexically unrealized operator in the representation of the sentence which he emphasizes should not be identified with the q-marks themselves). In chapter 9 I shall criticize Recanati's first move that involves language shift for its failure to account for the impropriety of the scare quoted words, but even Recanati realizes that the pre-semantic story applied to indexicals is a stretch when he concludes by saying that the issues are "controversial" (284). See also Maier 2016, 21–22, where he criticizes any attempt that incorporates a shiftable (semantic) contextual language parameter on the grounds that it undercuts the Kaplanean distinction between the pre-semantic and semantic contexts that would render a priori known truths like "I am here" as a posteriori known truths. For an elegant compositional semantic account of sub-sentential quotation that involves a context-like-shifter (technically, it is represented by an evaluation-function) that *is* identified with the q-marks, see Richard 2015 and chapter 8, this volume, for discussion.

13. In addition to the pragmaticist's and semanticist's accounts (and my own), there is Maier's 2014, 2016 and Geurts and Maier's 2003 "free relative/deferential" analysis. Apart from the objection raised in chapter 3, I return to their treatment of indexicals in chapter 8.

14. Depending on one's theory of indirect discourse, one will judge the resulting indirect discourse sentence to be true, false, or true but misleading or pragmatically unacceptable. For example, if Jack said: "I am hungry," 'Jack is hungry' preserves its representational content (namely, <j, *Hungry*>, but a report of Jack's utterance by 'Jack said that Jack is hungry' may be false or inappropriate insofar as it presupposes or implicates that Jack does not know that he is Jack (say, he is an amnesiac) or that he is referring to another Jack. In contrast, as John Kulvicki (personal communication.) points out, we sometimes do report Jack's utterance 'Jack is hungry' by 'Jack said that he is hungry' without saying something inappropriate, even though we have whatever Jack was conveying by referring to himself by his own name rather than speaking in the first-person.

15. I borrow the term "quasi-indexical" from Castañeda 1967's category of "quasi-indicators" that are derivative expressions in indirect discourse (*oratio obliqua*), dependent on an antecedent indicator (Castañeda's term for indexicals), that enables one to "preserve" indexical reference by making it "interpersonal and enduring" (85); see also Castañeda 2001. Following Castañeda, we might place an asterix after the indicator term (e.g., 'he*') to mark its quasi-indicator status, as in (9*) Quine said that he* is confused. Schlenker 2003 takes Castañeda's quasi-indicators to be monsters; I am taking them to be devices that capture the character-istic profile of a quoted indexical, like the first-person, through the substitution of a different

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quoting pronoun or indexical that is evaluated in its actual context of *utterance*, thereby preserving the quoted content in a different context while avoiding a monster and violation of DR.

16. We can, however, capture something like indexical conversion to express the representational content of other context-dependent expressions like 'you' and 'here' or the demonstrative 's/he' in each of these (a) quotation-sentences using the *quasi-de se* (b)'s:

(1a) Jack said (in c where ***Bill*** is the addressee): "***You*** are happy."
(1b) Jack said to ***Bill*** that ***he (himself)*** is happy."
(3a) Jack said (in c where ***Bill*** is demonstrated): "***He*** is happy."
(3b) Jack said of/about ***Bill*** that ***he*** (***himself)*** is happy.
(4a) Jack said (in a context whose location is ***l***): "The game is ***here.***"
(4b) Jack said (in a context whose location *l** different from *l)* of/about *l** that the game is ***there.***

17. Kaplan 1989, 553–557, does for indirect discourse ('says that') what I am suggesting is necessary to do for direct discourse (quotation): a "full analysis of indirect discourse [that contains indexicals] includes mention of the suppressed character of the direct discourse event which the indirect discourse reports" (554).

18. As John Kulvicki (personal communication) has observed, in some cases the change in context forces us to convert the tense rather than, or in addition to, the indexical. If I/Jack say: "I am leaving," I must report myself (Jack) by saying 'I/Jack said that I/he *was* leaving.'

19. Apart from explicit indexicals, I assume for now that the characters (and, hence, contents and direct referents) of other expressions are stable and do not vary across contexts. As Emar Maier has emphasized to me, apart from the idealization this assumes, we will see in chapter 9 that when we attempt to extend this account of representational content to improper uses of phrases (aka 'scare quotations'), the story becomes much more complicated.

20. In chapter 2 we contrasted mentioning and quotation with respect to the possibility of quantifying-into quotation-phrases and mention-expressions. We can quantify into quotation-phrases or contexts (i, iii) just as we can into indirect discourse reports (ii, iv):

(i) Every Trump follower about whom Hillary said "They are deplorables"/ "He is deplorable" voted for a Republican.
(ii) Every Trump follower about whom Hillary said that they are deplorables/ that he is deplorable, voted for a Republican.
(iii) To everyone he meets, John says, 'I love you.'
(iv) To everyone he meets, John says that he loves her.

This does not conflict with the fact that both quotations and indirect discourse are opaque because all of these cases involve relational or wide scope readings of the quantifier relative to the verb of (q-)saying.

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21. See chapter 2, n. 34, where I distinguish this claim from Banfield 1973's claim that direct and indirect discourse sentences cannot be syntactically or transformationally derived from each other.

22. Throughout the latter part of this chapter I am especially indebted to discussion with Malte Willer and written comments by Emar Maier, neither of whom agree with my proposal!

Chapter 6

1. Note that in saying that the quoted token is the semantic value of the quoting expression, I am not saying that it is its referent or *bedeutung* in Frege's sense. Following the distinction I drew in ch. 2, quotation is one context in which reference qua denotation and semantic value come apart.

2. Davidson (1984b) is, therefore, only half-right when he writes that a quotation (on his view, the quotation-marks themselves) refers "to a shape [Davidson's conception of a type] by pointing out something that *has* it" (90, my emphasis). Szabó (1999) is, I think, getting at the same relation as exemplification between a token and type but he calls it "representation" which he opposes to 'instantiation.' On my view, the objects represented, or denoted, by a predicate *are* its instances. Exemplification is the opposite of instantiation.

3. I do not know whether prior to the late eighteenth century, there was anything analogous to the verbatim requirement. Although quotation was originally specific to authoritative or canonical texts like Scripture or Homer—and one might therefore think that the actual words would matter—what counted was the wisdom they expressed, not the words that expressed it.

4. John Kulvicki (personal communication) has pointed out that types are ordered from the more specific to the more abstract and general, and that the more specific type entails the more abstract, e.g., 'x is crimson' entails 'x is red.' In the case of pictures, Kulvicki has also argued that abstractions over their syntactic features (e.g., their colors) yields abstractions over their semantic contents, what they are about. So, if all crimson things are red things, then a picture that represents things as crimson can itself be represented more abstractly by a representation of those things as red. This raises the question whether, given our analogy between quotation and pictures, quotation admits an analogous kind of abstraction. So, if Jack said: "The hood is crimson," can I quote him as saying: "The hood is red"? It does seem as if I can indirectly report him as saying *that* the hood is red, at least in certain contexts. However, in quotation, we want to report not only what was said but also how it was said—and while the contents of certain properties may be hierarchically ranked in their order of specificity and abstractness, there is no analogous ranking of the respective word-types. So, suppose we were asking young students which hoods are red and which orange. If Jack said: "The hood is crimson," we could report him as

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saying that the hood is red but we cannot quote him with 'Jack said: "The hood is red."'

5. On pronunciation, see Potts 2004b; on signs, C&L 2007, and on manner of speech, Recanati 2001, 2011. I emphasize representational content because, absent any such content, the quoting intonation, pronunciation, sign, or manner will be mentioned, not quoted.

6. C&L 2007, 147–150, distinguishes expressions (with meanings, that belong to languages) from the signs with which we articulate or manifest expressions. Signs themselves do not belong to a language, and any one sign ('rot') can articulate different expressions in different languages, just as one expression can be articulated with different signs in different systems (e.g., in written and spoken sign systems). Important as this distinction is, C&L do not distinguish between the mediums of the sign systems (writing vs. oral speech) and the modes by which the signs signify (by depiction vs. description). Second, in order to explain how (i) "'Apple' = '*Apple*'" and (ii) "'Apple' ≠ '*Apple*'" can both be true, they argue that the mentioning items in (i) are expressions and in (ii) signs. Therefore, the different truth-values of (i) and (ii) are due to the different mentioned items contained between the inverted commas: (i) contains and mentions expressions and not signs while (ii) contains and mentions signs and not expressions. Hence, (i) and (ii) contain syntactically different objects, the one composed of signs, the other expressions. But this is not obvious. Since a sign must be an articulation of some expression, it is not clear how a concrete sign token cannot but also be an expression. And since expressions must be articulated by some sign, it is not clear how any token expression cannot but also be a sign. To be sure, we may be interested in, or focus in context on, one rather than another, but both are necessarily co-present. An alternative explanation for the difference in the truth-value of (i) and (ii) would be, anticipating chapter 7, that treating both as analog representations (and in different contexts), in (i) the difference in font makes a difference, in (ii), not.

7. See Potts 2004 on phonological, syntactic, and semantic representations as elements of our ontology for quotation.

8. It is a further question whether, say, a phonological representation alone can be exemplified or whether a semantic representation (e.g., a character) must also be exemplified whenever some non-linguistic or non-semantic property is exemplified—even if the semantic exemplificandum carries no weight in determining truth-value.

9. There is also what we might call a pseudo-'you' where 'you' occurs in place of 'one' as in this quotation of Donald Trump in the British tabloid the *Sun*: "I guess when they put out blimps to make me feel unwelcome, no reason for me to go to London . . . I used to love London as a city. I haven't been there in a long time. But when they make you feel unwelcome, why would I stay there?" Note the appositive

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shift from 'I' to 'you.' (https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6766644/donald-trump-feels-unwelcome-london-protests/)

10. See K. Davidson 2015 for a similar example.

11. On containment, see C&L 2007, 25, 150–151; on interiority, see Gomez-Torrente 2013.

12. The role of resemblance is one way that my account, and my use of exemplification, differs from Harth 2011 and De Brabanter 2017, 2018 who employ exemplification or iconicity to account for the pictorial character of quotation (or mentioning, on which they concentrate, without distinguishing the two). They both take themselves to be explicating resemblance which they likewise take to explain pictorial reference.

13. This relation between the representational and exemplificational contents of quotations recalls the relation between the literal and metaphorical interpretations of expressions. Metaphorical content, or the content expressed by a predicate Ø interpreted or used metaphorically, is not its literal interpretation and its literal interpretation is not part of it. But the metaphorical interpretation depends on the literal meaning of Ø insofar as what is metaphorically expressed is selected from presuppositions about Øs *under its literal interpretation*. Likewise, the semantic value of the exemplifying quoting expression depends on its representational value, even though the latter is not part of the former. The trick both for metaphor and for quotation is to find space in the semantics for the roles of these two contents. To be sure, like duck-rabbit, we (usually) do not (although it is not clear that we cannot) attend to both at the same time. One can either see '*S*' as a representation with truth-conditional content or as the sample token exemplifying a salient property or representation. But when one sees the sentence or expression as one rather than the other, the other content is not eliminated or lost, nor does the expression change its meaning; the other meaning is a potentiality waiting to be activated.

14. Note that the token uttered by T in *c** need not be a token of *S* so long as it instantiates the representation or property exemplified by *S* in *c*, for example, when T's utterance was in a language other than that of *S*.

15. Thanks to Philippe De Brabanter for discussion of this issue.

Chapter 7

1. I am indebted to Malte Willer for raising these examples with me. Details will vary with one's semantics for questions.

2. Abbott (2005) originally cited these kinds of examples as counterevidence to theories that held that all quotations are NPs. Since the phrase belongs to no single constituent category, ipso facto it cannot belong to the category NP.

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3. Maier proposes two strategies to solve the problem: (i) "break up" the quoting phrase into individual quoting words or (ii) employ 'unquotation' (Shan 2011) in order to construct a phrase that falls in a well-formed grammatical category, e.g. "[serves] breakfast at any time."

4. Compare Richard 2015, 226, n. 13, where he raises the question whether quotation is a "syntactic phenomenon at all" given the possibility of quoting non-constituents.

5. Anand and Nevins 2004 point to the analogous impossibility of A'-extraction from direct quotations in Zazaki (where 't' is the "trace" of the moved NP in:

(i) *The girl that Hesen said "I kissed t" is pretty.

in contrast to the indirect discourse sentence

(ii) The girl that Hesen said that I kissed *t* is pretty.

Note that in both strings 'I' shifts its reference in Zazaki to Hesen, so that even in (ii) 'I' does not refer to the speaker of the context of utterance.

6. I have added (9b) to Maier's own example (9a) because the verb 'misunderestimate' is not an English word. This would incline one to think that the q-marks are really scare quotes—which properly ought to scare quote only the word 'misunderestimate.' Since 'forgive' has no such complication, the data concerning wh-movement is a bit clearer in that case.

7. Maier 2014a, 7–8 adduces wh-movement as a test of linguistic opacity and argues that the fact that "genuine quotation [under which he includes mixed quotation] . . . blocks wh-movement" is evidence that mixed quotation is opaque and therefore "patterns with direct rather than indirect discourse." This conclusion is difficult to endorse since indirect discourse has, since Frege, been taken to be a clear example of opacity! For further discussion of wh-movement, see Richard 2015, 226–227.

8. For critical discussion of Clark and Gerrig 1990 and Wade and Clark 1993, see Johnson and Lepore 2011.

9. Recanati nowhere explains what it is for an open quotation to be "recruited" as a singular term other than happening to occur in the grammatical position of a NP, name, description, or demonstrative. However, it should be kept in mind that whether a position is that of a singular term or NP is itself a theoretical decision that depends on one's analysis of the logical form of the sentence. For instance, Recanati 2011, 230 gives the following (non-quotational) example of a demonstration that is "recruited" to be a singular term: a piano student plays a passage in manner μ after which her teacher says: "It's not [plays a passage in manner μ]—it's [plays the same passage in manner μ*]." Recanati comments: "Here the teacher's successive demonstrations are linguistically recruited and fill slots in the sentence frame 'It's not ____; it's ____ .' The demonstrations serve as singular terms." However, this proposal assumes that "is" is the identity sign flanked by singular terms. If instead 'is' is a

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copula, the demonstration would be something like a common noun or predicate which would have a semantic value (a property or extension) but not an individual referent as Recanati requires for a closed quotation.

10. It is worth nothing in this connection that in his chapter "Open Quotation Revisited" which is a sequel to his earlier paper "Open Quotation" (originally published in *Mind*, both reprinted in Recanati 2011), Recanati takes the difference between open and closed quotation to be simply that in the former "the speaker does something with the words, and thereby means something," in contrast to the latter which has the "status of a linguistic constituent and has a semantic content of its own" (271)—with no mention in the entire chapter of pictures and pictorial meaning. In the latter chapter Recanati is primarily, even exclusively, concerned with the way in which context affects truth-conditions—e.g., through context-shifting for indexicals and language—which, as I write in the text, is his overall project.

11. Recanati 2011, 236 proposes that "one could perhaps argue that [14] is actually elliptical for something like [14c] but then "denies" without giving a reason that the two are synonymous.

12. Of course, "Quine" in (17b) is a singular term but, because it is echoic, Recanati counts it as an open quotation.

13. A wide range of writers on quotation make the same move as Recanati, adopting scare quotations as exemplars of mixed quotation; see, e.g., C&L 2007, 15. I would add that Recanati 2011, 226–229, goes back and forth between claiming that the quotation "mimics" and "mimicks" its target. Although contemporary dictionaries say that these are simply alternative spellings of one word, Recanati seems to use 'mimic' to mean 'imitate' (from 'mimesis') and 'mimick' to mean 'ridicule' or 'mock.' As we said in the text, 'mimicing' is a secondary non-linguistic motive or intention for uttering a quotation and not incompatible with its semantic analysis as an attribution; this is even more evident in the case of 'mimicking,' i.e., mocking or ridiculing. Which of these Recanati intends seems to me entirely open.

14. One might ask whether Recanati considers (14) itself to be scare quoting.

15. Cf. Recanati's different thoughts about the analysis of this example in 2011, 272 and 288.

16. Ignore for the moment that the terms are in a foreign language.

17. For a somewhat similar view, see Benbaji 2003, 2004b. If, as I shall argue in chapter 8, the q-marks are "part" of the verb of saying, one might also argue that the verb of saying may be linguistically recoverable from the explicitly articulated q-marks.

18. For his own explanation, see Recanati 2011, 241. He concludes by writing that the speaker "ostensively speaks like them [the group] but he does not say that he speaks like them." This is to me the decisive reason *not* to take such a case of "echoing" as quotation.

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19. See also Ricks 2002, which characterizes allusion as "the calling into play of the words and phrases of previous writers." An extended discussion of allusion is beyond the scope of this book, but see Ross 1981; Irwin 2001; and Ricks 1984, 1996 (which includes a study of allusion in J.L. Austin, "Austin's Swink"), 2002). I am indebted to Richard Eldridge for raising this topic with me and to David Hills for these references. For a closely related phenomenon, see Sperber and Wilson 1981 on "echoic mention."

20. See, however, the problem C&L 2007, 6, raise for the compositional truth conditions of sentences that contain quotables that are not part of the language of the matrix sentence and have no semantic value in the language.

21. Note that this would also rule out the possibility of quoting (not: mentioning) genuine gibberish. I say 'genuine gibberish' in anticipation of what I shall argue in chapter 9 that some examples of purported gibberish (e.g., 'philtosopher') are not gibberish. See C&L 2007 which lumps together gibberish, foreign words, and nonlinguistic symbols and entities in discussing the possibility of quotation. Even apart from quotation, the whole subject of gibberish raises many questions in need of further research. For example, can we nominalize a nonlinguistic symbol or sequence of sounds by appending 'ing,' as in 'He is #$%^#&!!ing'?

22. For conflicting data, see "And she goes 'Dad, I wrecked your car. I'm so sorry'" (De Brabanter 2017, 244).

23. This constraint issues from the representational role of quotation. If quotation *only* involved exemplification, then non-linguistic exemplifying or sampling objects would be possible constituents of quotation.

24. For further discussion, see Partee 1973 and Clark and Gerrig 1990, 781–782, citing Hudson.

25. If one's theory takes the objects of belief to be sentences or, say, logical interpreted forms, then the meta-language, i.e., one's *explanans*, may well allow for (direct) quotation. The difference I mean to be indicating is a difference in the *explananda*, the (object language) natural language constructions to be explained.

26. Thanks throughout this paragraph to Chris Kennedy (personal communication).

27. The classic, and seminal, discussion of free indirect discourse (FID) is Banfield 1973 who presents a wealth of data, e.g., that some verbs that introduce FID cannot introduce (direct) quotation; for more recent analyses, see Fludernik 1993 for a cognitive linguistics approach, and Sternberg 1982, 1991 who employs formal literary theory. For a semantic treatment, see Doron 1991, Eckardt 2014, Schlenker 1999 (which uses monsters), 2004 (which employs multiple contexts), and Shan 2011; for a pragmatic explanation, see Maier 2015, 2016, 2018, which argues that FID takes the subject's perspective as the default (hence, preserving the locational and temporal indexicals as if they were being quoted) and incorporates devices such as Shan's

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idea of unquotation to mediate the tension between VR and "pragmatic attraction" for personal indexicals and tenses A further question is whether a constraint like VR applies to thought. I am indebted to Emar Maier for directing me to much of this recent literature.

Chapter 8

1. Because this approach is generally put forth as an account of mentioning, the quotation-expressions are typically taken to be expressions that can fill the position of a name or NP.

2. For a quite comprehensive albeit partisan review, see C&L 2007.

3. Note, as Chris Kennedy (personal communication) observes, that in the (2) and (3) pairs the third approach could appeal to (syntactic) ambiguity to distinguish the two utterances which the inverted commas would in turn disambiguate.

4. The precise syntactic category of the quotation expression will vary according to one's theory; see, e.g., C&L 2007, 128–130.

5. I should clarify that in saying that the q-marks are a syncategorematic but sometimes discontinuous lexical part, extension, or continuation of the "quotational verb of saying," I do not mean what Quine 1960, Scheffler 1954, 1955, or Goodman 1972b mean when they write that 'believes that snow is white' is an 'unbreakable one-place predicate,' having no internal semantic structure. What I mean by claiming that 'said ". . . ." ' is one predicate is that the q-marks spell out the quotational character of the saying, containing between them the empty slot in which we incorporate the sentential or sub-sentential quoting unit. The quoting token itself has all semantic structure necessary for its representational content to semantically interact with its matrix sentence, including quantifying-in and anaphoric relations.

6. For the example from Khabardian, see Ershova 2013. I am much indebted to Chris Kennedy for bringing this paper to my attention and for critical discussion of this whole section of the chapter. Kennedy (personal communication) has also proposed that it may be preferable to divide the lexical construction of Q-saying into two stages in order to account for its productivity. As we saw in chapter 7, §VII, (31)–(34), the structure of Q-saying can be realized by a wide range of thin and thick verbs of saying, including 'shout,' 'mumble,' 'growl,' 'ask,' 'wonder, 'question, 'plead,' 'command,' 'tell,' and 'direct,' as well as mental or attitudinal verbs such as 'wonder,' 'convinced oneself,' and 'remember.' This regularity suggests that we might first have '"___"' compose with the quoting phrase and then obligatorally with a verb of saying, i.e., require that '"___"' must compose with some verb of saying. This would also provide an easy explanation of why, when sub-sentential quotations occur in superficially non-reportative contexts (e.g., (14)), it *must* be possible to recover an underlying verb of saying. Finally, if no such requirement for

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the inverted commas or marks holds for mentioning, this lexical requirement for quotation would preserve the homonymity of the commas and marks in mention and quotation contexts.

7. For the sake of argument, I ignore the fact that 'is the sun' in (4) is interpreted metaphorically and that at least one author takes metaphorical interpretation to be context-dependent like indexicals and demonstratives.

8. This account is inspired by that of Richard 2015; I discuss the difference between his view and mine in §IV. Thanks to Chris Kennedy for help with details.

9. On the incorporation of speech act roles, such as point of view (manifest by, e.g., indexicals) into syntactic representations, see Speas and Tenny 2003.

10. In addition to Richard's and Maier's semantics, a third formal proposal for mixed (sub-sentential) quotation is found in C&L 2007, 133–141, but they do not discuss indexicals. Their "Minimalist" account, they write, is derived from an earlier version of Richard 2015 (C&L 2007, 134). Richard 2015, 220–227, titles this semantics "The Movement Account," raises a number of decisive objections to it, and says (221, n. 5) he no longer endorses it. For further objections, see Gomez-Torrente 2013. Since I share their criticisms, I do not present the account here in detail.

11. On my account, the truth-condition for (8a) uttered in c is

> In every c* and day of c*, d(c*), there is an e such that e is a saying & e's agent was John & the character {' finish the job tomorrow'} is exemplified by Stern's utterance of "finish the job tomorrow" in c & e possesses the character {'finish the job tomorrow'} & the content of e in c* is the property <will finish the job on d(c*)+1> composed with the content of the rest of the complement clause as it is interpreted in c.

For Richard's own example and analysis, see Richard 2015, 231.

12. In n. 17 of Richard 2015, 228, he seems to express reservations whether this is "where [the event variable] ought to go," but he does not spell out his worries.

13. In personal correspondence, Richard has acknowledged that "the variable under assignment is *like* a context insofar as it provides a (very limited) mapping from uses of expressions to interpretations. I say 'very limited' because the variable under interpretation (i.e., assignment of an event to it) can only interpret parts of assertive utterances in e. On at least some understandings of what a context is, a context will provide a more extensive mapping." I should add that Richard raises important objections to Recanati's informal view of quotation as a monster (discussed in ch. 5), so their views should not be identified.

14. Following Kaplan's (1989) distinction between contexts (of utterance) and possible worlds (or circumstances of evaluation), I use 'counteractual' to refer to alternative contexts other than the one in which the utterance in question occurs and 'counterfactual' for alternative (possible) worlds in which the truth-value of a proposition (expressed in a context) is evaluated.

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15. In Maier 2018, in order to account for the special behavior of free indirect discourse, Maier gives a more detailed pragmatic explanation that appeals to two "constraints." The first, "Attraction," is a general constraint on speakers' choice of indexicals to those "that refer directly to the most salient speech act participants and their surroundings." The second, "Verbatim" (like our VR), is specific to quotation and directs speakers to "reproduce referring expressions from the original utterance being reported." These two principles can easily come into conflict, for which Maier appeals to "unquotation" (based on Shan 2011) to resolve the tension. I should add that in his referee's report on this manuscript, Maier 'admits that . . . I have to appeal to a pragmatic/post-semantic computation of a defeasible inference that if Quine used the words "has an anomalous feature" to express a property, that that property is probably the property of having an anomalous feature,' so to his credit he is well aware of the problem we have raised.

16. See De Brabanter 2017, 246, which allows that the inverted commas may be polysemous but also claims that they are not essential.

17. See, however, n. 6 this chapter for Kennedy's proposal according to which the occurrence of the inverted commas or q-marks even in non-reportative contexts would require an underlying verb of saying.

18. I am indebted here to correspondence with Philip De Brabanter who pushed me on this point.

19. This notion should not be confused with the referential transparency of Quine 1960, 1961 or with Maier 2014's notion (both discussed in ch. 2.)

20. C&L 2007, 115–116, 129. See also Saka 2005, 2006; Reimer 1996; Washington 1992. Throughout this paragraph and the next two I am indebted to discussions with Nic Koziolak.

21. Alternatively McConnell's utterance might have been 'Pence's agreement with Schumer was a surprise to both of us,' with 'us' referring to McConnell and Schumer (on the assumption that because Pence need not be contextually present, Schumer would be the default).

22. Such enumerations of authorities to attest the truth of a claim is frequent in both Islamic and Jewish, or rabbinic, literature and surely served as one of the earliest uses of the practice of quotation (albeit without employing quotation marks).

Chapter 9

1. Some claim that the term 'scare quote' was first introduced in Anscombe 1956, 3; see also Geach 1957, 81.

2. See C&L. 2005a, 2007. The first philosopher to write at length on scare quotes was Predelli 2003, 2005, but see also Brandom 1994 whose insightful analysis within

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his inferentialist framework has similarities to my proposal below. De Brabanter 2005a includes under the title 'hybrid quotation' both standard sub-sentential/mixed quotations and scare quotations, and contains papers representing the full variety of semantic and pragmatic approaches to scare quotation.

3. Despite the fact that we draw no principled distinction between sentential and subsentential quotation, we have not found sentential as well as subsentential scare quotations.

4. I emphasize that I am not making a syntactic or semantic claim about an underlying level of syntactic or logical form explicitly containing a term for the subject or verb of Q-saying. Note also that the scare quotational use of 'so-called' should be distinguished from its mentioning use in sentences like 'Giorgione was so-called because of his size.' The scare quoting meaning is closer to that of 'alleged' and probably belongs to the class of privatives.

5. As I said earlier, Geurts and Maier's 2003 and Maier's 2014 "deferential" account of subsentential/mixed quotation (according to which the content of the quoting expression is "what the subject intends to refer to/express with the phrase") works well for these cases.

6. In this respect (as well as in the attitude expressed), scare quoting resembles irony. See Stern 2000, 234–235 and below.

7. On this analysis of metaphor, and of the relation between the metaphorical and literal, see Stern 2000.

8. Sperber and Wilson 1981 analyze irony in terms of mentioning (or what I call 'quoting'), while I am analyzing scare quoting in terms of irony—but both of us take irony to be the expression of the speaker's attitude toward the quoting words rather than the expression or implication of a propositional content.

9. For a similar view of the sarcastic 'like,' see Camp 2012 and Camp and Hawthorne 2008. Camp and Hawthorne deal almost exclusively with the sarcastic 'like' but they do mention the quotational 'like' as in,

(i) She was like, We need to get out of here fast.
(iia) I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she was like, Are you crazy?

The data on quotational 'like' is complicated and deserves further research. Notice that the complement to the quotational 'like' must be in a direct mood (although it need not be declarative), hence, the unacceptable indirect question:

(iib) *I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she was like, whether I was crazy? (Ginzburg and Cooper 2014).

In general the quotational 'like' takes sentential complements such as

(iii) Bob saw the spider and was like, I can't kill it,

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although it sometimes seems to allow an interjection:

(iv) Bob saw the spider and was like, ahh! [in a scared voice] (K. Davidson)

As with direct and mixed quotation, the quotational 'like' does not allow wh-movement:

(va) The little girl was like, [with a beaming smile] I got an A. (K. Davidson)
(vb) *What was the little girl like [with a beaming smile] I got an ___? (K. Davidson)

Unlike the sarcastic 'like' (see Camp and Hawthorne), it also seems to exclude negative polarity items:

(vi) *The little girl was never like, [with a beaming smile] I got any A. (K. Davidson)

Finally, unlike sentential/direct quotation, it seems possible to project the complements of 'like' quotations onto animals and non-language users:

(viia) [During the first encounter between visitors and a newly arrived orphaned walrus at the zoo], I first looked at the walrus, and he was like, What's that? (NY Times 22/01/14)

in contrast to

(viib) *I first looked at the walrus, and he said, "What's that?"

As Camp and Hawthorne suggest, the linguistic objects of the quotational 'like' "reenact a private or public drama," in thought as well as speech. It is tempting to analyze the relation between the quotational 'like' and the sarcastic 'like' along the same lines that I have analyzed the relation between quotation and scare quotation. However, as Camp and Hawthorne show, the sarcastic 'like' has striking syntactic and semantic constraints that are not true of sarcasm in general and it is not evident that those same constraints hold for the quotational 'like'. For example, the sarcastic 'like' always fronts its sentential complement, taking the entire sentence and not a sub-sentential clause as object. The quotational 'like' does front its complement sentence rather than focus on a single sub-sentential constituent, but it occurs in each case in a containing sentence. Possible parallels should be pursued more systematically in further work.

Chapter 10

1. "By imitation, I do not mean imitation in its largest sense, but simply the following of other masters, and the advantage to be drawn from the study of their works" (Reynolds 1774/1842, 90).

2. See also Elgin 1983, 127–134 and Capdevila-Werning 2011 who applies Goodman's account to architectural quotation. For another early attempt to connect linguistic quotation and pictures, see Danto 1974 and, using Danto's account, Carrier

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1979. Recently there have been a number of attempts to apply the methods and tools of linguistic semantics to pictures and in particular representation; see Abusch 2014 and forthcoming; Abusch and Rooth 2017; Greenberg 2013; and Kulvicki 2020. None of these authors, however, discuss quotation.

3. Note that it is the mentioning expression that is nonsense here, not the mentioned expression. Although it is controversial, Goodman allows nonsense and non-linguistic things to be mentioned. See Goodman 1978, 44–45; Bennett 1988, and C&L 2007, 23–24.

4. Note that Ø is a metalinguistic variable whose substituend is a name, e.g., 'Jack' or "'Triangles have three sides.'" The string 'Triangles have three sides' is itself a sentence, not a name.

5. https://useum.org/artwork/Woman-in-Front-of-a-Still-Life-by-Cezanne-Paul-Gauguin.

6. https://www.moma.org/collection/works/78389.

7. http://www.artnet.com/artists/william-delafield-cook/museum-piece-sZYoq-AC77dJBU5zR4O-iQ2.

8. https://www.rct.uk/collection/406983/the-tribuna-of-the-uffizi.

9. http://www.seattleartmuseum.org/exhibitions/morse.

10. See, e.g., "Archduke Leopold Wilhelm in His Gallery in Brussels," https://useum.org/artwork/Archduke-Leopold-Wilhelm-in-his-Gallery-in-Brussels-David-Teniers-the-Younger-1650.

11. These alternatives are not intended to be exhaustive.

12. See, for example, Peter Paul Rubens's "The Presentation of the Portrait of Maria de' Medici to Henri IV," https://www.mutualart.com/Artwork/The-Presentation-of-the-Portrait-of-Mari/F2DCA65BCA5640D1 (cited as an example of a depiction within a depiction by Carrier 1979, 197) in which the king directly gazes at an ornate portrait of the bejeweled Maria enclosed in a frame, held aloft by the gods of love and marriage Hymen and Cupid. If there were no frame, would we see Maria herself floating mid-air as if she were appearing in a vision or would the visual discontinuities suffice to distinguish the depiction on a canvas from the surroundings?

13. https://www.diego-velazquez.org/christ-in-the-house-of-martha-and-mary.jsp.

14. I owe the example to Carrier 1979, 197 who cites it to make a different point. A second example, also cited by Carrier, is Titian's *Venus with a Lute Player*, which depicts a landscape whose pictorial plane is continuous with that of the inside of the depicted room, leaving it ambiguous whether we are looking through a window at an actual landscape or at a realistic painting on the wall of the room.

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15. Another interesting painting in which Velazquez seems to be deliberately cultivating ambiguity is his *Las Meninas* (https://www.museodelprado.es/en/the-collection/art-work/las-meninas/9fdc7800-9ade-48b0-ab8b-edee94ea877f). For the considerable scholarship on this picture by both art historians and philosophers, see Foucault 1971, Searle 1980, Snyder and Cohen 1980, and especially Snyder 1984, to whose analysis I am much indebted. For our present concerns, the point of the picture does not seem to be attributional quotation if only because the image on the easel which Velazquez depicts himself painting is hidden from the sight of the viewer and, among the various paintings depicted on the walls of the studio, the only two that are "discernible imitations—copies of originals—of oil sketches by Peter Paul Rubens" (Snyder 1985, 540), seem to be mentioned rather than quoted. However, scholars debate whether the image of the king and queen reflected in the mirror on the back wall—on which the eye of the viewer is centered—reflects the (unseen) picture on the easel or the actual (but not visible) king and queen who are the subjects being painted. If we think of the frame around the mirror image as a q-mark or inverted commas, and remember that the image in the mirror is Velazquez' *own* depiction, *Las Meninas* can be analyzed as a picture of (or containing) a picture by Velazquez (namely, the image in the mirror) either of the royal couple or of the unseen picture on the easel. This is not use/mention ambiguity but the ambiguity of being either a picture of X or a quoting picture of a quoted picture of X. Either Velazquez is painting himself painting a portrait of the royal couple or he is depicting himself painting a picture whose own representational content can be seen, and known, only by being quoted by another picture.

16. Of course, the emoji in (P) *are* replicas that I have cut and pasted from my font collection. So, imagine each hand-drawn by me, making them truly pictorial and analog. Such depictions for planning exhibitions are legion in the museum world, as John Kulvicki (personal correspondence) has observed; see, for example, Vik Muniz 2002, the catalog for an exhibition he curated at the Manil Collection (Houston), which contains digital photographs of small-scale models of the Manil galleries used to plan exhibitions of pictures from its own collection in those galleries.

17. Depending on one's conception of bare-bones pictorial content, it may be a composite exclusively of shapes and colors. I will continue to speak of people or individuals.

18. Thanks here to Judith Feldmann for pointing out an unclarity in an earlier draft.

19. Cf. Kaplan's 1989 description of "the appearance" of the individual demonstrated by a demonstration as "something like a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject" (526). The arrow points *to* the individual, not *at* him.

20. I am especially indebted to John Kulvicki throughout this section for comments and suggestions.

21. I write that the depicting context in which P_2 exemplifies what it does is either that of P_1 or P_2 to allow for cases where P_1 and P_2 are temporally or culturally different,

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e.g., where P_1 is produced in its painter's context at a contemporary moment and P_2 at a time (in *S*'s context) in the past. At the different times, a depicted object in P_2 could exemplify different *exemplificanda*.

22. For linguistic quotations, we also distinguished those that contain indexicals and other context-dependent expressions from those that do not. Since it is not clear that pictures contain indexical elements, I omit that issue here.

23. https://www.khm.at/en/objectdb/detail/2574/?offset=8&pid=2599&back=576&lv=listpackages-5489.

24. https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/370478.

25. https://www.metmuseum.org/en/art/collection/search/11797. Note that Pratt is depicted at a blank canvas and Benjamin West's picture cannot be seen.

26. The earliest image of this sort that we possess is a thirteenth-century miniature in a Greek psalter preserved at Saint Catherine's Monastery on Mount Sinai.

27. For these images and the history of this trope, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Luke_painting_the_Virgin and the references therein.

28. https://www.artsy.net/collection/andy-warhol-birth-of-venus.

29. https://www.phillips.com/detail/sherrie-levine/NY030111/171.

30. See Singerman 2004 for an interesting analysis of Levine's work as challenging traditional conceptions of copy, reproduction, and painting.

31. On the idea of inseparable parts, see Kulvicki 2020. Insofar as they quote inseparable parts, one might also classify these artworks as sub-pictorial quotations, discussed in the next section.

32. John Kulvicki (personal communication) has proposed that if we think of physical frames as q-marks, then we might think of all pictures in museums in their frames with their title and author tags as pictorial quotations. I would argue, to the contrary, that it is precisely the *non-identity* of the quoted and quoting artists in "After-NN" pictures and the verb of Q-saying-like "After" that makes "After-NN" pictures, unlike museum pictures simpliciter, pictorial quotations. Kulvicki's proposal is strangely reminiscent of Ross 1970's performative hypothesis on which every sentence is associated with an explicit illocutionary act, i.e. is derived from a deep structure containing a performative verb; e.g., declarative sentences like 'Chicago is freezing" are derived from underlying representations like 'I assert/declare/claim Chicago is freezing. I cannot elaborate but I fear that objections similar to those raised against Ross would apply to Kulvicki's proposal.

33. Similar remarks apply to Warhol's famous *Mona Lisa* (https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/489409) and *Thirty Are Better Than One* (https://www.wikiart

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.org/en/andy-warhol/30-are-better-than-one-1964), although they involve more than attributive quotation. See §V in this chapter.

34. On Davidson, see chapter 3 in this volume. Steinberg's essay was written as an introduction to Lipman and Marshall (L&M) 1978, published to accompany an exhibition of the same name *Art about Art* at the Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, NY, in 1978. This is the only book to my knowledge that surveys in depth the general twentieth-century phenomenon in American Art that takes art to be specifically about art. Throughout this chapter, I have benefited greatly from its many examples and insightful analyses. I have been able to locate only one other major exhibition devoted to this phenomenon in contemporary art: a show entitled "Art after Art," at the Renaissance Society at the University of Chicago that was held March 9 to April 16, 1971. See https://renaissancesociety.org/exhibitions/268/art-after-art/.

35. For the Trumbull, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington_(John_Trumbull,_1790); for the van Dyke, https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/anthony-van-dyck-equestrian-portrait-of-charles-i; and for the Titian, https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/adoration-of-the-magi-titian-tiziano-vecellio/1QEPG2ihlgT-mg. For more examples of the practice in the seventeenth-century Spanish draftsman Alonso Caro, see Véliz 1999.

36. Another good example of a quoted abstracted inseparable part is Michelangelo's *Madonna Medici* (Steinberg 1978, 25–27), which I discuss below. For clear examples of quoted separable parts, see Steinberg's analysis (1978, 16–19) of the images assembled in Hans Sebald Beham's fantastic image *The Fountain of Youth*, which 'quote' earlier images drawn by Marcantonio Raimondi and the c1640 anonymous etching of Piazza Barbarini, which, in turn, 'quotes' separable parts from various etchings by Jacques Callot.

37. For Pacheco's painting, see https://www.google.com/search?q=Francisco+Pacheco+St.+Sebastian+Nursed+by+St.+Irene&client=firefox-b-d&sxsrf=ALeKk02mZSNTecULK3CBHZ371ghp2Y3ieg:1588082163756&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=EiUub2ONaeI3JM%253A%252CaLI7iUk9BnkdfM%252C_&vet=1&usg=AI4_-kQ1rXig-tozuSyUS5eteEv9y2-vzA&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiaj_qJo4vpAhUSqXEKHW4kCRoQ9QEwBXoECAkQCw#imgrc=EiUub2ONaeI3JM:. For Van Achen's, see https://www.google.com/search?q=Hans+von+Aachen+The+Martyrdom+of+St.+Sebastian&tbm=isch&client=firefox-bd&hl=en&ved=2ahUKEwj9lt7Bo4vpAhUM4oUKHZ_kCvkQBXoECAEQJw&biw=1054&bih=524#imgrc=-0i07pvUa5O-4M. The quotation is from Pacheco's *Arte de la Pintura* in which he describes in detail his own painting of Saint Sebastian. See Steinberg 1978, 22–23, who speculates that the thief in fact was not Pacheco, but his more sophisticated and bold apprentice Velazquez.

38. The one neutral phrase Steinberg allows himself is "the reappearance of old motifs in new art" (1978, 25).

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39. See Reynolds 1774/1842: Speaking of 'imitation' specifically as "the borrowing of a particular figure" and "transplanting it into your own work," he writes that when the source is ancient, "it is generally allowed that no man need be ashamed of copying the ancients: their works are considered as a magazine of common property, always open to the public, hence, every man has a right to take what materials he pleases; and if he has the art of using them, they are supposed to become to all intents and purposes his own property" (105).

40. I do not know where and when subsentential linguistic quotation originated in Western texts. Thus it is possible that artists were quoting picture-parts before author-speakers were quoting sub-sentential linguistic phrases. In medieval Hebrew rabbinic writing, there is an Andalusian "mosaic style" of composition in which sub-sentential phrases from Scripture are assembled like small stone or glass pieces to fit together with prose pieces of the author's own invention in grammatically well-formed complex phrases. A master of this kind of mosaic writing was the important Spanish rabbi Nahmanides (Moses b. Nahman, 1194–1270). This is not quotation and there are no marks or citations. The medieval philosopher-grammarian Profyat Duran claims that this "melodious" style of writing is unique to Hebrew literature (Duran 1865, 23). On Nahmanides and the mosaic style in medieval Jewish *kaballah*, see Idel 1998, 18–32 and Marmur 2014, 11. On the broader Hebrew linguistic or rhetorical phenomenon, see Septimus 1983, 26, n. 50, and references therein. I am indebted to Bernard Septimus (personal communication) for discussion of this question.

41. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Michelangelo,_madonna_medici.jpg.

42. For an image of the Hellenistic Muse, now in the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford, see Steinberg 1971, 147, figure 6.

43. It is undecided whether the painting on the wall is an actual painting Vermeer is re-presenting and thereby quoting or whether it is Vermeer's own painting of the Last Judgment. In the latter case, it may be more correct to say that the painting depicts (but does not quote) a painting of the Last Judgment (among other things).

44. In contrast, pictures (tokens) can be forgeries (i.e., falsely claimed to be autographic products of a particular artist), unlike verbal or linguistic tokens of one type that are allographic.

45. https://www.moma.org/collection/works/117141. See also the Israeli artist Adi Nes' *The Last Supper* www.imj.org.il/en/exhibitions/behold-man, which substitutes Israeli soldiers for the Apostles.

46. http://www.artnet.com/artists/mel-ramos/plenti-grand-odalisque-aJyApCpo2OebxbaVmBITadw2.

47. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grande_Odalisque.

48. See, e g., http://www.artnet.com/artists/john-clem-clarke/judgment-of-paris-ii-cac0UXz8LDfKiHZ7ZfwBOg2.

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49. https://www.artimage.org.uk/21405/roy-lichtenstein/rouen-cathedral--set-4—1969.

50. See also Malcomb Morley's photorealist re-presentation of Vermeer's *Vermeer-Portrait of the Artist in His Studio* and discussion in Lipman and Marshall 1978, 80.

51. For examples of re-presentations based on reproductions, see Lipman and Marshall 1978 on Audrey Flack's *Leonardo's Lady* based on da Vinci's *La Belle Ferroniere* (6); Robert Rauschenberg's *Persimmon* based on Rubens's *The Toilet of Venus* (7); Morley's *Vermeer* (see n. 50); and Roy Lichtenstein's *Femme dans un fauteuil* based on Picasso's *Woman with Cat* (114).

52. Especially interesting cases are the re-photographs, or photographs of photographs, of the Marlboro Man (originally photographed by Norm Clasen) by Richard Prince in his "Untitled Cowboy" series and Sherrie Levine's re-photographs of Walker Evans' depression era photographs in her "After Walker Evans" series. As we noted earlier in connection with Goodman, digital photographs both allow replication and duplication (from one negative), and both Prince's and Levine's re-photographs were made from reproductions of the originals, thus challenging traditional conceptions of authorship and originality. Thanks to Stephanie Brooks for discussion of these cases.

53. For the Duchamp, see https://www.imj.org.il/en/collections/199796; for Halsman's *Mona Dalí*, see https://www.imj.org.il/en/collections/220221.

54. https://www.fotolibra.com/gallery/1314024/robert-colescott-natural-rhythm/. Viewers tend to assume that the wife in Van Eyck's original is pregnant, although scholars nowadays believe that her loose top was simply fashionable dress at the time and, indeed, that the picture depicts an engagement rather than a marriage covenant. In Colescott's re-presentation, my own impression is that we interpret the woman as pregnant and very likely they are not yet wed.

55. https://smarthistory.org/kehinde-wiley-napoleon-leading-the-army-over-the-alps/. Thanks to John Kulvicki for bringing Kehinde Wiley's paintings to my attention.

56. http://www.artinasia.com/img/event/25260-a5592c880ab1d713468dcd88fe5640b3.jpg.

57. A bit differently, Colescott's *Natural Rhythm* and Rivers's *I Like Olympia in Black Face* mocks, makes fun of, and rejects the racial and gender infrastructure that underlies the Western art tradition.

58. See http://readingandart.blogspot.com/2012/10/nick-cudworth.html.

59. Many (but not all) of these paintings can be seen on Cudworth's gallery page, https://www.nickcudworth.co.uk/.

60. Scholars now identify Vermeer's picture on the wall as Pieter Jansz's *A Wooded Landscape with a Gentleman and Dogs in the Foreground*, but why Vermeer chose it we do not know.

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61. Another theme in a number of Cudworth's pictures is the creation of illusions, again sometimes playfully. But this motif does not occur in the Vermeer series.

62. Note that the dark green of the foreground wall complements the slightly lighter shade of green of the wall depicted *in* the painting and the slightly lighter green of the wall in the background scene. There is a deliberate attempt to blend the three.

63. Cudworth 2003, 22, says that he calculated the area of the map "to accord with the proportions of The Golden Section," or golden ratio. In the original the height of the woman is only 35 percent of the whole picture; in Cudworth's re-presentation, it is 61 percent. Thanks to Stephanie Brooks for insights into *Reading I* and *II*.

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Index

Allusion, 103–104
Amharic (language), 70
Analog vs. digital, 56–59. *See also* Goodman, N; Haugeland, J.
Art about art, 163, 165

Caconomasia, 157
Cappelen, H., and E. Lepore (C&L), 2–3, 35–36, 49, 64–65, 104, 134–136, 138, 141
Castañeda, H.-N., 73
Character vs. content, 66–70, 72–73, 81–82, 85, 87–89, 107, 112, 114–118, 122, 128–129, 137. *See also* Kaplan, D.
Church, A., 24
Cicero, 8
Circassian (language), 113
Codex Bezae, 7
Cudworth, N., 168–174

Davidson, D., 30, 39, 49
  his "challenge," 44, 47, 63, 88
  criticisms of proper name theory, 29, 39–40, 90
  demonstrative theory of the inverted commas, 25, 39, 109, 111, 126
  on mixed (double-duty) quotation, 40–45, 47, 101, 155
  on quotations as pictures, 2, 49, 96
Diogenes Laertes, 8
Direct quotation, 41–44
Direct reference (DR) thesis, 67–71, 75
Duchamp, M., 153, 164, 166, 168
Duhem, P., 2

Egalitarian revolution in quotation, 17–18, 140
Ewe (language), 70
Exemplificational content, 77–83. *See also* Goodman, N., on representation vs. exemplification; Types of analog representations, 86–88
  as contribution to the semantic value of quotation-sentences, 88–91

Flavius Philostratus, 11
Free indirect discourse, 107
Frege, G., 21–24, 30–31, 73, 90, 103–105, 147
  on disambiguating function of inverted commas, 21–22, 147
  on indexical conversion across contexts, 73–74, 114
  on mentioning, 21–24

Geach, P. T., 25
Geurts, B., 37, 45–47. *See also* Maier, E.
Gomez-Torrente, M., 27, 146
Goodman, N., 3, 51. *See also* Haugeland, J.; Kulvicki, J.; Similarity/resemblance, critique of
  on analog vs. digital, 56–58

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Goodman, N., (cont.)
on linguistic quotation/mentioning, 143–147
on pictorial quotation/mentioning, 147–151
on representation vs. exemplification, 53–56

Haugeland, J., 68
on analog vs. digital distinction, 57–59
on bare-bones vs. fleshed-out representational content, 60–61
Hollander, J., 157
Homer, 14, 140

Inverted commas, 1, 5–6
descended from diple and S-shaped flourish, 7–8, 10–13, 17–18, 31, 138, 140, 159
homonymity of, 31, 38, 122–126, 132, 138, 140–141,154, 156
iterability and transparency of, 3, 119, 125–129
movement from margin to inside text, 11–13
as part of verb of q-saying, 111–115, 122–125
as punctuation to guide oral recitation, pausing, and intonation, 11, 13, 19
and reading habits, 10–11
as the result of the printing press, 11–13
as signs of ownership and copyright, 16–17
as successor to indentation, 6–7, 12–13
use to mark natural dialogue in realistic novels, 17–18
use in proof theory and phonetics, 19
use to resolve use-mention ambiguity, 21–23, 28, 30
Isidore of Seville, 8

Kaplan, D., 27, 32, 65–70, 78, 114. *See also* Direct reference (DR) thesis
on character vs. content, 65–69, 81–82
on indexicals between inverted commas, 69–71
on monsters, 32, 68–69
Kharbadian (language), 113
Kulvicki, J., 94, 125, 150–151, 155
on inseparable vs. separable pictorial parts, 138–140, 155
on pictorial transparency, 59–61, 125, 150
on syntactically relevant properties (SRPs), 60

Lectio divina, 10
Levine, S., 153–154
Lipman, J., and R. Marshall, 163–165
Locke, J., 14–15
Logophoricity, 5

Maier, E., 37, 45–46, 81–82. *See also* Geurts, B.
free relative/deferred account of quotation, 45–47, 120–121
on nonconstituent quotation, 94–96
on opacity and verbatim requirement, 33–34
on wh-movement out of quotations, 96–97
Mention(ing) (pure quotation), 18–29, 94, 102, 106, 109, 111, 126, 143–147. *See also* Church, A.; Davidson, D.; Frege, G.; Gomez-Torrente, M.; Goodman, N.; Homonymity; Quine, W. V. O.
as autonymous self-reference, 24
context-dependency of, 27
in free relative/deferential theory of sub-sentential quotation, 45–47
and Goodman, 145–146
in pictures, 147–151

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vs. quotation, 1, 21–22, 31–38, 79, 86, 90–91, 108, 111, 123–124
vs. use, 15–17, 29, 166
Mention-expressions, 25
iterabilitiy of, 125
lexical vs. syntactic complexity of, 25–30
m(ention)-marks, 25
and opacity, 29, 33, 35, 40
proper name theory of, 24–30, 39, 90–91
vs. Recanati's closed quotations, 98
Michaelangelo, 160–161, 164
Mixed quotation, 41–44
Mona Lisa (Leonardo da Vinci), 148, 152–153, 164, 166

Notae, 6–8, 10–13, 139

Pacheco, F., 156
Parkes, M. B., 7, 13, 19
Pictorial quotation, 143–174. *See also* Cudworth, N.; Goodman, N; Lipman, J., and R. Marshall; Steinberg, L.
"After NN" pictures, 153–155
as attribution, 151–153
depiction of pictorial quotation, 168–174
frames and easels as inverted comma surrogates, 147
and impact of reproduction technology, 165
St. Luke painting the Madonna with child paintings, 153, 162
vs. pictorial mention, 147–151
subpictorial quotations, 155–162
Plato(nism), 8, 14, 78, 140
Potts, C.
on context-dependence of quotation, 36
on intonation patterns of quotations, 19, 79–80, 90
on quoting linguistic objects, 54, 90
on quoting pronunciation, 31, 37, 69
on two-dimensional analysis of quotation, 44, 47
Pure quotation. *See* Mention

Quasi-indexicals (e.g., he*), 73, 75, 89, 127
Quine, W. V. O., 39, 90, 98
on opacity of mention-expressions, 33–35, 76, 94
as 'philtosopher,' 101
proper name theory of mention-expressions, 24–30
on quotation-picture analogy, 2, 49, 52
Quotation(s). *See also* Inverted commas; Mention(ing); Mention-expression; Pictorial quotation; Scare quotation; Verbatim requirement (VR)
classical (pre-18th c.) vs. modern conceptions of, 13–18, 139–140
compositional semantics of, 89–91, 113–121
containing indexicals, 5–6, 32, 41, 43, 64–65, 69–75, 81, 114–115, 118–121
context-sensitivity of, 36–38
cross-linguistic quotation, 32–33, 83–86
distinguished from mentioning, 1–2, 5, 122–124
distorted by conflation with mentioning, 2
dual reference of, 40–47, 63, 88–89
entails (homophonic) indirect discourse sentence, 28, 35, 44, 71–73, 75–76, 88, 104, 112
of nonconstituent phrases, 1, 94–95
of nonlinguistic quotables, 1, 104–106
opacity of, 35–36, 75–76
'quotation-expression' defined, 19
'quotation-sentence' defined, 19
quot*ing* vs. quot*ed* word tokens/types, 19

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Quotation(s) (cont.)
representational content of, 64–65, 71–76
of Scripture, 6–7
semantic differences from mention-expressions, 31–38, 90–91, 125–126
sentential (direct) vs. sub-sentential (mixed) quotation, 41–44
of thoughts, 106–107
verb(s) of quotational (Q)-saying, 111–115
unquotation, 96–97
and wh-movement, 34, 36, 96–97
'Yes' and 'No' quotation, 93–94
Recanati, F., 3
on context-shifting monsters, 102, 136
on open vs. closed quotations, 98–103
on 'philtosopher,' 136–137
on quotation-picture analogy,3, 49–50, 98
Representational content, 63–76. *See also* Character vs. content; Direct reference (DR) thesis
bare-bones vs. fleshed-out, 61, 68, 71–75, 77, 80–81, 84, 87–88, 112, 114, 116–118, 126, 128–129, 133–134, 152
constraints on ("Never" and "Insulation"), 74
Reynolds, J., 143
Richard, M., 25, 36, 119–120, 127
Russell, B., 21, 113

Scare quotation (in words), 4, 101, 131–142
analogy to metaphor-literal relation, 138–139
as device to express speaker's attitude to subject's use of words, 140–142
as explained by free relative/deferred analysis, 47, 121
and irony, 141–142
nonliteral use of inverted commas, 139–142
in pictures, 152, 167–168, 170
representational content of, 133–138
Schurer, M., 11
Shakespeare, W., 15–17, 160
Similarity/resemblance, critique of, 49–52
Slave (language), 70
Snow, E., 161
Steinberg, L., 155–160, 162–163
Steinberg, S., 156, 163
Steinova, E., 80

Tarski, A., 2, 25–29, 90, 98
Transparency, 53, 95
Kulvicki's sense of, 59–61
Maier's sense of, 33, 94
of pictorial systems, 125–129
Quine's sense of, 28
Trumbull, J., 155
Tversky, A., 51, 55
Types, critique of, 78–79

Ugly Duckling objection, 50, 51

van Eyck, J., 166
Velazquez, D., 148, 164
Verbatim requirement (VR), 5, 16, 18, 20, 33–35, 78–79, 82–83, 152, 154, 162
Vermeer, J., 147, 153, 161, 164, 168–174
Virgil, 8

Warhol, A., 153–154, 164, 166
Watanabe, S., 50
Wiley, K., 166

Zazaki (language), 70

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